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SUMMARY
The thesis aims to illuminate the influence of the business lobby on British aid 
policy by examining the arguments of that lobby, especially in respect of demands 
for tied aid, and assessing the extent to which these have been reflected in trends in 
the UK aid budget from 1978 to 1989. The central point is that the benefits to 
business are determined largely by the impact of aid, the extent to which British 
exports are aid-financed and the distribution of such exports across industries and 
firms. Much of the thesis concentrates on estimating the impact of different types of 
aid, which are shown to be significant for particular industries and firms but not 
necessarily for the economy. In terms of exports supported, the Aid and Trade 
Provision generates the greatest benefit to the UK, followed by contributions to 
multilateral aid agencies. Bilateral aid, even if tied, generates a relatively lower 
benefit. Business lobbies often emphasise the employment potential of tied aid but 
we argue this is unlikely to be significant.
The commercial benefits from aid, which can be related directly to the business 
lobby, provide only a first approximation of the effects of aid. The development 
arguments for aid condemn tying as being against the interests of aid recipients; it 
distorts prices and resource allocation, limits choice and thereby fails to maximise 
global economic welfare. The thesis argues that if one looks behind the commercial 
benefits of tied aid to try and identify the net economic effects, on the dofior and 
globally, the case for tying is very weak. However, tying is prevalent amongst all 
major donors, which we explain as due to internal political pressures, as 
demonstrated in the UK case, and a desire to match the practices of other donors. 
We note that the real value of British aid fell considerably while Mrs. Thatcher was 
Prime Minister, while tied bilateral aid bore the brunt of the cuts, large exporters 
were somewhat protected due to the increased availability of Aid and Trade 
Provision funds to them. The major influence on the UK aid budget over 1978-89 
was the Conservative government's commitment to cut public expenditure; within 
this constraint, the influential large companies derived commercial benefits.
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NOTATION
1. General Notation
Some standard notation is adopted throughout: 
scalars italic (normally lower case),
vectors bold lower case,
matrices BOLD upper case (diagonal matrices are in ITALICS),
parameters are generally in letters of the greek alphabet and follow the above
conventions for scalars, vectors and matrices.
The list of symbols below (in scalar form where it exists) gives the meaning 
normally attached throughout the thesis. Since the number of letters in the alphabet 
is less than the possible uses, some letters are occassionally used with a meaning 
other than that given. We endevour to keep this to a minimum, they are always 
emphasised at the time and the usage is obvious by the context. Duplication is most 
frequently necessary in the case of subscripts and is normally only employed for a 
single equation, or group of equations, which are presented on one occassion only.
2. Symbols (Roman)
a ... value of aid, for different types of aid ( a, f t  fJ ., t).
c ... consumption (consumer demand for industry output).
d ... final demands (for industry output).
e ... exports.
/  ... primary inputs.
g ... government spending (demand for industry output).
h ... household income, labour inputs.
H  ... Household income multiplier (calculated from 10 data).
i j  ... subscripts; generally refer to the Ith element of a row vector or Ith row of
a matrix; y* element of a column vector or f*1 column of a matrix.
I  ... Always and uniquely the Identity Matrix.
k ... contract value of ATP awards.
I ... generally an interdependence coefficient - an element (/zy) of the Leontief
inverse; occassionally a time-lag when used as a subscript
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L ... Always and uniquely the Leontief Inverse.
. m ... imports (usually as a primary input).
n ... generally the number of elements in a vector, summation, etc.
N ... the Aggregation Matrix.
O ... Output multiplier (calculated from 10 data) for each industry.
q ... industry output: qi the output of the Ith industry; qj the total value of
inputs to the 7th industry; qa is industry output required for xQ.
Q ... aggregate output multipliers (derived from impact analysis), per unit aid
(2a)» aided export (Qxa) and for impact on industry (Q-) 
q ... vector of industry outputs.
r ... Cournot reaction function, r^xp
t ... generally taxes (on intermediate inputs); designates time if used as a
subscript, except for </>t = tax input coefficient, 
v ... investment (demand for industry output).
w ... industry employment; wa is employment due to xa.
W  ... aggregate employment multipliers, per unit aid (Wa) and aided exports
(Wxa)', W ^  = industry employment per £lm  of output. 
x  ... aided exports: the value of industry exports directly due to aid, designated
xa for each type of aid; xc is Cournot output quantity, 
z ... inter-industry trade: z-  the output of industry i that is purchased as an
input by industry j.
Z ... the 10 matrix of inter-industry transactions.
3. Symbols (Greek) 
a  ... ATP, normally used as a subscript.
P ... bilateral aid, normally used as a subscript.
X ... degree of competitiveness (for MAA contracts).
A ... change in a variable
3 ... partial derivative
(/> ... input coefficients, with relevant subscript (m, t, h, it).
O ... matrix of input coefficients.
y  ... proportion of potential xa accruing in a given year.
T] ... labour share in total industry inputs.
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X ... degree of leakage from tied aid; share of local costs.
fi ... multilateral aid, normally used as a subscript.
k  ... profits (as a component of primary inputs).
0 ... technical 10 coefficients (z^qp.
0  ... matrix of technical coefficients.
p  ... export ratio (xja), with subscripts for type of aid (a, p, fi, t).
<7 ... level of export subsidy (implicit in tied aid or mixed credit).
£  ... summation sign.
T ... degree of tying of aid; tied bilateral aid, normally used as a subscript.
Q  ... Employment multiplier (calculated from 10 data).
4. Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
ATP Aid and Trade Provision
BOB British Consultants Bureau
BOTB British Overseas Trade Board
BRE British Rail Engineering
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CIA Chemical Industries Association
CSO Central Statistics Office
DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD); generally used as an
acronym for the developed, donor, economies 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EC European Community
ECGD Export Credit Guarantee Department
EDF European Development Fund
EGCI Export Group for the Constructional Industries
EMENA Europe, Middle East and North Africa
FAC Foreign Affairs Cimmittee (of the Houses of Parliament)
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GEC General Electric Company
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GIO Aggregate (28 Industry) 10 Matrix
GNP Gross National Product (National Income)
GOC 'government opportunity cost1
HSPE Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering Ltd.
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IGBA Independent Group on British Aid
IMF International Monetary Fund
10 Input-Output
JBE John Brown Engineering Ltd.
LA&C Latin America and Canibean
LDC Less Developed Country
MAA Multilateral Aid Agency
NGO Non-governmental organisation (generally aid agency)
NEI Northern Engineering Industries
QDA Overseas Development Administration
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPB Overseas Projects Board
R&D Research and Development
SALs Structural Adjustment Loans
SCAT Sub-committee on Aid and Trade
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
STP Strategic Trade Policy
TBA Tied Bilateral Aid
TCA Technical Cooperation and Assistance
UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
YOC 'investment opportunity cost'
WPAT Working Party on Aid and Trade
Abbreviations for industries in the 10 model are in Table 5.1; see also Table 8.1.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The election of a Conservative majority with Mrs. Thatcher as Prime Minister in 
1979 heralded many changes in British society and Government policy. The 
dominant economic ideology became that of laisser faire; free markets in which 
business can be competitive, efficient and profitable and, in principle, minimal State 
intervention. It is not our intention to consider whether, in general, the 
Conservatives succeeded in imposing this ideology and whether the predicted 
benefits did indeed accrue. Rather, we focus on a single area of policy and ask why 
did the British aid budget acquire the form it had over the decade 1979-89. Thus we 
need to know how aid policy was determined and what changes, in the process and 
outcomes, occured over that decade.
Most people would equate aid with help, and are likely to accept the strict definition 
of official development assistance (aid) as "flows to developing countries and 
multilateral institutions ... provided by official agencies ... administered with the 
promotion o f the economic development and welfare o f developing countries as its 
main objective, and it is concessional in character." (Development Assistance 
Committee, DAC, 1985:171, original emphasis). We thus confine attention to 
official aid, that granted by the governments of donor (DAC) economies, and paid 
for by taxpayers. The aid activities of private charities, such as Oxfam or Trocaire, 
or of non-governmental organisations in less developed countries (LDCs) are not 
considered since they comprise only a minor part of government policy (although
they may influence and be influenced by it).
/
Those who contribute to private charities are giving money without any expectation 
of a material return, but this is less clearly so in the case of public charity. 
Taxpayers may believe that genuine aid "should be a unilateral flow of resources 
given without expecting a quid pro quo; its only objective should be the promotion 
of development in recipient countries." (Beriage and Vanderiee, 1978:351). This 
provides one explanation for aid: taxpayers desire some degree of international 
redistribution so that, in a median voter model of public choice, aid will be a 
component of public expenditure. The objective of promoting development can be
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defined, and achieved, in different ways which have implications for the form of 
aid. There is first the development case, whereby the purpose of aid is seen to be 
the alleviation of poverty and increasing the welfare of the poorest people in the 
poorest countries. Alternatively, there are what we will term economic cases for aid 
which essentially see the purpose of aid as being to assist economic growth in 
LDCs. These distinctions will be made clear early in the thesis.
Aid is one element in public policy and the financial costs are borne out of public 
expenditure. It follows that decisions about aid are taken within a political process 
and are affected by the influence of, and dialogue between, the participants in that 
process. While a median voter approach may explain why aid will be an element of 
public expenditure, we need to consider the activities of interest groups and the 
motivations of bureaux and the Government if we wish to explain the details of aid 
policy. Those who derive the greatest benefit from aid will try hardest to influence 
government policy; while the median voter may feel good about giving aid, this will 
not. be as powerful an incentive (for lobbying the Government) as the substantial 
business and profits that companies can derive from contracts in LDCs. Although 
emergency aid, such as disaster relief, tends to receive the highest profile in the 
media (which may satisfy the taxpayer) it is a small fraction of total aid. The greater 
part of aid, especially that directed by economic rather than purely development 
arguments, requires the recipient LDC to import goods, and often personnel, which 
can be a major source of business for some exporters in donor economies.
The business lobby or at least a subset of it, those who tty to influence the form of 
British aid so that it meets the commercial interests of exporters, have a vested 
interest in the aid budget. While the public choice motive for aid may well be the 
promotion of development and the alleviation of poverty in LDCs, the business 
lobby stands to gain if the products financed out of British aid are provided by UK 
exporters. The ability to generate exports will depend on the form aid takes, for 
example whether it finances a capital goods project or the provision of primary 
health care in rural areas, which is discussed in Section 1.1 below. In general, 
however, business interests will favour and lobby for tied aid, ie. aid that is 
granted subject to the condition that all or most of the money is used to purchase
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goods, required for the project, from donor exporters. A central argument of this 
thesis is that there is strong pressure for tying from business lobbies and certain 
government departments, but that tying in general is against the interests of 
recipients and is not necessarily in the economic interests of donors. Much of this 
thesis concerns a critique of the case for tied aid by examining the arguments and 
evaluating them, in terms of the donor benefits, against evidence for the UK.
Much of the motivation for this thesis, and some of the raw data for the analysis, 
came from May, Schumacher and Malek (1989), Overseas Aid: The Impact on 
Britain and Germany. This was an extensive quantitative study of the impact o f 
aid on the UK, ie. the commercial value to the economy of the exports of UK 
firms that were attributable to aid finance, over the period 1978 to 1984, and a 
comparison with the experience of Germany. The approach adopted to measure the 
impact of aid on a donor economy was to estimate the value of exports attributable 
to aid, hereafter termed aided exports, and quantify the value of the economic 
activity required to produce these, in terms of output, employment, and trade. May, 
Schumacher and Malek (1989) provide a wealth of data on the value of the impact, 
on aggregate and in terms of the distribution of benefits across industries and 
regions, in addition to microdata from a survey of firms.
While the quantitative analysis is extensive, including an attempt to evaluate if the 
geographical allocation of British aid has a significant effect on the pattern of UK 
exports, May, Schumacher and Malek (1989) fail to provide a clear underlying 
theoretical framework within which to assess why the impact of aid is worth 
measuring and, in particular, how it relates to British aid policy. The basic objective 
of this thesis is to provide such a theoretical framework and to re-estimate and 
reinterpret the impact of British aid in the light of it. There are two strands to the 
framework. First, we demonstrate that the importance of impact derives from the 
arguments for tied aid, whereby a donor is seen as justified in conducting its aid 
policy so as to ensure an economic benefit for itself. This connection is most 
evident in the way in which the business lobby uses measures of impact to support 
claims for tied aid. Second, we examine the evolution of British aid policy over the 
decade from 1978 to 1989, paying particular attention to the trends in tied aid and to
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the ways in which business lobbies have tried to influence policy, with an 
evaluation of the extent to which they have been successful. While concerned with 
many aspects of policy we will tend to confine attention to the aid budget.
We will argue that measures of impact have been presented by some, notably 
business lobbies, as representing the economic benefits a donor can derive from 
tied aid. We hope to demonstrate both that impact is not a measure of economic 
benefit and that evidence on impact does not, in itself, support arguments for tied 
aid. The approach adopted is to present the arguments fo r  tied aid and then to 
evaluate these in terms of the impact of different types of aid. The underlying 
argument is that tied aid can only be justified on economic grounds if it confers a 
larger net global welfare gain than an equivalent amount of untied aid. Impact is 
only a first, gross, approximation of the economic benefits to donors; even if one 
did find that tied aid had a greater impact than untied aid, one could not conclude 
that tying was of greater net benefit even to the donor.
The remainder of this chapter outlines some general limits on the scope of the 
analysis and the structure of the thesis. Section 1.1 reviews the most important of 
the forms that aid can take, indicating which of these will receive attention in 
subsequent chapters and paying particular attention to the potential for a type of aid 
to generate UK exports. Section 1.2 outlines the issues involved in estimating the 
net impact of aid on a donor economy. Impact measures the gross effects of aid, the 
value of aided exports and the economic activity generated by them. Since these 
gross gains accrue to firms and industries we term them commercial benefits. To 
arrive at net benefits to the economy one must account for the effects on export 
trends, eg. does tied aid displace commercial exports, and the opportunity costs, 
could money spent on aid have yielded a higher benefit if allocated to some other 
public expenditure heading. The net economic benefits should account for the 
wider effects of tying on trade and for the facts that aid is only one of alternative 
forms of government expenditure and, when tied, is effectively a transfer from 
taxpayers to exporters. Finally, since aid is intended to promote growth and/or 
development, one would also wish to consider the net welfare effect on recipients 
and donors. We concentrate on gross commercial impact, as being what we
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measure directly, but will address the other issues. The structure of the thesis and 
an outline of each chapter is provided in Section 1.3 which concludes this chapter.
1.1. The Different Form s of Aid
Aid can take different forms and a number of distinctions can be made. The 
princip^ distinction, for our purposes, is between tied and untied aid. Tying means 
that aid is granted subject to the condition that the recipient spend some or all of the 
funds on goods produced by donor companies, and/or that donor personnel 
(consultants, trainers, managers, etc.) are employed to implement or assist in the 
implementation of the aid disbursement It is the tying of aid to goods that is of 
greatest importance, in terms of generating a return to the donor and in terms of our 
thesis. While tying to personnel can generate a return to the donor, this is of less 
significance in commercial terms. Often, the personnel may be the aid, for example 
the provision of nurses or teachers, in which case the connotation of tying is 
inappropriate. The point is that tying de facto limits the recipient's choice.
A second important distinction is whether the donor is a government or an aid 
agency and, in addition, what type of agency, as this will tend to determine the 
nature of the conditions, such as tying, attached to the aid. Our principle concern 
being with tied UK aid, we concentrate attention on bilateral, or government 
(donor) to government (recipient) aid, which accounted for almost 75 per cent of 
official development assistance in 1985 (Todaro, 1989:482). We will also consider 
official flows from Multilateral Aid Agencies (MAAs) such as the World Bank, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Community's 
Development Fund (EDF) and regional development banks (see Chapters 4 and 7).
A further distinction is that between project and programme aid, the former being 
allocated for a particular purpose or to a particular sector (eg. to build a power 
station or to finance electrification schemes) while the latter is given for more 
general uses, such as balance of payments support. By its nature, because a specific 
product or set of products is defined by the use, project aid is the best suited to 
tying and, generally, it is on this type of aid that we focus. However, programme 
aid is very important and the distinction between the two is not always clear, if 
recipients have discretion over use, then programme aid may be allocated to sectors,
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or if the recipient can substitute resources then programme aid may release funds to 
invest in projects. Also, donors can impose conditions that effectively tie part of 
programme aid, eg. by insisting that balance of payments support is used to defray 
export credits of the donor.
There are a number of types of aid to which little attention is paid. Foremost of 
these is technical co-operation and assistance (TCA) whereby the donor provides 
expertise and training with the basic aim of education, ie. investment in recipient’s 
human capital. While such aid may confer commercial benefits (donor labour is 
employed and the recipient may acquire a taste for donor technology) it is frequently 
regarded as quality aid which is relatively good in promoting the development 
interests of recipients. However, it is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 
TCA and, while the record is promising in terms of projects meeting their 
objectives, many projects are failures (see Cassen, 1986, Chapter 6). Another type 
of aid which we omit is food aid; while the origin of food aid was to disburse 
agricultural surpluses, so that it was of commercial benefit to donors, the impact on 
donors is inextricably linked with agricultural policy and the net economic effect is 
often negative (see Wyse, 1983:12-14, for a discussion in respect of Canada). 
Furthermore, while the objective of feeding the hungry is appealing, the net effect 
may be counter-productive depending on the effects on incentives and suppply 
response of LDC farmers (see Singer et al, 1987). Finally, we do not consider 
emergency aid of any form, both because it is unpredictable and, more importantly, 
because it is not a clear part of the policy-making process.
The Aid and Trade Provision, introduced in 1978 and expanded in the 1980s, is a 
peculiar form of aid, being a mixed credit. We term it peculiar because mixed 
credits are granted to commercial exporters seeking contracts in LDCs, and the aid 
element is effectively an export subsidy to the company (although given to the LDC 
government) worth a certain percentage of the contract value. Being so overtly 
commercial and tied, this form of aid receives particular attention. It is especially 
relevant because it is a direct support for exports with high commercial benefits 
relative to the initial aid expenditure; the objective of using aid to maximise the net 
economic benefit to the donor should most effectively be met through mixed
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credits. If it can be shown that mixed credits may not increase the net welfare of 
donors, and are even less likely to increase net global welfare, it follows that the 
economic arguments for tying are very weak. We hope to show that the case for 
tying is indeed weak, and advocate a more development oriented aid policy.
1.2. Donor Benefits from Aid
There are four elements of donor economic benefit. First is the direct benefit, the 
value of aided exports. Second, there are indirect benefits due to the economic 
activity required to meet these exports. These two combined constitute the gross 
commercial benefit. Third is whether aid is trade creating; do aided exports merely 
substitute for exports that would otherwise have been won or are they additional 
and do they in turn generate future exports not supported by aid. This will 
determine the net commercial benefit, a first approximation of the net economic 
benefit. Fourth, whether tied aid constitutes a net economic gain to the donor 
depends on whether there are displacement costs, would the resources devoted to 
aided exports have otherwise been productively used, or opportunity costs, could 
the resources devoted to aid have been more productive in an alternative use. The 
last element is difficult to deal with in any detail and any rigorous analysis would 
require heroic assumptions to permit inferences regarding the net welfare effect. To 
evaluate the effect on global welfare, one must consider the effects on recipients; we 
address this point but admit that it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
It is the aided exports, not aid itself, which impact on the donor economy; the 
fundamental determinant of impact is the ratio of aided exports to initial aid (termed 
here the export ratio). This direct benefit differs between types of aid. The most 
important distinction is between bilateral aid, some portion of which can be tied, 
and multilateral aid, which is generally perceived as untied. Fully tied aid will 
prima facie generate exports of equivalent value but tends to include an allowance 
for local costs so that the export ratio is less than one. In contrast, multilateral 
agencies tend to operate a juste retour principle whereby donors can expect to 
receive agency contracts in rough proportion to their contributions. Although major 
contributors tend to receive a lower share of contracts than their share of 
contributions, the export ratio can exceed one because the agencies boost their
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funds by borrowing on international capital markets, hence contracts exceed 
contributions. This leads to the apparently counter-intuitive result that multilateral 
aid is more effective at generating exports than tied bilateral aid, ie. that it has a 
greater direct benefit. In the case of bilateral aid, the direct benefits will generally be 
greater the higher the level of tying (since the export ratio is higher).
Aided exports will generate indirect benefits through increased economic activity. 
Exports represent the output of, and revenue to, a particular industry. In order to 
produce these goods, that industry must purchase inputs from other industries, the 
value of which should also be included as part of the impact To meet the increased 
demand for their products or services, the other industries will also demand inputs, 
and so on. The value of this output multiplier can be calculated (using Input-Output 
analysis) so as to measure the total production required throughout the economy to 
meet a given volume of export demand. Industries differ in the share of their inputs 
coming from other domestic industries; the output multiplier, and indirect benefits, 
increases as the share of other industries' output in total inputs increases and 
therefore depends on the nature of the industries winning aided exports.
The direct and indirect benefits measure the impact of aid, which is estimated 
retrospectively for a particular year and represents that part of total economic 
activity in that year which can be attributed to demand due to aid. Impact, like the 
Input-Output method in general, tends to emphasise gross transactions. There is no 
inherent claim that aided exports created output or employment (although, as we 
will show, many comentators implicitly and incorrectly make such claims), nor are 
there normally any assumptions regarding the level of economic activity had there 
been no, or fewer, aided exports. This begs two questions: were aided exports 
trade creating and did they displace domestic activity? In other words, what 
inferences can we draw regarding the net economic effects of aid?
Aid is not fully trade creating if there are substitution effects, that is, if the aid is 
used to finance goods which would otherwise have been purchased from that 
donor. These effects are. more likely if aid is tied and granted to a relatively large 
country with trading ties to the donor, they are least likely to be significant in the
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case of multilateral aid (since multilateral agencies award contracts subject to 
international competition). The essential point is the existence of trading ties; when 
untied aid is granted to a trading partner there is an expectation, if not an underlying 
obligation, that the money is spent on donor goods. However, given competition 
between major donors and the evolution of world trade, traditional ties are 
weakening and while tied aid may not create exports its absence may lose market 
share. In certain respects tying is an instrument of export protection, and the 
presumption is that substitution effects will be slight
On the other hand, aided exports facilitate market penetration and may generate a 
radiation effect (Jepma and Quist, 1986). Aid granted to one country generates 
exports which give donor firms an opportunity to generate goodwill; if successful, 
the firm may win subsequent unaided orders in that or neighbouring countries. 
Substitution and radiation effects act in opposing directions and tend to be affected 
by the same factors in the same direction; trading ties and economic buoyancy in the 
recipient economy enhance both effects. It is not possible to generalise on the 
relative magnitudes but, given the level of donor export competition and the 
importance of aid in maintaining market share, neither should be over-emphasised. 
Since there is competition within multilateral agencies, the substitution effect is 
likely to be less and, since the most internationally competitive firms are most likely 
to win orders, the radiation effects should be enhanced. This is yet another reason 
why multilateral aid may confer greater benefits than bilateral aid.
Even if aid is trade creating, aided exports will not be additional to economic output 
if, in their absence, the resources employed would have been used domestically or 
to produce other exports. Theoretically, this displacement effect is only significant 
on aggregate if the economy is operating at near capacity so that, not only is a firm 
unable to meet the exports without sacrificing some other output but also, the 
demand has to be met by foreign firms. Displacement counts only if output is lost to 
the economy, not if output is produced by one firm rather than another. In general, 
the scope for increased productivity, such as overtime, will mitigate any output 
displacement. There may be displacement effects in specific industries facing 
capacity constraints but the economic importance is questionable; one needs to
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show that exports are somehow less beneficial than domestic goods which would 
otherwise have been produced. The concept of displacement is closely related to 
that of opportunity costs; resources employed in one use, such as aided exports, 
are not avaliable for other uses, such as production for domestic demand. There is 
said to be an opportunity cost if alternative uses could be more productive; there is 
no opportunity cost if existing uses are the best, or if resources would otherwise 
have been unemployed. The opportunity cost approach to measuring the benefits of 
aid starts from the implicit assumption that aid itself and aided exports represent 
resources which are not available for domestic use, and asks if these could have 
been better employed.
Evaluating opportunity costs depends on the implicit maximand. For example, the 
implied opportunity cost of tied aid will differ depending on whether the objective 
attached to the amount of public expenditure is to maximise exports, maximise 
donor welfare or maximise the development gains to recipients. It is our contention 
that the maximand is chosen in a political process, which interested parties will try 
to influence, and one must investigate this process to identify, in a sense, what 
alternative opportunities should be costed. The issue is further complicated by the 
fact that policy-makers may be satisficers not maximisers, so that an overall policy, 
such as the aid budget, will consist of individual parts each directed at specific, and 
often conflicting, objectives. To understand the why aid takes the forms it does, 
one must understand the process of aid policy-making. In strict economic terms the 
maximand for assessing opportunity costs should be the net effect on global 
welfare; we will contend, although we do not demonstrate the issue formally, that 
tying has a negative effect on global welfare.
1.3. Plan of the Thesis
Chapter 2 outlines the arguments for aid as an instrument to promote economic 
growth and development in LDCs, and demonstrates that differing objectives 
suggest different forms of aid. A distinction is drawn between the moral case for 
aid, which tends to relate closely to issues of redistributive justice, and economic 
arguments, which are based largely on perceived structural deficiencies in LDC 
economies. The former suggest that aid should be targeted on poverty alleviation 
while the latter supports project aid and programme aid directed at altering economic
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policy in LDCs. We will argue that tied aid is less likely to meet the interests of 
recipients than untied aid. More generally, we will argue that aid works, or fails, in 
complex ways and the existence of development and economic objectives can 
justify granting different forms of aid.
Chapter 3 addresses the measurement of the benefit of aid to donors, with particular 
emphasis on those arguments which appear to justify tying, and shows that 
measures of impact only cover, at best, the gross commercial benefit A wide range 
of costs and other effects have to be taken into account, some of which are actually 
greater under tying, to arrive at an indication of the net benefit We outline a range 
of arguments that appear to support tying and hope to demonstrate that even under 
these favourable arguments quite restrictive conditions must be met before it is clear 
that tied aid will confer a greater net benefit, to the donor, than untied aid. We will 
argue that many of the net effects are largely independent of the form of aid so that 
gross impact (the easiest effect to measure) is a reasonable first approximation from 
which to infer the ranking of types of aid in terms of net economic benefit We also 
try to identify those net effects most clearly related to the form of aid, especially its 
tying status, which receive particular attention in later chapters. While the empirical 
emphasis of the thesis is on measuring impact, we will try to account for other 
important economic effects.
One particular type of argument which receives emphasis is the strategic criteria for 
export subsidies, which can be applied to tied aid and the Aid and Trade Provision 
(ATP). This approach stems from game theory analysis of imperfect competition, in 
particular the concept of strategic trade policy. The argument states that if the global 
market meets certain conditions a donor can increase global welfare by granting a 
subsidy to exporters in that particular market These conditions, which we term 
strategic criteria, are restrictive and include that the global market is a Cournot 
oligopoly with very few firms, all in donor economies and earning monopoly rents, 
high barriers to entry, high technology and Research and Development (R&D) 
content and, preferably, economies of scale. The case for ATP rests on whether the 
firms benefiting are in markets which exhibit these strategic criteria, an issue 
addressed in Chapters 8 and 9.
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Its value as a first approximation to the net benefit of forms of aid is one reason 
why we emphasise impact. A second is that measures of impact are extensively 
employed by business lobbies to argue for tied aid on the basis that it generates 
greater commercial benefits, so that the donor derives greater benefits than under 
untied aid. In Chapter 4 we outline the process in which pressure groups try to 
influence British aid policy. On one side, and of most relevance to us, is the 
business lobby which essentially adopts the arguments of Chapter 3 in lobbying for 
a greater link between aid and the promotion of exports. They are in favour of what 
we will term a commercially oriented aid policy. On the other side are those who 
argue that aid should be granted to further the interests of recipients, following 
broadly the arguments outlined in Chapter 2, whom we term collectively the 
development lobby. They are in favour of a development oriented aid policy. There 
are clear conflicts in the aid policy advocated by each; in between lies the 
Government which, in the form of Departments and Ministers, has a variety of 
policy objectives and, in the form of the Cabinet, ultimately decides on the 
orientation of aid policy.
The latter parts of Chapter 4 examine the trends in British aid policy over the period 
1978 to 1989, with a view to assessing the influence of the competing lobbies. The 
implicit methodology is, having distinguished the implications of each competing 
lobby - commercial, development and political (Government) - for the form of aid 
policy, to infer the relative influence of each on the basis of the observed aid budget 
and the changes introduced. Special attention is given to ATP as the most 
commercially oriented component of the aid budget. The overall trends in the 
composition of aid, according to types of aid, the degree of tying, the nature of the 
projects financed and its geographical allocation, are also examined. Finally, some 
data on other donors are presented both to provide a comparison with the UK and 
because the practices of other donors will influence UK policy.
Having set the stage, so to speak, by presenting the economic arguments for tied 
aid and placing them within a policy-making environment, the Input-Output (10) 
method used to measure impact is presented in Chapter 5. Following a simple 
formal representation of how aid impacts on the donor economy, the elementary 10
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representation of an economy is given and the basic equation for measuring impact 
derived. Some extensions to this framework are then given, notably the calculation 
of output, income and employment multipliers which can be used to rank industries 
according to relative impact potential, ie, the extent of their interdependence with 
other industries. The data on which our estimates are based are then discussed 
before presenting, in simple equation form, the method used. The Chapter 
concludes with a brief consideration of some of the limitations of the 10 method.
The results of applying the 10 method of impact analysis are presented and 
discussed in Chapters 6 to 9, which each address different aspects of aid policy. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to tied bilateral aid and begins with a discussion of the direct 
benefits which distinguishes the views of, and benefits to, consultants, contractors 
and manufacturers. The results are discussed in terms of the overall impact on the 
economy and then according to the distribution of benefits by industrial groups, 
such as engineering or chemicals. While the commercial benefits are not great 
relative to the aggregate economy they can be significant for particular industries 
and our data permit an examination of the distribution of impact across 24 industries 
which account for almost all aided exports. We demonstrate that the benefits are 
highly concentrated and extend the analysis by relating aided exports to the overall 
export performance of these industries, which permits some inferences on the net 
benefits from tying. We also show how the method can easily be applied to 
measuring the impact from a particular order (volume of aided exports).
Chapter 7 conducts a similar exercise in respect of multilateral aid. Britain 
contributes to most of the major MAAs, notably the World Bank, UNDP and EDF, 
and this accounts for the share of multilateral aid in the aid budget. These agencies 
finance numerous projects in LDCs for which firms in contributing countries can 
tender (subject to varying restrictions). We outline the argument of juste retour 
which suggests that international tenders for MAA contracts are not as competitive 
as often claimed. However, the UK tends to do well in tendering such that its share 
in, and the value of, contracts often exceeds contributions, suggesting that the 
successful UK firms are relatively internationally competitive. The impact of 
multilateral aid is presented, compared with tied bilateral aid and shown to be
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greater in absolute and relative terms. Finally, the distribution of the impact of 
multilateral aid by industry is examined and related to export performance.
The analysis of Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that multilateral aid, which is essentially 
untied, has a greater impact than tied bilateral aid, and there is some evidence that 
the industries winning MAA contracts tende to be internationally more competitive 
than those winning tied bilateral aid contracts. This suggests that the impact of tied 
aid is not, in general, any greater than that of untied (multilateral) aid. This 
comparison is important in showing that the objectives of commercially oriented aid 
do not favour tied aid over contributions to MAAs. If it is held that multilateral aid 
in general is of greater benefit to LDCs than tied bilateral aid, the case for tying is 
severely weakened. If untied bilateral aid is generally given to meet the development 
objectives of aid, the question can become what form of aid will best meet the 
commercial objectives. Tied bilateral aid is not favoured over multilateral aid but we 
must consider the case of mixed credits.
Using the method of Chapter 5 and a specific data set, Chapter 8 presents a detailed 
evaluation of the impact of ATP. This can be treated as the flagship for the 
commercial objectives of aid and, as an export subsidy, is akin to the ultimate in 
tying, in the sense that the return on tying (the export ratio) is well in excess of 
unity, and explicitly links aid to exports. Since the gross impact of ATP, relative to 
initial aid, is far higher than for other types of aid, it is especially relevant to try and 
assess the net benefits. While we cannot claim to rigorously complete this task, our 
analysis suggests that the net global benefit of ATP could well be negative. If the 
objective is, as it should be, to maximise the net global benefit from aid, mixed 
credits are not favoured.
The commercial benefits of ATP are considerable and highly concentrated in a few 
large companies and there is strong pressure from the business lobby to increase the 
use of mixed credits. While the administrative and policy trends of ATP were 
considered in Chapter 4, the arguments for mixed credits are examined against 
some evidence in Chapter 8. We reiterate that the strongest business argument 
arises from demands that the UK match other donors, and outline the international
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use of mixed credits. As stressed in Chapter 3, the strongest economic justification 
for ATP will arise if the firms which benefit can be shown to meet strategic criteria. 
Evidence on the impact of ATP is presented in some detail and we then examine if 
these criteria are m et We conclude by observing that the strategic criteria are not 
obviously met and that ATP has been of apparendy litde development benefit.
In Chapter 9 we bring the evidence on the impact of various forms of aid together 
and try to infer the net economic benefit, to the donor, associated with each. The 
specific objective is to bring together the arguments and evidence of the previous 
chapters to address the question of whether tied aid is justified. Thus we ask what 
the objectives of tying are, and then try to evaluate if tying is necessary or sufficient 
to meet these (commercial) objectives. The basic argument is that tying is not 
generally necessary to achieve commercial benefits such that, once development 
objectives are accounted for, the case for tying is very weak. The chapter begins 
with an estimate of the impact of the UK aid budget in 1986, taken as a base year, 
and this is compared with estimates of the impact of alternative aid policies (one 
more commercially oriented, the other development oriented). We then attempt to 
evaluate the opportunity costs of aid by comparing the impact of aid with that of 
alternative forms of government expenditure, and address the specific issue of the 
employment-creating potential of tied aid (arguing that it is unlikely to be great, 
contrary to the claims of business lobbies). The latter part of the chapter tries to 
evaluate the importance of aid in terms of British export competitiveness; we would 
only consider our analysis to be a first approximation, but it lends little support to 
the arguments for tying.
A general economic evaluation of tying must start with two observations. First, tied 
aid tends to increase the prices yet reduce the choices facing LDCs. Consequently, 
resource allocation is distorted and there is a dimunition in the economic welfare of 
the recipient Second, tying is a subsidy to exporters which distorts world prices so 
that resource allocation is sub-optimal. Furthermore, the subsidy favours a certain 
group of exporting donor companies, and these can then pay more for the factors 
they use intensively. This will distort relative factor prices in the donor and will 
impose costs on other firms. Hence, donor economic welfare may also be reduced. 
Given these considerations, if tying is to increase net donor welfare the tied aid
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must be trade creating but, even if it is, recipient welfare is still reduced. The merit 
of untied aid is that it does not introduce obvious price distortions and if it furthers 
economic growth in LDCs it will ultimately benefit world trade and global welfare. 
The evidence reviewed in Chapter 9 suggests that tying of UK aid has not 
obviously yielded a net increase in the economic welfare of the UK hence, untied 
aid is generally to be preferred. To achieve this, multilateral^ying is probably 
required, and this is a basic conclusion of our analysis.
The conclusion is presented in Chapter 10; first our basic thesis is outlined and then 
the evidence and arguments of the thesis are summarised. We argue that while 
certain conclusions are justified, others require more particular attention and provide 
avenues for further research. In essence, we believe our estimates of impact to be as 
extensive and robust as the data permit and that sufficient empirical work has been 
conducted on this issue; the aggregate ratios and multipliers can be applied to 
particular projects or forms of aid to obtain reasonable approximations of impact 
Furthermore, we believe that the influence of the business lobby, in terms of inputs 
and outputs, has been fairly comprehensively evaluated. These are the two areas, as 
stated at the outset, which form the joint strands of the theoretical framework and 
encompass the two specific questions we hope to answer.
As in most areas of research, the attempt to answer one question throws up many 
more which, usually, are more difficult to answer (and, perhaps for that reason, 
appear more interesting). This thesis is no exception, and these deficiencies are 
addressed in Chapter 10 in the context of three future research areas: tying and the 
effectiveness of aid in LDCs; an econometric analysis of the aid-export relationship 
and a more formal application of strategic trade policy arguments to ATP, permiting 
a theoretical evaluation of the welfare effects of unilateral abolition of mixed credits 
and facilitating a more detailed study of the individual industries. The thesis will 
attempt to answer a particular set of questions, as set out in this Chapter, but also 
provides a basis for future research on an important topic.
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CHAPTER 2. THE MOTIVES FOR AID I: RECIPIENTS
In Chapter 1 we defined aid as official development assistance; now we wish to 
establish the relationship, in theory and practice, between aid, economic growth and 
development. An understanding of this relationship will facilitate an evaluation of 
the implications of a commercially oriented aid policy for promoting development. 
Furthermore, it will be useful to understand the basis of the views of recipient 
governments and development lobbies, within donor economies, so we can later 
identify how these conflict with the interests of the business lobby. This Chapter 
does not attempt to cover fully the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness (see 
Cassen, 1986; Krueger et aly 1989; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 1987). Rather, we 
wish to identify the features of the aid and development relationship most salient to 
our later discussion and analysis.
In Section 2.1 we outline a number of arguments for why there should be aid, ie. 
why should taxpayers in relatively rich countries give money to the governments of 
relatively poor countries, and sketch the implications of these for the effectiveness 
of aid in achieving its objectives, especially development, in Section 2.2. The first 
argument considered is the moral or ethical case and we will contend that while a 
reasonable case can be made for redistribution this does not itself provide a case for 
aid but, rather, has implications for the form of aid (ie. the redistributive objective 
should be achieved). We then outline the basic economic argument for aid in terms 
of the two-gap model, whereby aid may be required to finance investment that 
cannot be met from domestic (LDC) savings or to plug a balance of payments gap. 
Again, Section 2.2 will sketch the implications for the form of aid required. The 
third argument we consider, which is presented in a general way to encompass the 
previous two, treats aid as an international public good.
Essentially, in Section 2.1 we propose that aid can be justified as an instrument of 
global redistribution, in which case the benefits should accrue to the poor in LDCs, 
as a means of facilitating the efficient allocation of global resources and to help 
macroeconomic stabilisation, which can be in the interests of the global economy. 
In Section 2.2 we begin by relating these arguments to fungibility, the extent to
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which aid releases LDC resources for other uses, and the incidence of aid - who 
benefits and what are the effects on the allocation of LDC resources, eg. via effects 
on relative factor prices or technology dependence. We discuss the effectiveness of 
aid, in general, to promote economic growth in recipient countries and consider the 
case of project aid and its effectiveness in promoting development
Section 2.3 turns to the issue of tied aid and reviews the costs imposed on 
recipients by the practice of tying. There is evidence that goods supplied under tied 
aid agreements are costed at above world prices so that there is an inefficiency in the 
global allocation of resources. Furthermore, LDC choice is constrained, especially 
in respect of technology, which may conflict with the objectives of aid. Finally, in 
that section, we consider the debate regarding the relative merits of a dollar of aid as 
against a dollar of export revenue. It is our aim to demonstrate in this chapter that 
there are a number of arguments against tied aid because it reduces the capacity of 
aid to promote development
One of the implications of our discussion in Section 2.2 is that donors may wish to 
exercise control over the disbursement of aid and the implementation of projects. 
While LDCs may resist this as infringing on their sovereignity, it is defensible on 
the basis that donor taxpayers have a right to try and ensure that aid reaches its 
targets. More generally, but not necessarily as defensible, donors wish to retain 
control over aid. A particular manifestation of this which assumed predominance in 
the 1980s is policy based lending or conditionality whereby the donor, usually the 
World Bank in these cases, attaches particular conditions which the recipient must 
meet in order to receive the aid. We discuss this issue briefly in Section 2.4, 
although such lending is outside the remit of this thesis.
2.1. The Case for Aid
We confine attention to three broad arguments for aid and do not intend a 
comprehensive review but, rather, wish to identify those arguments which have 
major implications for the form aid should take. First, we look at essentially 
redistributive arguments in the context of the moral case for aid. Then, using two- 
gap analysis as a basis, we explore some economic justifications related to
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investment opportunities and resource allocation. These arguments are then brought 
together to present a general case for aid.
The Redistributive Case for Aid
The moral case for aid is complex and by no means clear-cut (Riddell, 1987, 
devotes some 75 pages to reviewing the debate). It is useful to distinguish the case 
for redistribution through aid per se from the form it should take. The first issue is 
whether there is an obligation for international redistribution. The second is, 
accepting such an obligation, does this require the donor government to allocate 
some of its scarce resources for redistribution. The third issue is which forms of 
aid are most appropriate to achieve redistributive aims. We consider each in turn in 
a necessarily brief exposition. 1
One of the most appealing arguments for redistribution is Rawls (1973) A Theory 
o f Justice which, at its barest, has two principal features, First, the rules for social 
justice are formed and legitimised within a model of social contract where the 
objective and correct principles to govern society could be agreed, and adhered to, 
by rational self-interested agents. Second, these principles would be those as 
chosen by rational self-interested agents in the original state, that is, behind a 'veil 
of ignorance' so that they do not know what position they will have in society. If 
widespread risk-preference among the decision-makers is precluded, the society 
chosen will include a moral case for redistribution (potential entrants will desire a 
safety net against the chance of their being bom into poverty). This argument 
supports that of utilitarianism, since redistribution will increase the utility of 
recipients by more than any disutility to donors (given altruism or utility 
interdependence and/or diminishing marginal utility of money). It also supports the 
ctaims of 'basic needs', whereby it is held that all humans have a fundamental right 
to a basic minimum of subsistence (such as food, clothing and shelter) and, 
consequently, the rich are under an obligation to assist the poor in attaining this
1 It is reasonable to note here that, unfortunately (in our view), Riddell (1987) does not draw 
such a clear distinction between the moral imperative for giving aid and the subsequent, but 
separate, arguments for different forms of aid. Our approach is that one can establish that aid 
should be given but that, even so, other factors come into play in determining whether aid is 
given and, if so, in what forms.
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minimum (see Riddell, 1987:20-24; Dower, 1983, argues strongly for the moral 
case for foreign aid). The argument is that if potential entrants to society do not 
know their position in the income distribution or in space (ie. in which country) 
they will, a priori, accept that there should be redistribution.
The case for redistribution is not accepted by all. Nozick (1974) argues that the only 
basis for justice is whether the existing distribution arose in a just manner. 
Individuals have a fundamental right to all they possess and the State has no moral 
right to coerce the rich into assisting the poor. If one holds that existing 
distributions arose out of 'just procedures' then economic differences are deserved 
and reflect individual differences, and there is no obligation for redistribution. The 
extreme implication is that the poor are so due to individual characteristics, whether 
laziness or inefficiency, and there is no moral obligation to assist them; even if one 
did give aid, it would not be used effectively (Bauer, 1971).
The debate cannot be resolved here but we express preference for the Rawlsian line 
of argument in which justice is based on a set of principles that people can see to be 
correct and that they would favour if abstracted from their existing position in 
society, ie. it has the essentials for a moral imperative. Nozick's approach, on the 
other hand, defines an outcome as just on the basis that the historic process out of 
which it arose was just. Even if one accepts Nozick's premise, one can question 
whether the process was indeed just. Robinson (1979) and Bagchi (1987) provide 
considerable evidence to support any claim that the existing global distribution of 
wealth arose from a process, of imperialism and colonialism, which was far from 
just. Without going as far as accepting arguments that the Western economies owe 
LDCs compensation for past wrongs, we feel that historical experience tilts the 
balance of argument away from Nozick and towards the Rawlsian case for justice.
Even if one accepts the case for redistribution2, government to government aid is 
not necessarily implied. At this level of argument there are three lines of criticism of 
aid (Riddell, 1987:13-15). First, a government's obligation is to its own citizens
2 Note that redistribution is not the only source of a moral case for aid. Dower (1983, 1990) 
argues from the premise of 'the duty to alleviate the suffering of the poor', which is not 
conceptionally identical to redistribution, and may be morally stronger.
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rather than those of other states. While this has important implications in practice, 
we find the argument in principle unappealing (see Dower, 1990, for a constructive 
critique). In the Rawlsian model, the veil of ignorance could include not knowing 
which country one would live in; the logical implication is that one would choose 
international redistribution of some form. A second argument is that while the 
government, as holder of the public purse, may be the proper authority to grant aid 
it is by no means clear that the LDC government is the most appropriate recipient. 
This argument has a point given that redistribution requires aid from the relatively 
rich to benefit the relatively poor, but the real implication is that aid should be 
targeted on the poor (which we discuss in more detail below).3 The final criticism 
is that many demands on public spending derive from moral obligations and why 
should aid predominate?
... there are other claims with moral implications on a government's financial resources. 
Hence to constitute a moral justification for providing aid the potential donor not only 
has to accept the moral obligation to provide aid but also has to agree that in comparison 
with the obligations it has to its citizens and to its own country, foreign aid expenditure 
is a legitimate use of its financial resources. (Riddell, 1987:15)
This argument relates to many of the issues to be considered in the thesis, although 
phrased differently to our usage. We hold that the moral case for aid exists but that 
the ultimate choices of how much aid to grant and of what form arise from a policy­
making process in which, amongst other concerns, the government weighs up the 
moral strength of conflicting demands. The ideological stance of a government will 
* predispose it to one set of demands rather than others, but they will also be 
concerned with the economic return on government expenditure. Hence the 
relevance of evaluating the potential benefits of aid to the donor. To sum up so far, 
we hold that there is a redistributive case for aid, and that this implies targetting aid 
or otherwise trying to ensure that the poorest benefit, but it does little more than 
establish aid on the donors' policy-making agenda.
3 A common form of this argument is that some taxpayers in donor countries are poorer than 
some people in developing countries, and why should there be a redistribution from the former to 
the latter. The problem is of practice rather than principle and depends on the redistributive systems 
in both countries and the targetting of the aid.
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... what government's ought to do [as representatives of their electorate] is a function of 
what people want and think ought to be done, not what, by some rational standard, , is 
judged by the thinker ought to be done. [Thus, even if some aid, such as tied aid] ... is 
actually imperfect or downright inappropriate, the obligation of the government to give 
such aid is justified by appeal to the democratic basis of government (Dower, 1990:4)
The philosophical arguments can present a moral case as to why aid ought to be 
given, either because redistribution is 'good' or absolute poverty is 'bad' (see the 
discussion of aid as an international public good, below). If accepted, they also 
indicate the form aid should take, eg. that it should be targeted on the poor or that 
the objective of aid is in terms of some underlying concept of development from 
which the poor will benefit and/or absolute poverty can be alleviated. However, to 
begin to explain why aid has taken the forms we observe, and to go part of the way 
to understanding the factors determining the effectiveness of aid, one must look to 
politics and economics, and the interface between the two. In the remainder of this 
chapter we focus on economic arguments (political arguments are introduced in the 
next chapter but are only developed fully in Chapter 4).
Dual-Gap Analysis as a Rationale for aid
A common economic justification for aid is based on the view that all economies are 
inter-related through international trade and factor mobility such that if growth in 
one country is retarded this will constrain the global economy. By implication, 
global resource allocation is sub-optimal and global welfare is not maximised. It is 
in the interests of all economies to facilitate the growth of each; this can provide the 
basis for international agreements, such as the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), or for aid as a reallocation of resources to where they can more 
effectively be used. Dual-gap analysis formalises this argument (Thirlwall, 
1989:295-304, gives an extensive exposition). Using the conventional Keynesian 
notation (which differs from notation elsewhere in the thesis) and ignoring 
government, the following identities will hold ex post for, respectively, income, 
consumption, investment, exports, imports and saving (5) over the whole 
economy:
Y = C + I + X - M
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Y - C = S = I + X - M
and
I  - S = M - X  (2.1)
Identity (2.1) states that if savings exceed investment (I - S < 0), consumption is 
less than production and the country will have a trade surplus. On the other hand, if 
consumption exceeds production (/ - S > 0) there will be a trade deficit (M - X > 
0). However, the accounting identity in (2.1) need not hold ex ante, ie. planned 
savings minus planned investment may not equal the planned trade balance; it is 
within this context of implicit planning to achieve a growth target that dual gap 
analysis provides a rationale for aid. Recalling the basic elements of the Harrod- 
Domar growth model (Thirlwall, 1989:296) we can define the growth rate (g):
s.k = g = v.m (2.2)
where s = the savings ratio
k = the output-capital ratio4
v = the ratio of imported investment goods to income
m = the marginal productivity of imported investment goods.
Equation (2.2) encapsulates the arguments that growth requires investment goods 
which can either be produced domestically, requiring domestic savings, or can be 
imported, requiring foreign exchange. Assuming that domestic and foreign 
resources are not substitutable, then growth is constrained to the level of whichever 
is lower, savings or foreign exchange. While this assumption may appear strong, 
since surplus foreign exchange may be able to compensate for a scarcity of 
domestic resources, there would at least be a lag in converting surplus savings into 
reducing the trade deficit The essence of (2.1) and (2.2) is that two related gaps 
constrain growth. The investment-savings gap (I-S) states that domestic savings 
are too low to meet the target growth rate. The foreign exchange gap (M-X) states 
that the minimum import requirements (of investment goods) for the target growth
4 We outline the argument for the I-S gap, following the notation for (2.1) and with K  equal 
to the capital stock: k = Y/K and /  = sY = AK. Given Y = kK  and AY = kAK  it follows 
that growth, g = AYfY = k(IfY) = k.s. An analogous argument applies to imports.
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rate are less than the maximum of export earnings available. For any target growth 
rate both gaps can, and in LDCs probably do, exist simultaneously and foreign 
capital flows are needed to fill the larger of the two (in doing so, the other will also 
be filled). Thus, aid can fill I-S by bringing domestic savings up to the required 
level (this can be interpreted as an argument for project aid which is a form of direct 
investment); the expansion of domestic production will reduce the net demand for 
imports and/or expand exports, thereby filling the trade gap. Similarly, aid can fill 
the foreign exchange gap by financing imports of capital goods, eg. programme aid 
for balance of payments support. The latter may seem to present an argument for 
tied aid since this finances imported goods; this issue is explored in Section 2.3. 
There are clear merits to this analysis:
It synthesises traditional and more modem views concerning aid, trade and development 
On the one hand, it embraces the traditional view of foreign assistance as merely a boost 
to domestic saving; on the other hand, it takes the more modem view that many goods 
necessary for growth cannot be produced [domestically] and must therefore be imported 
with the aid of foreign assistance. (Thirlwall, 1989:297)
Dual gap analysis is not without failings or critics. In particular, from our 
perspective, the anlysis talks of foreign capital flows but does not specify if these 
should be grant-in-aid; the arguments could appear to favour tied aid as much as 
untied aid. More generally, the model does not provide a convincing mechanism by 
which both gaps can be filled. There is the obvious problem that project aid to 
compensate for a shortfall of domestic savings may not be effective, in that the final 
product is economically inefficient, or may not benefit those for whom aid is 
intended. These issues are addressed in Section 2.2. Bridging the trade gap is far 
more problematic since financing imports does not in itself facilitate the expansion 
of exports, and the LDC may receive inappropriate technology or become 
dependent on donor technology.
The paper which first proposed dual gap analysis (Chenery and Strout, 1966) was 
aware of these problems and placed the analysis within a three-stage growth 
process. In the first stage, the developing economy faced a shortage of skills and 
domestic savings but no significant foreign exchange gap. The purpose of aid was
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to facilitate investment not consumption (see discussion of Figure 2.1 below), so 
the I-S gap could be closed. In the second stage aid may be required to maintain 
the momentum of growth in investment; although domestic savings may reach the 
proper level, structural rigidities and skills shortages keep the growth in the rate of 
investment below target. In the third stage the savings gap has been largely 
overcome and aid plugs the foreign exchange gap. The authors place considerable 
emphasis on the need for policy reform in LDCs and the effective use of aid, but 
may not have allowed sufficiently for both gaps being large at the same time. 
Chenery and Strout (1966:691) acknowledge that aid may not be very effective in 
plugging the foreign exchange gap over the long-run because LDCs face 
considerable difficulties in increasing exports and improving their terms of trade.
Aid as an International Public Good
Mosley (1987) argues that global income redistribution is an international public 
good, asserting that the basis of international redistribution is equivalent to intra- 
national redistribution. We generalise this argument to encompass the issues already 
discussed. The donor community can be considered as a global government whose 
budget is aid funds. We have already argued for redistribution but wish to add an 
allocative argument for aid. The strict allocative justification is that international 
capital markets are imperfect, and this provides the major case for project aid. 
Savings are low in LDCs, implying a high opportunity cost of investment, while 
projects are often very risky, subject to long gestation periods and may generate 
extensive externalities which make it difficult for the investor to capture the benefit 
streams (Krueger et al, 1989:44-46). Thus, international capital markets will 
allocate insufficient funds to LDC projects which should be undertaken.
Considering dual gap analysis, there is also a stabilisation case for aid: it is in the 
interests of the world economy to minimise global fluctuations. This provides a 
justification for programme aid, especially if directed at stabilisation. Redistribution 
provides a further case for aid though, following earlier arguments, in this case it 
should be targeted on the poorest groups. Distinct arguments for aid imply distinct 
forms of aid and much of the subsequent discussion in this thesis is predicated on 
such distinctions. The allocative and stabilisation arguments for aid require that the
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funds achieve specific economic objectives, and the success of aid in terms of these 
arguments can only be evaluated against studies of the effectiveness of aid. The 
redistributive argument relies on the incidence of aid, ie. who benefits? In practice, 
the distinctions may become blurred but we believe they are worth making and 
emphasising. Furthermore, expectations regarding aid will depend on which 
justification is (subjectively) being assumed.
2.2. The Effectiveness of Aid
In the previous section we outlined-a partial typology linking the justifications for 
aid to particular objectives in terms of the economic effects; not all aid can be related 
to a specific justification-objective pair but if we observe that certain objectives have 
been more consistently aspired to than others (appraised retrospectively from the 
effects), we can infer which arguments have dominated donor policy. We begin this 
section with a brief exposition of the concept of fungibility - can aid allocated for 
one purpose permit reallocation of funds to alternative uses? We then consider the 
incidence of aid, in terms of targetting the poor, and look at the evidence on project 
aid, which relates to the allocative function. We also consider the overall 
macroeconomic effectiveness of aid.
Aid Fungibilitv
It is convenient to present the argument in terms of inter-temporal production where 
funds can be allocated for present consumption or for investment, ie. future 
consumption. This choice is represented in Figure 2.1 (based on Mosley, 1987:86). 
Aid is implicitly treated as an addition to government revenue in the LDC with the 
government determining the allocation between consumption and investment. If aid 
is granted with no conditions attached it is a net increment to government revenue 
and the LDC can decide how it should be allocated. Even if aid is allocated for a 
specific purpose, but that purpose is one the LDC government would have wished 
to finance, it effectively releases public funds for other uses. Fungibility refers to 
this potential to substitute aid funds for planned expenditure, thereby releasing 
domestic resources for alternative uses, and implies that aid may not ultimately, or 
effectively in terms of incidence, be used for the intended purpose. We discuss 
Figure 2.1 for the case where aid is granted without conditions.
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Figure 2,1, Aid and Intertemporal Production
O
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Mosley (1987:87) distinguishes between aid pessimists and aid optimists. In the 
absence of aid, the initial inter-temporal consumption possibility curve is CjCq 
(where, due to investment, OCj > OCq) and Iq is the LDCs social indifference 
curve for present (Cq) and future (Cj) consumption; the chosen outcome is at 
point S. The granting of aid, in time r, expands the inter-temporal consumption 
possibility frontier to AjAq asssuming aid of amount CqAq. Aid pessimists such 
as Bauer (1971) argue that the LDC will squander the additional funds on present 
consumption and settle at point P  where the aid will have no lasting effect on 
economic growth (it may alleviate immediate hardship, which may be desirable). 
Aid optimists argue that aid will be used effectively and invested productively so 
that the LDC settles at point Q. We can note that although the initial position S 
was based on LDC sovereignty (Iq), both these views deny that LDCs will seek, 
with aid, to maximise their utility. In other words, if aid is granted freely so that 
LDC governments retain choice over its allocation then they would seek the highest 
attainable social indifference curve and settle at S'. From the LDC perspective S' 
and not Q is the desired outcome.5
To argue that fungibility is undesirable or, by implication, that aid should be for the 
uses intended by the donor assumes that LDCs should not have sovereignity over 
the allocation of their resources. This is the underlying argument of the aid 
pessimists but it should be clear that the argument does not apply to aid per se but 
to the capacity of the LDC to use aid effectively. There may be political reasons 
why LDC governments do not maximise ’social welfare' but rather look after the 
interests of certain groups (eg. urban bias). It is beyond our scope to analyse the 
full implications of this point (that LDCs are not welfare maximising) but it is 
important because it provides an underlying rationale for attaching conditions to aid, 
whether tying or policy based lending. Furthermore, fungibility may have positive 
effects on the recipient economy. Pack and Pack (1990) demonstrate that there was 
a slight degree of fungibility for aid to Indonesia over 1966-86 but this was largely 
reflected in increased tax effort so as to generate funds to invest in sectors not 
favoured by aid.
5 In fact, S' is the consistent outcome: if the LDC was initially at S it was maximising social 
welfare and why should it change its objective function when it receives aid?
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This analysis also provides a useful basis for distinguishing project and programme 
aid. Project aid is very explicitly intended for investment, whether to fill a savings 
gap or to realise investment opportunities that are undervalued by imperfect capital 
markets. The intention of project aid is that the funds be used to obtain a position 
such as Q for the particular investment; if the aid is tied to the project the fungibility 
problem should not arise (can one object if any funds released are used to move 
towards S' on aggregate?). The implications of tying are considered in the next 
section. The intention of programme aid is quite different and may well be to 
achieve a position such as P (eg. food aid to alleviate hardship among the most 
vulnerable during structural adjustment) or, more generally under structural 
adjustment loans (SALs), may be intended to move the LDC into an economic 
environment where S' is attainable.
Aid Incidence and Targetting
Any aid programme will affect the allocation of resources, relative factor prices and 
ultimately the welfare (incomes) of economic agents (landless labourers, peasant 
farmers, urban workers, etc) in a complex way determined by economic inter­
relationships. Consequently, if the benefits of aid are intended to accrue to a sub-set 
of the population, the design and implementation of the project, or programme, 
must be carefully appraised. Even then, uncertainty and imperfect information can 
upset the best laid plans. We will try to identify the key implications for the nature 
of aid, in particular if the intention is to alleviate poverty.
The easiest way to convey the relevant point is that any targetting objective can be 
interpreted as the magnitude of the distributive weights attached to consumption in 
the project appraisal (see Brent, 1990, for a clear exposition). Taking as given the 
economic appraisal of the project, in which the net social benefits and net social 
costs attached to the project are estimated, targetting relates to how one treats the 
consumption resulting from the project If the intention is to increase the income of 
the poorest groups, landless labourers and peasant farmers in a rural project for 
example, then one attaches a premium (a weight greater than unity) to any increase 
in consumption of those groups. In particular, one would wish to attach a very high 
weight to any reduction in the income/consumption of those groups. Targetting
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therefore requires a comprehensive project appraisal and, in particular, one that 
goes beyond a simple economic appraisal of costs and benefits to evaluate the 
distributive impact.
One distinction between aid intended to benefit the poor and aid granted to finance 
investment because of a savings gap or imperfect capital markets lies in the weights 
attached to distributive effects. Although we will not argue that tied aid necessarily 
has a lower distributive impact than untied aid, we will argue that certain types of 
UK aid, notably ATP projects, are subject to less rigorous appraisal than would 
normally be required. At the very least, the ability of such projects to meet targetting 
objectives is seriously impaired. More generally, the ability of inadequately 
appraised projects to confer net economic benefits must be questioned. If the 
purpose of aid is to alleviate poverty, full appraisal is required; if this is seen to be 
lacking, one may question if poverty alleviation is the underlying rationale.6
The Effectiveness of Aid
There are two broad aspects to the effectiveness of aid, not always distinguished in 
the literature, that reflect the distinctions we have already made. First, most studies 
on the aggregate effects are concerned with the relationship between aid and 
economic growth. In particular, they wish to test the hypothesis that aid makes a 
positive contribution to economic growth (eg. Mosley et al, 1987). This approach, 
in essence, is suitable for project aid motivated by capital market imperfections 
and/or a savings gap, and for programme aid motivated by stabilisation. Second, 
there are studies of the impact of projects which focus on targetting and distribution 
rather than just on economic effects. The point we wish to raise, although it is not 
one we can do justice to here, is that economic growth is not, in itself, a measure of 
development. While the correlation may be positive and high, economic growth is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for development (though it is probably 
a necessary condition for long-run, or sustained, development) because there is no 
guarantee that growth will improve the welfare of the poorest
6 Furthermore, much tied aid relates to capital goods which are not poverty-focussed: "Another 
criticism, from within the aid community itself, was that the capital-intensive industrialisation 
policies of the 1960s had contributed to the worsening of income distribution in developing 
countries." (Krueger et al, 1989:5).
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It is not our intention to review the literature on aid effectiveness but rather to pick 
out the most salient conclusions from two comprehensive reviews, Cassen (1986) 
for project aid and Mosley et al (1987) for the overall effect on economic 
growth.7 Given our comments above, it would appear that the former should 
relate more closely to development; this is not so because the Cassen review is 
largely concerned with the effectiveness of projects in terms of their economic 
appraisal, and distributive impact receives little attention (but is raised in Mosley, 
1987, Chapter 6). We direct the interested reader to these studies, and wish to draw 
only two conclusions. First, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that aid in 
general promotes economic growth. Second, the economic impact of projects 
reveals a varied experience, although the net effects could be positive if donors 
learn from experience, while distributive gains are even more elusive.
The aggregate effect of aid on growth presents a complex problem because the two 
variables are inter-related: it may be as easy to claim that slow economic growth 
attracts increased aid as it is to argue that high levels of aid promote growth. Also, 
the linkage between aid and growth is indirect; for example, aid may affect the level 
of private investment and/or relative prices, especially the exchange rate, which in 
turn can constrain any beneficial impact on the growth rate. Neither causal claim can 
be made with total conviction; according to a major study which attempts to account 
for the simultaneous relationship:
... we have found it impossible to establish any statistically significant correlation 
between aid and the growth rate of GNP in developing countries ... the apparent inability 
of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall 
growth in the Third World must give the donor community... cause for grave concern.
(Mosley et al, 1987:636)
The authors emphasise three critical parameters determining the effectiveness of aid: 
the productivity of (public and private) capital should be high; the proportion of aid 
diverted to recurrent budgets should be minimised, as should the potential
7 We do not imply that either study should be taken as the 'final word'. Cassen (1986) in 
particular has been subjected to criticism - Paul Mosley, a contributer to the Cassen study, was so 
dissatisfied with the tone of the published version that he was prompted to write his own book 
evalauadng aid (Mosley, 1987).
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distortionary effects of aid, whether on relative prices or crowding-out private 
investment. To enhance the effectiveness of aid, donors may impose conditions to 
account for these factors. The productivity of capital depends on the management 
ability and technical skills of the recipient, and its capacity to absorb aid; good 
project appraisal can help achieve adequate rates of return and allows one to focus 
on distributive impact, but TCA and long-run development of human capital are 
essential to improve capital productivity in the recipient Aid diverted into recurrent 
expenditure is unavailable for investment although, on the other hand, the 
sustainability of aid projects requires a recurrent budget which should be built into 
the initial aid award (rather than diverted from future aid). Tied aid with its 
emphasis on capital goods often imposes a burden on future recurrent expenditure. 
Furthermore, capital projects are more likely than poverty-focussed projects to 
substitute for domestic private investment. These are some reasons why tied aid 
may, at least, make less of a contribution to economic growth than untied aid.
Aid on aggregate has not obviously been effective in promoting growth, and for 
reasons that may mitigate against tying. We now briefly consider project aid, 
with reference to the implications for tying and development (qua distribution). It 
must be stressed that while project appraisal theory has been developed to a 
sophisticated level, actual evaluations tend to be restricted in coverage.8 The 
major weaknesses are the timing and scope of evaluation. In the first case, a 
question rarely answered is whether the project is self-sustaining once the aid 
ceases, although this has obvious implications for recurrent public expenditure. 
Secondly, logistic and data constraints imply that the boundaries of the evaluation 
are tightly drawn, so that important economic and distributive effects could be 
overlooked. "Some considerations - notably market analysis and marketing, and the 
interconnected choices of technology, scale and location - are seldom treated 
satisfactorily." (Cassen, 1986:106). It is generally the case that the evaluations are 
conducted by the donor agency, and may not be as critical as they could be. 
Consequently, evaluations have to be interpreted rather cautiously.
8 Throughout, we interpret appraisal as refering to an analysis of the prospective impact of a 
project (ex ante) whereas evaluation refers to a study of the impact of the project after completion 
(ex post). The theory is essentially the same in both cases.
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The World Bank is the only donor agency that routinely conducts evaluations; its 
projects during the 1960s and 1970s registered an ex post economic rate of return 
of 17 per cent on average, while over 1975-83 almost 80 per cent of projects 
achieved a return of at least ten per cent. Including studies by other donors the 
"common conclusion is that some 65-75 per cent of projects are found to be 
satisfactory or highly satisfactory, and most of the remainder problematic but not 
irreparably so, with a small percentage (in single figures) completely written off." 
(Cassen, 1986:109). Some commentators are more optimistic in emphasising the 
micro evidence of project successes and arguing that, while the macro evidence is 
ambiguous, "there is certainly no systematic evidence that aid has been detrimental 
to growth." (Krueger et al, 1989:123, original emphasis). While a range of factors 
can explain the failures, or limited achievements, of projects, and considerable 
emphasis is often placed on the policy environment in LDCs, one is of most 
relevance to our analysis: "On both sides, commercial and political considerations 
intrude to defeat or at least diminish the effectiveness of aid." (Cassen, 1986:169).
The final issue we wish to consider is the effect of aid on inter-personal distribution 
of income in LDCs. "We must begin with a warning. The quality of the data 
available for the analysis of the distributional effects of aid programmes within 
countries is very poor." (Mosley, 1987:163). The underlying problems are 
twofold. First, the nature of project appraisal/evaluation is such that it is easier to 
estimate net economic benefits than net social benefits, and the vast majority of 
evaluations are largely confined to economic effects. Secondly, it is extremely 
difficult to obtain information on the poorest groups and the few studies that do 
attempt to evaluate the impact on distribution focus largely on the incomes of the 
poor, although a more fruitful analysis would need to address the effect of a project 
on the entitlements of the poor (following Sen, 1981). Of the thousands of projects 
that have been undertaken, distributional effects have been estimated for about ten, 
and these relate to the non-representative sub-set of poverty-focused projects. While 
the method and scope of studies vary, rendering comparison difficult, "The pattern 
which leaps to the surface is that aid projects can help the poor but not the poorest." 
(Mosley, 1987:165).
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There are a number of features of projects which have a broadly predictable effect 
on distributional impact (Mosley, 1987:169-81). First, the poorest are only likely to 
benefit from relatively small-scale, labour-intensive, technology; to the extent that 
tied aid promotes large-scale, capital goods, technology the expectation must be that 
it is unlikely to benefit the poorest groups (such projects often erode the 
entitlements of the poorest). Second, if the objective of the project is to make traded 
goods available the benefits will tend to go to those with the greatest purchasing 
power. This argument is best interpreted as indicating the form poverty-focussed 
projects should take (eg. providing primary health care or education in rural areas) 
rather than as critical of aid in general. For example, the poorest are unlikely to 
benefit directly from major power generation projects but may ultimately benefit if 
there are dynamic gains from the provision of energy to industry. Finally, the onus 
on aid projects to further redistribution is lessened if the recipient government itself 
engages in effective redistribution via taxation and public expenditure. While this 
has occured rarely in practice, it reinforces the importance of the economic 
environment and recipient policy.
This thesis is primarily concerned with explaining why British aid policy took the 
form it did during the 1980s and with examining the way in which the business 
lobby has promoted tied aid. In discussing the objectives of aid, we have argued 
that tying is inconsistent with poverty-alleviation and, in the proceeding section, 
demonstrated that tying will tend to reduce the potential effectiveness of aid. Even if 
aid is being offered as investment to promote growth, rather than specifically for 
redistribution and development, effectiveness is still limited and is not furthered by 
tying. The essential point is that tying is contrary to the objectives of aid as poverty- 
alleviation, and not necessarily consistent with the objective of aid to promote 
economic growth. Consequently, those who argue for aid to promote development 
(the development lobby) are generally opposed to tying.
2.3. Costs of Tied Aid to Recipients'
Tying imposes a cost on recipients, the greater to the extent that it causes them to 
purchase more goods from the donor, and at a higher price, than would otherwise 
be the case. If all aid were untied so that the recipient could choose how to spend it 
each would have the opportunity to determine its own investment projects, to
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determine the technology appropriate to its long term interests and purchase imports 
at world prices. Critics of aid may argue that LDCs are unable to avail of this 
opportunity being constrained, for example, by repressive political systems or 
inadequate administrative machinery, and are likely to make inefficient decisions 
(eg. Bauer, 1971). We have already discussed the limited effectiveness of aid in 
promoting growth and development and here take the position that, since aid is 
given, the issue rests on the relative costs of tying (if recipients are constrained in 
the ways outlined above any costs of tying may be greater).
There are two inherent economic costs of tying. First, tying restricts competition to 
the donor industries and thereby implies imperfect competition since the number of 
firms competing to provide an order is restricted and the scope for excess profits 
increasesd. Tied aid is, in economic terms, equivalent to an export subsidy the 
value of which can be shared between the supplying firm and recipient country (in 
partial equilibrium terms, the shares will be inversely proportional to the respective 
supply and demand price elasticities). Where the donor's tied aid forms a large 
share of the recipient's total, or at least the total for particular sectors, the potential 
for excess profits increases as monopoly exporters appropriate the aid subsidy since 
demand is probably more inelastic than supply.9
Empirical estimates for the 1960s (Bhagwati, 1967) suggested that tied prices could 
include 33 to 50 per cent 'excess costs' to most recipients. Increased international 
competition suggests that the scope for excess profits has lessened in the 1980s; 
recipients with very limited resources need aid to afford the order but suppliers 
facing intense competition (from other donor firms) are likely to cut their margins to 
win market share. This argument notwithstanding, more recent estimates suggest 
that excess costs can still be as high as 50 per cent, with transport and shipping 
costs an important consideration (Jepma, 1989:49-52). It seems probable that tying 
increases the cost of goods to recipients (relative to world prices). The second 
inherent cost is that tying increases the liklihood that goods offered to recipients are
9 We do not wish to overemphasise these partial equilibrium arguments because, in our view, a 
formal analysis may require badly behaved demand and supply curves. In particular, demand could 
be highly inelastic or non-existent above a certain price.
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not those that would be chosen in a perfect world and therefore represent an 
inefficient allocation of resources (Johnson, 1967). Tied aid reflects donor 
technology rather than the techniques most appropriate to recipients and the 
specifications create a dependency, for maintenance and spare-parts, which is rarely 
accounted for in the aid award. In general,"... the goods and services offered are 
of low priority to the recipient, are excessively capital-intensive, are highly 
dependent on Western technologies and are import-biased." (Jepma, 1989:10).
There is a further cost of tying for (potential) exporters in developing countries. It is 
generally assumed that while tying can confer a trade advantage to a donor this does 
not impose a trade cost on developing countries (Button and Westaway, 1988). 
Tying reduces competition; access to the market is restricted, profit margins and 
prices can be higher, and the allocation of resources less efficient, than in free trade. 
Thus, tying creates a barrier to entry for developing countries whose industries 
could compete in markets dominated by donor industries.10 There is some 
evidence for this in international construction where newly industrialising countries 
such as Brazil, Korea and India significantly increased their market share 
throughout the 1970s but suffered most when the global market collapsed in the 
1980s; contractors from the major donors were somewhat protected by tying 
policies (Strassmann and Wells, 1988).
In summary, untied aid is preferable because, ceteris paribus, tying leads to higher 
prices, an inefficient allocation of resources and increases the likelihood of 
inappropriate technology being exported to recipients. Given the use of tying to 
promote donor trade interests, it is worth considering the literature on aid versus 
trade for recipients, ie. will the economic benefits to recipients be greater if they 
receive aid rather than if their exports increase by an equivalent amount. The benefit 
of pure aid (A) to a recipient can be interpreted, following Johnson (1967), as 
saving the excess burden of import substitution (c) while providing money for 
investment, and is defined as (l+c)A. Similarly, the revenue from exports (X ) is
10 Bob Hine has pointed out that in a Heckscher-Ohlin world this may be a null set. We accept 
that this may be true for most industries but believe there are many markets where tied aid acts as 
an effective barrier primarily because it determines that Western technology must be used. If 
recipients could choose the technology they may well find suppliers from developing countries.
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used to purchase imports which would otherwise be inefficiently produced 
domestically, with an implied benefit of cX. Pure aid confers a greater net benefit 
than export revenue since (l+c)A > cX given A - X .
Thirl wall (1976) pointed out that not all aid was in grant form so that the nominal 
value often contained a soft loan element (yielding a 'grant-equivalence factor' g) 
which reduces its real value to recipients (to Ag) so the net benefit is (l+c)Ag. 
Furthermore, tied aid tends to increase prices - a dollar of tied aid buys less - so that 
the relative value of a dollar of exports is greater by a factor of the ratio of tied aid 
prices to free market prices (r), giving a net benefit of rcX. Thirlwall (1976) 
argues that a unit of tied aid is still likely to be worth more, in terms of avoiding 
import substitution, than a unit of exports, ie. (1 +c)Ag > rcX (A =X ) . 11
If one accounts for indirect effects on savings, relative prices and public 
investment, exports may be of relatively greater net benefit than tied aid (Mosley, 
1988).Also, in terms of long-run development, one would wish ultimately to be 
able to replace aid (as a source of savings and/or foreign exchange) with exports. 
Whatever the net outcome, it is clear that tied aid is of less benefit than untied aid. 
Incorporating our view that tying creates a barrier to entry for LDC exporters 
complicates the argument The potential for exports, which can be interpreted as the 
probability of achieving a particular export benefit, is then a declining function of 
the incidence of tying. The expected value of exports is therefore less and it may 
well be the case that tied aid is preferable to no aid (ie. exports), although untied aid 
is better still. In terms of global resource allocation, however, it is the case fo r  
tying that needs to be proved.
2.4. The Development Objectives of Aid
One aim of this Chapter was to establish the view of the objectives of aid held by 
what we term the development lobby, those who support aid to assist economic 
growth, alleviate poverty and improve the level of income distribution in LDCs. 
The aim is to define a development view of aid against which the commercial view, 
which forms the focus of this thesis, can be compared. The concepts of growth and
11 This conclusion has been challenged by Yassin (1982) and defended by Thirlwall (1983) with 
the argument centering on the appropriate values for c, g and r and their comparison.
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development have been contrasted and it was noted that the objectives of aid 
appropriate to each differ and have implications for the form of aid that would be 
recommended.
Aid for development per se has been interpreted as aid with the specific objective 
of alleviating poverty and improving the welfare of the poor in LDCs. If one 
questions the redistributive capacity of the recipient and its ability to maximise 
social welfare (as distinct from favouring specific groups), assistance should take 
the form of project aid. Such projects require detailed appraisal to ensure that they 
are targeted on the poor, are best directed towards labour-intensive appropriate 
technology or the provision of non-traded services and facilities, such as primary 
health care or irrigation, and the aid should be untied.
The other broad case for aid is to promote growth because the investment capacity 
of LDCs is constrained, either due to low savings, limited foreign exchange or 
imperfect capital markets. A foreign exchange gap tends to justify programme aid 
and, in particular, balance of payments support; constraints on meeting domestic 
investment opportunities or needs justify project aid. Programme aid need place less 
emphasis on targetting (although distribution should remain an argument) and is 
consistent with capital goods projects and infrastructure development, so that it is 
more likely to accomodate the commercial objectives of donors. However, untied 
aid remains preferable because it implies prices nearer to competitive world levels, a 
more efficient allocation of global resources and permits greater choice to LDCs.
It would be remiss to end this chapter without brief reference to policy based 
lending, especially SALs; while such aid is not directly relevant to our thesis, the 
incidence of tying can affect the effectiveness of SALs. The basic objective of SALs 
is to encourage market liberalisation in LDCs, with special emphasis on eliminating 
distortions on prices, exchange rates and trade. The underlying effect of tying, as 
outlined in the next chapter, is to support donor exports to LDCs. Intrinsically, 
tying imposes price, allocation and trade distortions which are, themselves, 
contrary to the underlying arguments for SALs (see Morrissey, 1991, for a 
development of this argument in reference to Africa). It follows that the prevalence
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of tying can interfere with the effectiveness of SALs; this is not an issue we expand 
on, but note it here as an additional criticism of tying.
A final point is worth elaborating since it may have been noticed by the observant 
reader: a number of the arguments presented here provide a rationale for attaching 
specific conditions to loans. In particular, the moral itnperative for aid, if one 
accepts that it exists, requires that aid achieves the objective of alleviating poverty 
which, in turn, requires targetting. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances where 
it w.ould be impossible to target aid without attaching rigid conditions. For example, 
the target group may quite obviously be politically disenfranchised (the discussion 
of aid to Haiti in Riddell, 1987, provides a useful case). Moving towards the more 
conventional interpretation of conditionality, and recalling Figure 2.1, the ultimate 
economic rationale for aid is to bridge some sort of market deficiency, such as a 
savings or foreign exchange gap, so that the recipient economy can operate more 
efficiently. To this end, conditions which, at least, encourage LDCs to remove the 
more blatant economic distortions to the functioning of their economy (and this 
should not be interpreted as requiring 'free markets') may be consistent with 
ensuring that a particular form of aid is more likely to achieve its objectives.
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CHAPTER 3. MOTIVES FOR AID H: DONORS
The development reasons for granting aid have been identified; these explain why 
aid should be given, and provide indicators of the form it should take. Our basic 
thesis, however, is that aid is a component of public policy so that, to understand 
why aid takes the forms it does, one must look to the influences on donor aid 
policy. The political aspects of this theme are developed in the next Chapter, here 
we wish to identify the self-interested economic motives determining donor aid 
policy. We distinguish gross commercial benefits, the level of economic activity 
attributable to the aid budget, from the net economic benefit once allowance has 
been made for resource reallocation, price and welfare effects. Commercial benefits 
can be measured, as we do in later chapters, and can therefore have a direct input to 
aid policy-making. Economic benefits are far more difficult to quantify but provide 
qualifications for any estimates of commercial benefits.
The commercial benefits are the value of the exports financed fully or partly by aid, 
plus the value of associated economic activity. The measurement of these benefits is 
the empirical subject of this thesis. To assess the extent to which these benefits 
represent a net economic gain one must question, for example, whether the exports 
could have resulted in the absence of aid, whether the resources deployed in 
meeting these exports had efficient alternative uses and whether the transfer from 
donor taxpayers to firms was welfare increasing. We pose such questions in this 
chapter, and identify the issues that must be addressed to determine if there is an 
economic benefit. These questions are difficult to answer formally and almost 
impossible to resolve empirically, nor is this our aim. Estimates of commercial 
benefits can only be evaluated against the implications for net economic effects.
Aid is a capital outflow which reduces the donor's balance of payments; this 
resource cost is reduced by the extent to which the aid generates donor exports, 
which represent revenue to, and economic activity in, donor industries. The general 
approach adopted to measuring commercial benefits is to estimate the value of 
exports attributable to aid, termed aided exports (xa), and quantify the impact of
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these on the economy. There are four elements of donor benefit, as identified in 
Section 1.2 above. First is the direct benefit of aided exports. Second are indirect 
benefits due to the economic activity required to meet these exports. These two 
elements, comprising the commercial benefits, are discussed in Section 3.1. Third 
is whether aid is trade creating; this is the subject of Section 3.2, looking at trade 
between donors and recipients and Section 3.3, which considers competition 
between donor firms for LDC markets. Fourth, would the resources devoted to 
aided exports have otherwise been productively used; the issues of displacement 
and opportunity costs is the subject of Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5 we 
conclude on the commercial benefits and the probable net economic effects.
3.1. The Commercial Benefits from Tied Aid.
The basic rationale for tying aid is provided by transfer theory (Jepma, 1989:34). 
Aid is a balance of payments cost and tying generates exports which reduce the 
resource cost of donor transfers to LDCs. The value of exports is a direct offset, 
but other trade effects must be considered to get at the net resource costs. Although 
anticipating Section 3.2, this is an appropriate point to review an early study 
estimating the resource cost of UK aid. Hopkin and Associates (1970) considered 
four elements in the impact of aid on the balance of payments.
First, there is the direct effect of the offset due to exports, and it was estimated that 
72.5 per cent of UK bilateral aid over 1964-66 was spent on exports. Second, is 
switching: if an LDC receives money for one purpose this allows it to switch 
previously allocated funds to some other purpose (discussed as fungibility in 
Chapter 2). Tying is ineffective if it allows money that would have been spent on 
UK exports to be switched to the goods of a third country, but is effective if the 
project would have been awarded to a third country (and, presumably, if the project 
would not otherwise have been commissioned). The authors estimate that 62 per 
cent of fully tied aid was switched over 1964-66 and that a fifth of this was spent 
on UK exports. The implication is that half of the exports would have been secured 
even without tied aid. Adjusting the direct effect, some 53.6 per cent of bilateral aid 
was spent on exports (ignoring switching to the UK from other donor's aid).
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The third factor considered was induced imports: insofar as aid contributes to 
economic growth it will stimulate increased demand for imports by LDCs, some of 
which will translate into UK exports. The authors estimate that 22 per cent of UK 
bilateral aid was spent within the LDCs on domestic production, which generated 
export demand and a multiplier effect so that the equivalent of 4.1 per cent of aid 
returned as demand for UK exports, increasing the return on aid (exports as a 
percentage of initial aid) to 57.7 per cent Finally, the authors try to account for a 
reflection effect whereby the proportion of aid spent on third country products is 
reflected in an increase of UK exports to those countries.1 Allowing for all four 
elements Hopkin and Associates (1970:8) estimated that 62.6 per cent of UK 
bilateral aid returned as exports, implying a net balance of payments outflow.2 
Missing from the analysis, however, is any estimate of the expected return, in terms 
of exports, had none of this aid been tied (over half was).
Another gain from tying is the impact on the donor economy: exports require 
increased production and generate employment and additional tax revenue, which 
defrays the net cost of aid to the Exchequer. The impact of aid, as used here, refers 
to the measure of the commercial benefits. We outline the impact approach to 
measuring commercial benefits and summarise the literature on employment effects 
before concluding the section with a brief review of studies of the imapct on firms. 
This Chapter reviews the issues and we present detailed impact estimates of other 
studies in later chapters where they can be compared directly with our own.
The Impact of Aid
It is the aided exports, not aid itself, which impact on the donor economy; the 
fundamental determinant of impact is the ratio of aided exports to initial aid (termed 
here the export ratio, pa, for a type of aid, a). This direct benefit differs between 
types of aid, as outlined in Section 1.2. The most important distinction is between
1 In our impact analysis we take into account the increased imports required by the UK to 
produce aided exports; adapting Hopkin's terminology this could be called a deflection effect, as 
part of the value of UK exports is deflected to other countries.
2 May and Dobson (1982) estimate a return of 114 per cent for Bilateral aid over 1974-79. They 
include UK exports captured from other donors' untied aid, but exclude the potential gains from 
induced imports and reflection; nor do they include the switching or deflection losses.
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bilateral aid, some portion of which can be tied (yielding pp  < 1, where p  
designates bilateral aid), and multilateral aid, which is generally perceived as untied. 
However, the juste retour principle enhances the possibility that the export ratio 
can exceed one given agency' borrowing on international capital markets (p^> 1, 
where fi designates multilateral aid). Aided exports will generate indirect benefits 
through increased economic activity. In order to produce exports, an industry must 
purchase inputs from other industries, the value of which should also be included 
as part of the impact. To meet the increased demand for their products or services, 
the other industries will also demand inputs, and so on. The value of this output 
multiplier can be calculated (using Input-Output analysis) to measure the total 
production required throughout the economy (see Section 1.2).
Input-Output (10) analysis provides a formal method to measure impact. The 
economic relationship underlying 10 is the inter-dependence between industries in 
an economy; part of the output of one industry is an intermediate input for others, 
and each uses the products of other industries to make its output. From the 10 
Tables for an economy, one can calculate the Leontief inverse, a matrix representing 
by how much the output of each and every industry will have to increase to meet an 
increased demand, such as aided exports, for the output of one or more industries. 
The total outputs can be decomposed into demands for intermediate and imported 
inputs, labour income (from which employment estimates can be derived) and 
increased tax revenue.
That portion of an industry’s inputs not coming from other industries is the share 
accounted for by primary inputs, basically labour, profits, rents, some taxes and 
imported inputs. Imported inputs do not contribute to the donor economy and can 
be subtracted from the value of aided exports to give the net value of exports 
attributable to aid. The taxes paid on primary inputs, including labour and profits, 
contribute to government revenue and, if expressed as a percentage of the aid 
budget, can be treated as a measure of the return on aid to the Exchequer. Finally, 
the employment supported by aided exports can be estimated by calculating the 
number of employees per unit of industry output and multiplying this by total 
industry output.
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Employment Effects
The literature on the impact of British aid is quite sparse and largely comprises 
reports or project studies by individual companies or business lobbies. These tend 
to concentrate on two features of impact. First, although a contract is awarded to 
one large contractor, economic linkages and sub-contracting mean that a very large 
number of small companies will get orders. Northern Engineering Industries (NEI) 
estimated that one major project involving £292m spent in the UK provided orders 
for over 2,600 companies, 25 per cent of which employed less than 50 people, and 
helped the survival of some of these, many of which were in the 'industrially 
declining' areas of the UK (NEI, 1988). Second, and receiving greater attention, 
are claims that exports create employment. Even accepting the implicit assumption 
that there would be no compensating orders in the absence of aid, it does not follow 
that new orders imply new employment; the increased output may be met by 
overtime and increased productivity rather than increased employment
In a survey of firms winning aided exports over 1978-84, 21 per cent of orders 
were accounted for by firms claiming no employment effects, 16.6 per cent of 
orders were in firms claiming labour addition, new jobs and/or overtime, and more 
than 50 per cent were in firms claiming at least labour retention, so that no labour 
time or jobs were lost (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:154). Sustained orders, 
a market share in LDCs, will generate employment so some jobs are due to aid; 
nevertheless, we will talk of the level of employment supported by aided exports. 
There are a variety of ways to estimate employment effects. One is to argue that a 
certain number of jobs are associated with each £lm  of exports and assume this 
holds for xa; the Minister for Overseas Development argued in this way that each 
£ lm  of xa resulted in 154 jobs in 1976 (cited in May and Dobson, 1979:17). 
Alternatively, micro-studies of firms winning xa can generate harder figures: there 
have been estimates of 127 jobs per £lm  xa in 1976 (May and Dobson, 1979:18), 
an average of 86 jobs per £m over 1975-79 (May and Dobson, 1982), roughly 119 
over 1979-81 (MacQuaide and Toye, 1986) and the equivalent of 65 per £lm ;tfl in 
1985/6 (Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering, HSPE, 1986). This declining trend 
is consistent with increasing labour productivity over the period
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An alternative method, which may be necessary if micro-data is not available, is to 
estimate the effects of orders using direct and indirect employment multiples for 
different industries. McGregor (1986,1987) applied direct employment multiples 
for the number of construction employees per £lm  in contract value and estimated 
indirect employment as the number of employees that could receive the average 
wage from the estimated value of orders to suppliers and sub-contractors. His 
results can be interpreted as associating 53 man years of employment with each 
£ lm  of xa in 1985.
The 10 method of impact analysis is one of the best ways of estimating the 
employment potential of aggregate xa on the whole economy since it accounts for 
the direct employment in the industry winning the order and derived indirect 
employment in supplying industries. The only study we are aware of to use this 
method for aid in general is May, Schumacher and Malek (1989). Their estimates 
can be expressed as 51 man years of employment per £lm  of exports to LDCs in 
1984, although for aid shipments, for which 10 analysis is used, they find that the 
number of employees associated with £lm  xa fell from almost 99 in 1978 to 49 in 
1984, which is to be expected given rising productivity (we discuss the issue of 
aided exports and employment in Chapter 9).
Commercial Benefits to Firms and Industries
The ways in which aid can assist firms, and how this varies depending on the 
nature of the overseas business they are engaged in, are discussed in Chapter 6 but 
some issues can be covered here. The first point is that aided exports tend to be 
concentrated in a few industries. Over 1975-77, mechanical engineering took 35 per 
cent of aided exports, electrical engineering and vehicles each took 15 per cent, 
metal manufacturing 13 per cent and chemicals almost 11 per cent (May and 
Dobson, 1979). The corresponding shares for the early 1980s are similar, except 
for chemicals whose share becomes much lower. Twelve four-digit SIC industries 
accounted for over half of bilateral aid-financed business over 1978-84 and, of 
these, process engineering contractors won 10.6 per cent and basic electrical 
equipment 9 per cent (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:100).
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The firms winning aided exports tended to be larger, at least in employment terms, 
than the average. Excluding firms employing less than 100, almost 20 per cent of 
the firms receiving orders over 1975-77 employed over 10,000 whereas only 1.6 
per cent of all firms were in that employment range (May and Dobson, 1979:6). 
Aided exports tend to be concentrated in few firms: some 3,300 firms won aided 
exports worth at least £5,000 over 1978-84; the 24 with orders of £10m or more 
accounted for over half of total orders, while 83 companies with orders of £lm  or 
more accounted for over three-quarters. This contrasts with the less than 50 per cent 
share of the 100 largest UK enterprises in 1981 domestic output (May, Schumacher 
and Malek; 1989:148). These orders were important to the firms winning them, 
accounting on average for 12 per cent of sales and 19 per cent of exports, 
representing specially manufactured products in some 60 per cent of cases (by 
value) while in only 13 per cent of cases (by value) did the firms expect that orders 
would have resulted without aid (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:151-3).
The distribution of aid orders tended to favour some regions more than others, 
largely reflecting the concentration of engineering plants. Over 1975-77, Scotland 
did relatively well, accounting for some 25 per cent of aided exports compared to an 
8.6 per cent share of UK manufacturing output. The North and West Midlands also 
fared relatively well, whereas Yorkshire, Humberside and Wales fared badly 
relative to their shares of manufacturing (May and Dobson, 1979). This 
geographical distribution changed, for no apparent reason, by 1978-84 when the 
North, East Midlands and Yorkshire & Humberside were the regions whose share 
of bilateral orders exceeded their share of manufacturing output; Wales and the 
South West were the only regions for which the former share was less than half the 
latter (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:122).
3.2. Trade Effects of Tied Aid
If aid contributes to the economic growth of recipients it will, in time, provide new 
export markets for donors. Donor industries will win a share of global orders 
which, in the absence of tying, should reflect their market share (the UK accounted 
for some eight per cent of Western exports to LDCs over 1978-84). This would be 
the desired position in a competitive free-trade world, and would correspond to an
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efficient allocation of resources. Donors tie aid in the belief that this will provide 
them with a higher share of LDC markets than would otherwise be the case.
Aid is not fully trade creating if there are substitution effects, that is, if the aid is 
used to finance goods which would otherwise have been purchased from that donor 
(this corresponds to Hopkin's switching). These effects are more likely if tied aid 
goes to a relatively large country having trading links with the donor, they are least 
likely to arise if recipients are countries with which the donor does not normally 
trade, or if the recipient is severly resource constrained. When untied aid is granted 
to a trading partner there is an expectation that the money will be spent on donor 
goods. Given competition between major donors and the evolution of world trade, 
traditional ties are weakening such that tied aid may act as an instrument of export 
protection, with the presumption that substitution effects will be slight. In a review 
of some evidence, Jepma (1989:37) concludes that some 30 to 50 per cent of tied 
aid is not trade creating (ie. is switched or substituted).
On the other hand, aided exports facilitate market penetration and may generate a 
radiation effect if donor firms generate goodwill and win subsequent unaided 
orders. Substitution and radiation effects act in opposing directions and tend to be 
affected by the same factors in the same direction; trading ties and economic 
buoyancy in the recipient economy enhance both. Competitive tying between 
donors is also important since those offering a greater volume of tied aid are more 
likely to win a net increase in market share; as others tie, any individual donor is 
under pressure to offer tied aid to protect its market share. While tying may not 
appear to increase market share, the absence of tying may lose market share (the 
relationship between tying and market share is asymmetric). Once tying exists it is 
therefore self-peipetuating.
If a donor grants a relatively large share of its aid to a small and relatively poor country, it 
may generally be expected that the resulting increase in trade towards that country will be 
less than the tied part of the aid. The reason is that in this bilateral relationship the 
substitution effect (only aid is used to finance flows that otherwise also would have been 
realised) surpasses the radiation effect... (Jepma and Quist, 1988:41)
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Thus, donors who concentrate their tied aid on the small, poorest recipients are the 
least likely to experience net trade creation. This poses a challenge to any 'Aid to the 
Poorest' strategy since "in those cases where a relatively intensive development 
relationship was built up ... the development of commercial trade was slower." 
(Jepma and Quist, 1988:40). This is one reason why pressures for export-oriented 
aid focus on tied aid to relatively rich recipients for whom the radiation effect may 
be large (see, in particular, Chapter 8).
It is very difficult to assess objectively the trade-creation versus trade-protection 
effects of tied aid, especially because most of the evidence comes from surveys of 
industries winning aided exports. Over 1975-77, the majority of firms said that 
aided exports followed their normal export activities, especially if they had ties in 
the recipient, and that very few generated subsequent orders, implying that trade 
creation was limited (May and Dobson, 1982:50). A survey of firms winning 
orders over 1978-84, in which respondents accounted for about half of the total 
value of aided exports, found that a third of firms claimed no significant effect of 
aided exports in generating commercial orders. However, more than 13 per cent 
won follow-on orders, over 20 per cent won spares orders and over 25 per cent 
won spares and follow-on orders (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:157). No 
indication of the value of such business was given but the evidence suggests that 
aid can assist firms in increasing their share of LDC markets.
There is no evidence that aid, on aggregate, has had a significant effect on Britain's 
exports to LDCs. In a cross-section regression analysis, although some 85 per cent 
of the variance in Britain's share of Western exports to LDCs over 1978-84 could 
be explained, the significant factors were historical ties, direct investment and the 
commodity structure of demand while aid, measured as UK share of total Western 
bilateral aid, was not significant (May, Schumacher and Malek; 1989:175-83). The 
equations were subject to multicollinearity and were specified in a rather ad hoc 
manner so that the results are not robust.3 Furthermore, the formulation cannot
3 For example, Berlage and Vanderlee (1978) argue that historical ties and political factors are 
the determinants of aid allocations by donors; it is therefore possible that aid is insignificant in a 
single equation specification because it is simultaneously determined.
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distinguish what would have been the case under untied aid. Finally, export 
competition is not really between donors, but between donor’ firms, where aid 
support may have a greater importance.
3.3. Strategic Trade Policy and the Implications for Tied Aid
Traditional trade theory is based on general equilibrium welfare economics; where 
markets are perfectly competitive and not subject to externalities, non-intervention is 
the recommended government policy for maximising economic efficiency and 
welfare. While other maximands may exist, these are generally deemed outside the 
remit of economics, or particularly treated as distortions. If the basic assumptions 
of perfect competition and no externalities do not hold, the principle of second-best 
may still support the recommendation of non-intervention. The new international 
economics (Krugman, 1986a) is based on a game theory approach in which 
competition between firms in international oligopolistic markets is modelled as a 
positive-sum repeated game. The basic feature for Strategic Trade Policy (STP) is 
imperfect competition:
Specifically, there is an international market for some good or closely related set of 
goods, but there are relatively few firms in the market As a consequence it is possible fa* 
firms to earn profits above the rate of return earned in purely competitive industries. Trade 
policy then emerges as a national attempt to obtain as large a share of these international 
profits as possible. (Brander, 1986:25)
Our interest in STP is that it is an economic theory which is capable of providing a 
justification for export subsidies, in which tied aid can be included. Under certain 
restrictive conditions regarding the nature of the imperfectly competitive market, it 
is possible that an export subsidy can increase domestic welfare and net global 
welfare. If the industries winning aided exports meet these conditions, then tying 
could yield a net economic gain to both donor and recipient. The formal analysis of 
STP is beyond our scope but the central idea can be conveyed with a simple case of 
oligopolistic competition, after which we generalise to discuss the required 
conditions. We can then consider, in later chapters, whether the allocation of aided 
exports tend to be to industries which meet these conditions.
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A Simple Case of Cournot Oligopoly
The basic premise of Cournot competition is that firms choose the quantity to 
produce so as to maximise their expected payoff (profit) given that there is a single 
market clearing price determined by the total output of all firms. Each firm thus has 
a reaction function which defines its best response, in terms of output to produce, 
given the outputs chosen by other firms. We assume certainty, so each firm will 
choose its best response; symmetry, all firms face identical cost functions; and a 
once-off game with homogenous products (the presentation here is drawn from 
Dixon, 1988). Given a single price (P) and output of the Ith firm (*,-) we can 
define the inverse industry demand (where the firm is excluded from the ] firms 
in the summations over all n firms):
P = 1 - Xi - £  Xj
assuming constant marginal costs (f) we can define costs:
f i  = A ;
hence profits
TTj = Xi (1 ~ Xj - £  xj) - f x t
choosing output to maximise profits
dnf i xi  =  1 - 2X i - Z x j - f  =  0
yielding a reaction function:
xi = n (xj) = (i - Zxj -f) / 2
given symmetry, all firms produce the same (Cournot) quantity:
2xc = 1 - (n - l)xc - f
implying Cournot quantity
xe = (1 - / ) / ( «  +1)
The Cournot quantity, x c, is a Nash equilibrium as represented by the intersection 
of the two reaction functions depicted in Fig. 3.1. In the Figure, both firms face
(3.1) and symmetry ensures both face (3.2) implying symmetric reaction functions, 
rj (*2) and ^2 (*;)> around the dotted 45° line. Both firms produce the same 
output and earn the same level of profits. The quantity decision is given by (3.5), 
ie. each firm will choose a point on its reaction curve and the Nash equilibrium is 
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each firm chooses output based on its assumption of how the other will choose 
since combined output determines price and, hence, profits.
Figure 3,1. Coumot-Nash Equilibrium
X,c
X, X.c a
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Profits can be represented by iso-profit curves such as nc in Figure 3.1 which is a 
locus of (x j , x 2 ) points for firm 1 to maintain the same level of profits: given
(3.1): a point on nc to the right of x c  implies profits are maintained as more is sold 
at a lower price; a point to the left along kc represents maintained profits as less is 
sold at a higher price. Viewed another way, the output of firm 1 defined where an 
iso-profit curve crosses its reaction curve is that output allowing firm 1 to earn the 
given profit while allowing firm 2 its maximum output From such a point, if firm 2 
increases its output, price falls and so too do firm l's profits. Alternatively, if firm 
2 reduces output, price rises and so too do firm l's profits. In fact, a firms reaction 
curve is the locus of the peaks of its iso-profit curves and the nearer the ^  to the 
respective axis, the higher the implied profits. Thus, a firm will wish to be on the 
lowest attainable 7% (the highest attainable profit). In Figure 3.1, 7ZC is the Cournot 
profit where both firm's are producing the same quantity (xc); since each firm is on 
its reaction function, each is earning the highest attainable profit given its rival’s 
output decision.
We can now indicate the case for an export subsidy. Firm 1 would prefer to be on 
%1 (>  7UC)  than at the Nash equilibrium, and could achieve this by producing x a  if 
it could be certain that firm 2 would accept this and produce an output below x c  as 
given from r 2 ( x j ) t ie. if firm 2 would produce X f .  Firm 1 would not choose x a  
given the model as discussed because it is not on r j ( x 2 ) ;  since firm 2 would 
choose x c  total output would be too high if firm 1 produced x a  (shown as Q in 
the Figure, which is above tuc implying a lower profit). One possibility would be 
Stackelberg leadership if firm 1 could register its choice first. Alternatively, firm 1 
needs some means of informing firm 2 that it can and will produce x a .  An export 
subsidy would have this effect: by reducing firm l's costs it would effectively shift 
r l ( x 2 ) outwards to r j ( x f i .  Thus the firm with the subsidy can credibly threaten to 
produce more and the other firm will acquiesce and reduce its output
The Conditions for a Strategic Subsidy
The formal model of the use of export subsidies to switch profits from foreign to 
domestic firms is expounded by Brander and Spencer (1985) but it is sufficient here
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to present the arguments in an informal manner. The argument of concern is that an 
export subsidy is a precommitment allowing domestic firms to increase their share 
of the market and, therefore, their profits. The central requirement is that an export 
subsidy increases the profits to the domestic firm by more than the value of the 
subsidy. The additional profits to the subsidised firm have two components; first, 
the transfer represented by the subsidy and, second, increased profits due to a 
higher share of the market (enhanced if there are increasing returns). There is 
therefore a net gain to the domestic economy (although there may be an implicit 
redistribution from taxpayers to shareholders); consuming countries should benefit 
"... because part of the subsidy will be passed on in the form of lower final prices. 
In fact the combined benefit to consuming countries and the domestic country will 
exceed the cost to the other producing country. From the world point of view this 
policy is actually welfare improving” (Brander, 1986:30). The result holds only 
under special conditions.
First, it is essential that profits are switched from a foreign firm to the domestic 
firm receiving the subsidy. Given the requirement that the increased profits should 
exceed the subsidy cost, the principal characteristic is that the industry exhibits 
barriers to entry and, hence, existing firms earn monopoly rents. The subsidised 
industry must face foreign competition and, if the rival is to contract, conform to 
Cournot oligopoly as outlined above. The Cournot model is appropriate to auction 
markets and, generally, where prices are more flexible than quantities (Dixon, 
1988:135) which is likely if industry capital requirements are large and inflexible. 
These basic conditions appear applicable to large overseas projects, but this in itself 
does not justify the subsidy. The existence of monopoly rents is essential, but not 
itself guaranteed by Cournot oligopoly, because otherwise the initial equilibrium 
would represent an efficient allocation of resources.
Second, it is required that the other firm (foreign country) does not retaliate by 
providing a matching subsidy; the initial subsidy is intended as a predatory strategy 
to gain first mover advantage. One can infer from Figure 3.1 that if both firms 
received subsidies they would over-produce and earn lower profits; the effect of the 
subsidy would then be to encourage an inefficient allocation of resources. A
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subsidy is most effective if the domestic industry has cost advantages over rivals 
or, more generally, if increased output allows it to avail of scale economies. 
Effective subsidies target technology-intensive industries so increased exports 
enhance market position, facilitate technological developments and thereby confer 
external economies to the domestic economy, as the gains from new technology 
spillover to other firms, industries and consumers. Under these conditions the 
subsidy helps an efficient producer to become dominant, and the gains from 
retaliation are lessened if not negated. If these conditions are not met, there may be 
an incentive for rivals to retaliate, leading to inefficiency.
Third, it is important that prices do not fall too much. If subsidised firms produced 
too much and/or rivals did not contract enough, there would be inefficient over­
production, prices would fall and profits may not exceed the cost of the subsidy, 
implying a net welfare loss. To prevent this the domestic industry must be at least 
as concentrated as the rival industries; the fewer foreign firms the more each is 
likely to cut its output while the fewer domestic firms the less one is likely to 
expand its output (Spencer, 1986:74). Extending this argument, if there are a 
number of competitive rivals, each may resist cutting its output in the belief that it 
can best survive a fight for market share, or alternatively because it believes it will 
be able to elicit support from its government
Fourth, it is essential that the subsidised industry is not intensive in the use of 
scarce factors. A unit subsidy is less effective to the extent that increased industry 
rents go to factor inputs rather than profits; although the factor incomes are a 
domestic benefit, they will constrain the expansion of exports and therefore 
constrain the strategic gain. More importantly, the subsidised industry will increase 
its demand for, and remuneration to, these factors thereby increasing costs 
throughout the economy and, in this way, generating inefficiencies in resource 
allocation and reducing the international competitiveness of other firms. Domestic 
consumers will suffer as output is diverted abroad and oligopolistic firms increase 
domestic prices, which reduces domestic welfare. In this context there is a net 
welfare reducing redistribution from taxpayers to a group of shareholders.
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To summarise, we propose a basic rule for identifying industries to which an export 
subsidy may be net welfare increasing: there must be very few rivals in an industry 
earning monopoly rents, the domestic firm must be capable of becoming dominant, 
suggesting that the subsidy need only be once-off, and the industry should not be 
intensive in the use of scarce factors. Even accepting the possibility of these 
conditions being met in theory, it remains very difficult to ascertain if firms meet 
these conditions in practice:
the criterion for selection is how much extra profit could be shifted to the [domestic] firm 
from its foreign rival pa* unit of the scarce resource expended in doing so. This depends in 
a complicated way on the technologies of the domestic and foreign firms, on the degree of 
substitution between their products, on the price-responsiveness of demand in the export 
market, and on the nature of oligopolistic competition. Needless to say, the selection 
criterion ... would be difficult to implement in practice. (Grossman, 1986:60)
Grossman (1986:56-7) argues that excess profits in a market will not persist 
indefinitely and a subsidy will encourage domestic entrants; domestic welfare will 
suffer if there are too many entrants, so that scale economies are not realised or 
excessive competition drives down the price. The difficulty lies in identifying which 
industries have sufficiently high barriers to deter entry. A related problem is that the 
selection process would be politically influenced, the winners being established 
industries and "... those that could most easily overcome the free-rider problems 
associated with industry-wide lobbying ... leaving us with a set of strategic trade 
policies that would serve only the interests of those fortunate enough to gain 
favour." (Grossman, 1986:65). Even if industries worth targetting exist, the 
political system under which subsidies are allocated would distort implementation 
so that the wrong firms could benefit. This implication is salient to our later 
analysis, as it implies rent-seeking, and will be invoked again in Chapters 8 and 9.
3.4. Opportunity Costs of Tying
Even if tied aid were trade creating, either by strengthening trading links with LDCs 
or by increasing the market share of certain firms, it involves a domestic 
redistribution of income and reallocation of resources which may not be optimal; 
taxpayers may be willing to give money to LDCs but nor necessarily to domestic
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firms. A more general aspect is the opportunity cost: could taxpayers’ funds used in 
tied aid have been better deployed in some other use? This issue is usually raised in 
impact literature in the context of the displacement effect which is comparable to 
the notion of crowding-out: the net impact on the donor is reduced to the extent that 
the demand for domestic inputs to meet the aided export displaces domestic demand 
that would otherwise have been realised. In their study of the impact of own-aid on 
the Irish economy, Fitzpatrick and Storey (1988) argue that the resource costs to 
Ireland from using labour and materials for overseas aid rather than to produce 
goods for use by Ireland actually outweigh the benefits of aid to the Irish economy. 
This conclusion is suspect because the authors did not account for the multiplier 
effects of increased exports while significant displacement is only likely in an 
economy at full capacity, which was not the case for Ireland (Morrissey, 1990d).
Love (1988; Love and Dunlop, 1990) made a commendable effort to allow for 
displacement effects in a study of the impact of a contract to supply gas turbines to 
China won by a UK company with aid support He argued that the exports could 
not have been won without aid to counter rivals, ie. there was no substitution but a 
significant radiation (two unaided contracts were won). A questionnaire was sent to 
all the major sub-contractors asking if the particular orders had prevented them from 
meeting other orders and there was no evidence of direct displacement. It was 
argued that real domestic displacement requires that orders are lost to foreign firms 
(above normal demand for imported inputs) and could therefore only be significant 
for industries with high capacity utilisation and, even then, would be proportional 
to the industry import penetration ratio. The study demonstrates that displacement 
effects are probably negligible and there is no reason to consider this as untypical.
Table 3.1 presents some data on business expectations regarding export growth and 
perceptions regarding the major constraints. The years 1980 and 1984 are chosen as 
representative of the period of our impact analysis, and the industries listed are 
those which won aided exports (see Appendix A for definitions). There are two 
important conclusions. First, optimism about export potential increased for most 
industries over the early 1980s. Second, price competition and, to a much lesser
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Table 3.1: Expectations on Export Growth and Constraints,
By Industry, 1980 and 1984.
Industry Export Constraints on Growth
Growth Prices Credit Capacity
1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984
1. MOP 5 6 35 62 0 4 2 2
2. I&S 5 25 89 53 14 15 2 2
3. nMMP 3 20 91 80 0 27 10 10
4. Frt 0 32 60 75 6 13 5 36
5. Phm 9 29 40 42 8 15 7 12
6. Mtl 0 33 98 33 0 0 3 10
7. IPlt 38 51 98 95 1 21 12 18
8. AMch 2 59 23 61 35 40 6 1
9. TWMch 0 74 94 95 5 15 1 14
10. PMch 3 28 93 60 7 12 10 3
11. MCMch 15 22 98 64 3 11 6 3
12. OMch 5 48 70 77 4 6 3 5
13. OfEq 3 0 93 24 7 3 10 0
14. IW&QElEq* 21 12 95 91 31 5 3 4
16. TIEq/ECA* 11 20 45 32 0 6 3 6
18. Mot 7 33 81 90 15 4 3 3
19. Ships 8 5 97 96 57 0 58 0
20. OVch 19 65 68 30 4 29 16 3
21. InstE 3 56 88 37 26 13 9 9
NOTES AND SOURCES: All data are from Confederation of British Industry 
Survey of Economic Trends (January 1980,1984, and 1985); Industries are defined 
in Table A.1; because of data, industries 14/15 and 16/17 were combined, as 
indicated, and * implies 1985 is used instead of 1984. Data are percentage of firms 
claiming: to be more optimistic about Export Growth than 12 months previously; 
that Price competition relative to foreigners is a constraint on exports; that the 
availability of Credit is a constraint; that plant Capacity is a constraint on the ability 
to increase output over the next four months.
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extent, availability of credit were by far the most frequently cited constraints. 
Capacity constraints were not generally cited as an impediment to export growth; in 
those industries where they were, it is generally true that both export optimism and 
capacity constraints increased. This is consistent since expanding firms will be 
using more of their capacity. The data suggest that displacement effects were 
unlikely to be significant on aggregate.
There is a potential relationship between perceptions on price competitiveness and 
the availability of credit which, since the latter refers to export credit, insurance and 
finance, is most important for companies exporting to LDCs. Firms that believe 
rivals can avail of export subsidies would be expected to see this as a problem of 
prices and the availability of credit. Tied aid does not explain the data, but the 
worries encapsulated in these expectations and perceptions indicate why firms argue 
for tied aid to help (price) competitiveness and to provide export finance.
Displacement effects can be generalised as a form of opportunity costs; resources 
employed in one use, such as aided exports, are not avaliable for other uses, such 
as production for domestic demand. There is an opportunity cost if alternative uses 
could be more productive; there is no opportunity cost if existing uses are the best, 
or if resources would otherwise have been unemployed. If displacement is low 
there is an expectation that opportunity costs are low and, beyond this, little can be 
said. The problem is not simply in identifying the alternative opportunities but also 
deciding on how to measure the benefits. For example, to assess the opportunity 
cost of using tied aid to increase domestic welfare, we would have to resolve all the 
problems of Sections 3.2 and 3.3, and carry out the same exercise for alternative 
uses of the funds. An obviously daunting task (but see Chapter 9).
3.5. Assessing the Net Economic Effect of Tying
We have demonstrated that numerous factors need to be considered in assessing the 
net economic effects of aid. A useful starting point to a full framework is Mosley's 
(1987:214-5) list of six elements in the export benefits of aid. His first four are, 
using the terminology set out earlier: direct exports, radiation effects, induced
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exports and reflection. These measure the gross expansion of exports and, to get at 
the net effect, one should deduct the switching/substitution element and any export 
displacement effects (his last two factors). Of these, only direct exports can be 
measured with any degree of confidence. To arrive at net economic effects we 
would also wish to examine the nature of the industries, the price and resource 
allocation effects and, hence, the ultimate effect on donor and recipient welfare.
The aim of this thesis is to measure the commercial benefits of aid - the direct and 
indirect impact of aided exports on gross domestic economic activity. We envisage 
a specific use for this measure as an indicator of business interests in the aid budget 
and of how well these interests are served by the budget and changes therein. The 
objective of this chapter has been to demonstrate that commercial benefits are not 
equivalent to net economic effects, and to identify a range of issues that must be 
acknowledged in evaluating any measure of benefit. Factors influencing the net 
economic effects demonstrate that there are issues of concern to the government, in 
determining the aid budget, above and beyond commercial benefits. The issues 
concerning net economic effects indicate areas of debate which act as a restraint on 
the influence of business groups. An example is useful.
In arguing the virtues of the Aid and Trade Provision, business groups normally 
cite the considerable commercial benefits and then assert that the orders would not 
have been won without aid support and that there were radiation effects. Thus, they 
try to circumvent some of the trade creation arguments. This line of argument seems 
to have been accepted by officials in the Department of Trade and Industry involved 
in export promotion. On the other hand, officials within the Treasury will be 
concerned with minimising public spending and will scrutinise export subsidies in 
terms of their probable net economic effects. Furthermore, officials in the Overseas 
Development Administration will be more concerned with the effectiveness of aid in 
the recipient countries. We will argue that the relative ease in measuring commercial 
benefits gives business interests a bargaining advantage, but this is insufficient to 
ensure an effective influence on government policy.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 4 6 5
CHAPTER 4. TRENDS IN THE UK AID BUDGET 1978-89
This Chapter reviews developments in UK aid policy over the period from 1978 to 
1989 (the latest date for which full data are available), as reflected by changes in the 
aid budget - its composition between different forms of aid; the sectors in which 
projects are supported; its geographical allocation and the relative poverty of the 
LDCs receiving aid. Since the theme of the thesis is the commercial benefits from 
aid, special attention is paid to the role of business interest groups, in particular 
their input into decisions on the composition and allocation of the aid budget. There 
is a perception that British aid has increasingly been directed towards commercial 
interests at the expense of development objectives, fuelled by the rhetoric of 
government statements and the introduction of the ATP. We term this the 
commercialisation of aid, that more emphasis is now placed on export potential, and 
ask to what extent have business groups influenced aid policy. No attempt is made 
to define aid policy per se and attention is focused on the aid budget which can be 
defined and largely measured so that changes are visible.1
In Section 4.1 we discuss the objectives of aid, distinguishing political, commercial 
and development considerations, its position within public policy and the political 
determinants of the allocation of aid. Section 4.2 turns to internal politics and 
describes the role of pressure groups in influencing the aid budget, arguing that the 
business lobby is likely to be more influential than the development lobby. There is 
an apparent digression in Section 4.3 which reviews the origin and administration 
of ATP. However, we will argue that this development encapsulates the debates 
between different lobbies, while the discussion allows us to elaborate on the 
essential administrative features of the aid budget Changes in the aid budget are 
reviewed in Section 4.4, which presents statistics on composition and allocation. 
Trends in UK aid are compared with those of other donors in Section 4.5. The 
summary and conclusion is in Section 4.6.
1 A few definitions are required: policy-maker refers to active participants in the dialogue with 
the government about aid policy; decision-makers are those who actually decide on details of 
policy, generally Civil Servants with the Cabinet as the ultimate authority. The budgetary process 
is the dialogue between policy-makers and decision-makers on the general form of the aid budget
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4.1. The Objectives of Aid Policy.
Aid is not, and has not been, a major element in British public policy, being often 
implicitly viewed as an element of foreign policy, and the aid budget is only a minor 
part of government expenditure (roughly one per cent throughout the 1980s). 
Nonetheless, it has important ramifications for Britain and three general objectives 
can be identified. First is the commercial objective whereby aid is used to support 
exports by British companies. Second are the political objectives of generating 
goodwill and influence for Britain in LDCs; that these are important is evident in the 
central role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Finally, the 
development objective is ostensibly the prime purpose of aid, to promote economic 
growth and increase welfare in the poorest LDCs. In deciding on the annual aid 
budget, the government has its own ranking of these objectives and must also 
respond to lobbying from interest groups favouring particular objectives.
The British government is constrained, by relatively fixed commitments to 
multilateral aid agencies (MAAs) and to some recipient countries, in the extent to 
which it can alter the aid budget in any given year. In 1981, 'unavoidable' 
commitments represented up to 60 per cent of the aid budget (Horesh, 1984:114). 
Within these external constraints, the composition of British aid can be seen as 
arising from a decision-making process to reconcile the three objectives, which 
often conflict but occasionally reinforce each other. Broadly speaking in this 
process, development issues are represented by the Overseas Development 
Administration (OD A) supported by a number of charities and NGOs; commercial 
interests are promoted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with the 
backing of business lobbies, and the FCO takes responsibility for global political 
aspects. All three act in concert on at least one issue, that the size of the aid budget 
be increased, and on this they are opposed by the . Treasury as guardian of 
government expenditure.
The broad emphasis of aid policy has been heavily influenced by international 
factors, in particular the strategy of the World Bank and IMF. In the early 1970s the 
World Bank promoted growth with redistribution and the targetting of aid on the 
poorest people in the least developed countries; this was recognised as UK policy in 
the 1975 White Paper (Ministry of Overseas Development, 1975). In the 1980s,
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largely in response to the ’neo-classical counter-revolution in development 
economics’ (Toye, 1987), both the World Bank and IMF have supported structural 
adjustment. This has been reflected in increased UK emphasis on programme aid 
for structural adjustment, an issue we do not discuss.
The Government’s perception of how aid promotes development, and indeed of 
what development means, influences how it reacts to international trends and affects 
the status of lobbies, making the Government more responsive to the arguments of 
one rather than another. From the 1975 White Paper it appears that the last Labour 
Government held a view consistent with the development lobby. British aid was to 
be targeted on the poorest people in the poorest countries since development means 
improving the welfare of the most impoverished. This had direct implications for 
the budget as aid was to be allocated to agriculture, irrigation and rural development 
(Jay, 1977). The trends in the aid budget in the late 1970s reflected these desires, 
going more to the rural areas in the poorest countries (Independent Group on 
British Aid, IGBA, 1982).
The shift in emphasis towards targetting the poorest was part of a global trend, and 
Britain was following the lead of others ”... we and other aid donors are now 
adapting our aid policies to give more help to the poorest countries and the poorest 
people within these countries” (Ministry of Overseas Development, 1975). This 
poverty-focussed strategy was also in line with World Bank thinking, which 
Yudelman (1976, cited in IGBA, 1982:8) dated to 1973 when the Bank decided to 
focus on poverty through projects to benefit the rural poor and increase the output 
of small farmers. Economic growth per se was no longer considered adequate to 
reduce poverty; insufficient wealth actually managed to 'trickle-down'.
The extent to which policy did change is debateable. Elliot (1976) argues that the 
White Paper was predicated on the belief that scarcity of resources, rather than 
exploitative relationships, is the fundamental cause of poverty; economic growth 
remained an effective and desirable strategy. Furthermore, promoting income 
redistribution and a rural focus had implications for economic and political relations 
in LDCs, and Britain was reluctant to press its views on LDCs (Horesh, 1984:115)
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which posed a dilemma regarding "how to offer but not to prescribe the right 
medicine, to make available what is best for the recipient, to be sure that it is his 
choice and that he chooses right" (Gee, 1976:39, original emphasis).
The weak commitment to the policy-shift was evident in the absence of any 
Government directives on how help to the poorest should be implemented (IGBA, 
1982:9). The accession of the Conservatives to power under Mrs. Thatcher in 1979 
coincided with an international trend towards neo-classical, market-oriented, 
economics which argued that the route to development was through export-led 
growth, trade liberalisation and de-regulated markets. This view sat comfortably in 
the economic ideology of a government sympathetic to the argument that aid 
encouraged laziness rather than efficiency; we have no evidence that they endorsed 
this view, but it made it easier for them to impose large cuts on the aid budget, 
which they did, and supported a shift away from the emphasis on the poorest. The 
Minister for Overseas Development in 1980, Mr. Neil Marten, said in a 
Parliamentary Statement on 20 February:
We believe that it is right at the present time to give greater weight in the allocation of 
our aid to political, industrial and commercial considerations alongside our basic 
developmental objectives.
The Thatcher government marked a shift towards an aid policy more compatible 
with business views but this does not in itself imply that the business lobby became 
more influential. Thateherite economics seemed to argue that only inefficient firms 
asked for State help; if tied aid was an export subsidy Mrs. Thatcher would not 
have been sympathetic to business arguments. Nonetheless, throughout the 1980s 
Ministers for Overseas Development were vocally supportive of business interests:
Most [businessmen] recognise that the aid programme is there to benefit developing 
countries. Many also believe that what they have to offer does promote development... it 
is unrealistic for the IGBA to believe that donors should not take account of any political 
and commercial considerations. Nor does it help to imply that anything that brings 
benefits to British industry, or brings political goodwill, can't by definition be 'real aid'.
(Mr. Chris Patten, in ActionAid, 1987:9)
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The government saw no conflict between various objectives of aid and could claim 
to promote development while furthering commercial interests, but was reluctant to 
directly assist companies. The DTI did not suffer from the same constraint and 
fostered a close sympathetic relationship, viewing itself as a partner to business. 
The then Minister for Trade, Mr. Alan Clark, argued that ATP should be brought 
fully under the control of the DTI, which should have greater control over the entire 
aid budget based on recognition of profit and advantage (Guardian, 15.7.87). The 
Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC, 1987) also took the view that the DTI should 
control ATP, but because ATP was not consistent with the purposes of aid.
Influences on the Level of the Aid Budget
In the 1980s the British gross aid budget has fallen from about 0.4 to 0.3 per cent 
of GNP, compared with an international target for developed market economies of 
giving 0.7 per cent of GNP in aid. Scandinavian countries have mostly exceeded 
this target while Britain is below most European countries but above Japan and the 
USA. Although this provides a useful benchmark, it says nothing about the effects 
of aid, either domestically or for recipients. While there is pressure to match the 
generosity of other donors, this is tempered by domestic interests and the ways in 
which other donors promote their commercial interests.
A number of studies have tried to analyse the factors determining the size of the_aid 
budget In an exploratory analysis subject to unresolved econometric problems, 
Beenstock (1980) found that the volume of a donor's aid was positively correlated 
with lagged aid, GNP, and the balance of payments, but negatively correlated with 
population, unemployment and the net budget surplus. The decline in the real value 
of UK aid in the early 1980s is therefore consistent with a period of high 
unemployment and slow growth, and we could generally expect aid to increase as 
an economy grows and its trade balance improves so it can more easily absorb the 
outflow of money. Beenstock interprets the net budget surplus as a measure of 
fiscal rectitude, so that a higher surplus means tighter spending and less aid.
A similar model has been proposed by Mosley (1981,1987) in which aid is related 
positively to existing commitments, the volume of aid given by other donors and
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the perceived need of recipients, but negatively to unemployment and the net budget 
deficit. Econometric analysis supported the negative coefficient on unemployment 
and positive coefficients on commitments and other donors. The coefficient on the 
budget deficit was expected to be negative as the deficit was interpreted as a 
measure of the pressures for cutting spending; the coefficient was significant, and 
negative, for only one of the nine donors tested (Mosley, 1987:78). Perhaps most 
importantly, he concluded that the UK and Canada, unlike other donors, responded 
to public demands to increase aid by trying to improve its quality. The models 
suggest that falling unemployment and rising GNP would permit increased aid 
although, given the trade deficit, there would be strong pressure for tying it.
4.2. Pressure Groups and Aid Policy
We will find it useful to classify groups into insiders and outsiders as a means of 
selecting those we expect to be influential. In the conventional view, insiders are 
officially recognised as representative of their members and are granted direct 
access to Whitehall departments, cultivating close contacts and regular dialogue. 
Outsiders, because they represent a heterogeneous or weakly defined membership 
and/or campaign on fundamental issues, are not granted direct access and are more 
likely to appeal to Westminister and the public (Jordan and Richardson, 1987:30- 
40). The obvious implication is that insiders have more influence so their views are 
more likely to be incorporated in policy. Two factors are consistent indicators of the 
status accorded to a particular group. First, the homogeneity and uniformity of the 
views of their membership. Second, the ability of the group to pose threats or 
sanctions to the government, or to identify a visible cost to members from a 
particular policy, or from the non-adoption of a policy. Homogenous groups which 
can make effective threats are the most likely to be influential insiders.2 We will 
argue, after describing the competing lobbies, that business groups tend to be 
insiders while the development groups are more likely to be outsiders.
The Business Lobby and Aid
The views of business groups on aid will depend on the nature of their relationship
2 A further factor is the involvement of the group in implementation but this is beyond the 
scope of our analysis. We acknowledge that the ultimate effects of aid policy, and the extent to 
which it meets any objectives, depend crucially on implementation in LDCs.
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to aid and there are three basic categories: large exporting firms for whom aid in 
relatively large volumes can be very important; smaller firms who could benefit 
directly from aid, in relatively small volumes, if it assisted their export drive, or 
who benefit indirectly from sub-contracts; and consultants, for whom aid support 
can be vital. The aims of a lobby are identified with their statements on aid and 
representative bodies, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the case of 
smaller firms, are taken as the voice of the lobby.
The Major British Exporters
Large firms in the contractor industry, comprising construction and engineering, 
have the strongest vested interest in aid because of the importance of LDC markets 
and the availability of aid support to foreign competitors (see Chapters 6 to 8); 
between 1978 and 1984 such firms won almost three quarters of all UK exports 
supported by aid. It is natural that the firms most likely to have a share in LDC 
markets will be large exporters. The single most important factor in winning 
overseas orders is a local presence and only the largest firms can afford the 
overhead costs involved, but aid support is often cited as being equally important
Large exporting firms constitute a relatively small, homogenous group and although 
the importance attached to different types of aid may vary, their fundamental 
interests are held in common. All agree that the aid budget should be used to further 
commercial interests by supporting their market share in LDCs. They claim that the 
benefits from aid-supported exports are commercially significant (see Chapter 3). 
By implication, there is the effective threat of an economic cost, in terms of lost 
output, if aid is not used to support British firms; the potential benefits of tied aid 
are visible, largely measurable and effect a small group directly.
The high degree of concentration in UK industry and the strong ethic of 
’individualistic enterprise’ has encouraged direct contact between individual firms 
and government; since the 1970s this principle (of bottom up consultation) has been 
accepted by government and civil servants with some success (Grant, 1987). For 
the major firms, close personal contacts with government are the principal means of 
expressing their interests. Large exporting firms have direct access to decision­
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making within the DTI3 through representation on the British Overseas Trade 
Board (BOTB) which was set up in 1972 to advise on overseas trade and the 
official export promotion programme and has membership of about half from 
industry, others from the civil service and commerce. The Overseas Projects Board 
(OPB), set up in 1977 as a separate group within the BOTB framework, is more 
directly concerned with aid:
The Overseas Projects Board... serves to give government an understanding of industry's 
views... [regarding] government policy in relation to major overseas projects, ... the 
selection of one company or one group of companies to put forward the most effective 
national bid [and] the provision of assistance under the Overseas Projects Fund and the 
Aid and Trade Provision. (Overseas Projects Board, 1988:3)
The OPB had ten members in 1988, seven from major firms, three among the firms 
that were the largest beneficiaries from ATP (see Chapter 8), and three from 
commerce. Its views are those of the Major British Exporters, a group of some 
thirteen of the largest contractors, established in 1985 and encompassing the OPB, 
and are set out in annual reports reviewing Britain's performance. It stresses the 
importance of winning overseas projects, in terms of the direct contribution to the 
export drive and the indirect benefits of the impact of increased output on the UK 
economy. "The Board would like to see an overall increase in the aid programme, 
enabling the bilateral aid programme to be increased without affecting our 
commitments to the multilateral development agencies." (OPB, 1988:9)
The Export Group for the Constructional Industries (EGCI) represents the major 
overseas contractors and its membership overlaps with the OPB. Its views on aid 
are set out in a number of papers by the Director General, Mr. Peter McGregor, 
which emphasise the underlying need for aid support because of the extensive aid 
budgets of other donors. The significant reduction in the real value of tied bilateral 
aid in the early 1980s imposed a large cost on British exporters in terms of lost 
orders; the UK should give more tied bilateral aid both in volume terms and relative
3 Major companies also tend to have close connections with the Tory party. Some 15-25% of 
the 1000 largest firms contribute to political parties (Grant, 1987:183). Of more importance, 
leaders of contractor firms are the most likely to have close personal contacts with the 
Conservative party.
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to multilateral aid, which took an increasing share of the total budget in the early 
1980s yet confers less commercial benefits (McGregor, 1985). Britain should 
increase its allocation of ATP which is the most effective form of aid for generating 
exports (McGregor, 1987).
McGregor's statements represent the views of the EGCI and are supported in tone 
by statements from individual companies (HSPE, 1986; NEI, 1988; Pick, 1983) 
and the OPB (1988). We thus infer that the input of the large exporting firms into 
decisions on the aid budget, through direct contacts by individual firms, the two 
Board's, the Major British Exporters and the EGCI reinforcing each other at 
various levels, has been to promote an emphasis on the commercial benefits of aid 
and argue for increased tied bilateral aid and ATP. Direct contacts by firms and 
these groups are reinforced by the circulation of policy statements and studies of the 
impact of tied aid (previous references) to the DTI, ODA, Treasury, Department of 
Employment and Parliament The companies believe these studies to be an effective 
element in influencing decision-makers and mobilising support.
The Confederation o f British Industry
The CBI aims to represent the full range of business interests, with membership 
including financial and advisory services and public corporations, but is 
predominantly an umbrella body for manufacturing (Grant, 1983). It claims that 
policies are decided by members in a largely bottom-up process so that it speaks for 
all sizes of business. On most issues, however, it is likely to reflect the views of 
larger members; coverage of small firms is patchy and policy is usually determined 
in specialist committees which tend to be dominated by larger firms. In fact, "It is 
the CBI’s apparent ability to speak for these major companies in a highly 
concentrated economy that is the main source of its influence with government" 
(Grant, 1987:120). As a lobby, the CBI is most effective when advocating interests 
common to the vast majority of its members, or held by a significant cohesive 
group within industry. In the latter case the group itself probably has direct access 
to the government and the CBI is only adding its voice. In this way, one may 
question the influence of the CBI itself since its membership is obviously 
heterogeneous. Its views on aid are fairly clear:
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The CBI’s view on aid is that it should be 'increasingly devoted to projects of benefit to 
Britain's trading interests'. In particular, it should be increasingly tied, switched to non- 
Commonwealth countries where there are 'commercial and investment opportunities' and 
concentrated more in infrastructure projects in countries which are 'rich in natural 
resources but lacking in communications'. (Cable, 1982:188)
The basic CBI view has not altered much during the 1980s, although more 
emphasis is now placed on development issues, partly in response to criticisms of 
the commercial orientation of aid; a Green Aid budget is also advocated. The CBI 
sees no conflict between commercial, development and political objectives; while 
recognising that early ATP projects may not have met development needs, it argues 
that the ODA now ensures that projects financed from British aid are carefully 
appraised against development criteria. Tied aid is seen as a means of export 
promotion and as the only means in many markets of increasing commercial and 
political links, and ATP is favoured as the most effective means of achieving these 
aims (CBI, 1990).
Confederation policy on aid is determined largely by EXPROM, the Export Finance 
and Promotion Committee within the International Affairs Division of the CBI. 
EXPROM has 35 members of which almost half are from industry and almost a 
quarter from commerce; four trade associations are directly represented and a 
further eight receive EXPROM papers. Seven large firms are members, three of 
which were large beneficiaries from ATP. More importantly, three of the six 
members of the Aid Working Group are large firms, two among the large 
beneficiaries from ATP. There is a close correspondence between CBI aid policy 
and that of the OPB and major firms; it is not unfair to argue that the CBI is not so 
much developing a policy as seeking the evidence to support its views on aid. The 
major exporters with the strongest interest in tied aid are the loudest voice within the 
CBI, which provides extra research to back their lobbying.
Small and medium sized firms are unlikely to have direct contacts with the 
government and their interests are represented by trade associations. The vast 
majority of these firms only benefit from aid indirectly and through sharing in the
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general increase in economic activity resulting from export orders. Their interest in 
aid policy is closely allied to that of major exporters and, on this issue, they rarely 
lobby in their own right but leave it to the 'big boys*. Trade associations in the 
contractor industry are closely linked to the major firms and adopt a similar policy 
on aid. However, many small specialist firms could expand exports if they had 
better access to tied aid and if the aid budget was targeted away from major 
exporters; business interests are not identical to the interests of major exporters but 
the latter, being insiders, are the most influential.
Consultants
Consulting Engineers are directly concerned with aid policy since LDCs account for 
over a third of their overseas business and they are internationally very competitive. 
In the 1980s roughly a third of consultancy contracts in LDCs resulted from 'direct- 
targetting' (Mansfield, 1987b: 1228) where the firm itself identified a potential study 
and approached the host government In these situations aid support is essential and 
the consultants are unhappy with the way in which British aid has failed to meet 
their needs. The cost of a major feasibility study is very high and can only be bome 
by large firms; given the low success rate of turning a study into a design contract, 
even the large consultants argue for support if they are to compete widely, although 
they generally favour multilateral aid and believe they would have a higher market 
share if there was no tying (worldwide).
The British Consultants Bureau (BCB), of which engineers are slightly less than a 
third of members, argues for more aid support to consultants, especially small 
firms. They point out that the Overseas Projects Fund is only suitable for funding 
consultancy as part of a design/finance/constmct package since British contractors 
want guarantees. They believe ATP funds should be used to finance 80 to 100 per 
cent of studies where no guarantee can be made, noting that other donors offer 
’untied' aid of this form. They argue for more support to medium and small firms, 
noting that specialised firms are often very competitive but cannot afford the costs 
of investigating LDC markets, through the aid budget and FCO and ODA overseas 
trade missions.
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The Development Lobby
The development lobby covers a disparate spread of interests and in many respects 
lobbies on fundamental issues, the proper way to promote development and 
alleviate world poverty and inequality, and has mobilised business counter- 
pressures. It is exceedingly difficult for the lobby to claim that its members will 
lose' if particular policies are adopted; more importantly, perhaps, its interests 
cannot easily be represented as economic or political gains to the UK. For these 
reasons the Government can afford to overlook the development lobby, which 
becomes an outsider and therefore operates by appeals to the public and 
Westminister. It has had some success in the latter and the report of the FAC (1987) 
was broadly sympathetic to the arguments of the development lobby.
The demands of the development lobby, except that for more aid, generally conflict 
with the business lobby. The root of the conflict is that they consider an export- 
oriented aid policy inconsistent with humanitarian objectives. Economic growth 
does not measure development and effective aid would be concentrated on the 
poorest countries and on the poorest people within these countries. This strategy 
demands a focus on rural development, agriculture and public projects (see IGBA, 
1982). The emphasis is on untied bilateral aid, which permits business groups to 
argue that such a policy would impose a cost by way of lost exports.
Pressure Groups and the Aid Budget
Decisions on aid are constrained and pre-empted by international pressures; within 
these bounds, the Government is subject to pressures from representatives of 
commercial and development lobbies, and has its own political interests. Table 4.1 
identifies the principal interest groups involved in the domestic aid budgetary 
process and lists the main demands of each. We treat political objectives as being 
the concern of the government and not represented by interest groups; this does not 
deny that some groups may share the political objectives of the government
Business is well connected to Whitehall decision-makers. The major exporters are 
inside the DTI framework through the BOTB and OPB, and dominate other insider 
groups. The largest companies have direct individual contact with senior members
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of the Government. The principal business groups also appeal to Westminister and 
the public through policy documents and press statements. The core demand is that 
the aid budget should be guided by commercial considerations so that it has an 
export orientation; the size of the aid budget should be increased by allocating more 
funds to ATP and tied bilateral aid. This orientation implies that aid should be 
directed to capital projects in the richer LDCs.
Table 4.1: Interest Groups and Demands on the Aid Budget































NOTES: The status accorded to lobbies refers only to the budgetary process and groups 
may be insiders in other aspects of aid policy, such as non-Govemment 
Organisations (NGOs) in implementation. No lobbies are attributed to political 
objectives which we treat as represented by the government, in particular the FCO.
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The implicit links between the organizational factors in the aid budget and the biases 
of aid are concisely set out by Wyse (1983: Table 8). He points out that tied aid, 
with Western development models and the need to demonstrate success by visible 
evidence, biases aid towards capital-cost rather than recurrent-cost projects on a 
large scale (easier to administer) and with high foreign cost components. The 
combination of tying and familiarity with western technologies (which all business 
groups encourage in ODA and FCO officials) favours complicated technical 
solutions, implying a need for foreign components, rather than simpler and often 
more appropriate technology. The use of western technology, furthermore, is more 
likely to create a long-term dependence on western exporters for supplies and 
maintenance. While intensive technologies do fuel economic growth, they tend to 
do so in an uneven manner, which increases inequalities in LDCs, and often 
transpires to be unsuitable (Burch, 1987:178). The desire for visible capital projects 
biases aid towards the market sectors in LDCs and a tied aid strategy will be most 
effective, in terms of generating exports, if the richer LDCs are targeted. These 
considerations determine the commercial objectives and do conflict with 
development objectives (this does not imply that achieving one set of objectives 
necessarily precludes the others; practical outcomes are usually compromises).
Political interests are those of the Government to ensure that aid promotes influence 
and goodwill in LDCs (Wyse, 1983:16, lists a number of ways in which aid 
promotes foreign policy objectives). The FCO has an implicit objective to maintain 
a sphere of influence; spreading aid over a wide number of countries, including all 
Commonwealth LDCs, is a means of doing this. The political gains are also likely 
to be greater if projects financed by Britain are visible, which tends to favour large 
capital projects. Having identified the principal objectives, the major pressure 
groups and their demands, we can relate these to changes in the aid budget and 
draw inferences on the influence of lobbies (Section 4.6).
4.3. The Origin of the Aid and Trade Provision
Being the flagship of commercial objectives, ATP deserves detailed examination. In 
the mid-1970s large UK companies, notably British Leyland and British Rail 
Engineering (BRE), supported by the CBI, lobbied for aid-support for commercial
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contracts in LDCs to counter foreign competition (Toye and Clark, 1986). The 
Government was made aware that UK firms were losing orders because 
competitors from other donors could avail of mixed credit packages. A Working 
Party on Aid and Trade (WPAT) was established in 1977 to choose the form of aid 
support most appropriate to help UK firms counter such competition. The WPAT 
disapproved of mixed credits for reasons that have since been used against ATP 
(Cassen, in FAC, 1987:122; Toye and Clark, 1986; Toye, 1991).
First, given their commercial motivation, mixed credits tend to direct aid to richer 
countries. Second, the distinction between aid and credit is blurred when both are 
combined. Third, competition is distorted and an escalation in the race for credit is 
likely. This is contrary to the objective of restraining credit competition agreed by 
all credit giving countries (Byatt, 1984). Furthermore, Britain is less well placed 
than its competitors to benefit from any such escalation, a view reiterated by the 
Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Neil Marten, in 1980: Britain should not 
encourage a credit race "because we would not win it" (Sutton and Hewitt, 
1982:31). These criticisms have been vindicated by ATP (Chapter 8).
The WPAT did not favour a general policy of mixed credit but recognised the need 
for some aid support and proposed using mixed credit in cases where normal aid is 
inappropriate. The new aid should be targeted on commercially beneficial projects 
where there is evidence of aid-supported foreign competition. The WPAT laid 
down basic guidelines for the Aid and Trade Contingency Provision, later renamed 
ATP, which have changed little. ATP was not to exceed five per cent of Bilateral 
aid initially and could not be used for military or luxury goods. Although it was 
stated that ATP would only go to relatively poor countries with an acceptable 
human rights record, the definition of poverty, in terms of GNP per capita, was 
almost high enough to include Greece and Portugal. All of these guidelines have 
been broken (MacQuaide and Toye, 1986; Chapter 8 below).
There were two specific objectives behind ATP, both reflecting business lobbying. 
The first was to introduce more commercially important projects into the aid 
programme. The second, to allow British firms match the mixed credits available to 
competitors. At its inception, ATP was to be granted only where there was foreign
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competition; this was difficult to verify and the condition was quickly relaxed. The 
Department of Trade specified that ATP would be granted only if aid was required 
to obtain an export order and the value of business generated exceeded twice the 
ATP cost or related to labour-intensive products.4 Companies could apply for 
ATP only if they could demonstrate actual or potential foreign competition. In 
1980, Mr. Neil Marten announced two fundamental changes in aid policy; greater 
weight to be given to political and commercial considerations and the unallocated 
aid margin to be increased (Sutton and Hewitt, 1982). This implied greater use of 
ATP and providing the budget to do so, and it was made available for projects 
initiated by UK companies. The ATP budget, as a share of Bilateral Aid, doubled 
between the early and mid-1980s (Table 4.3 below).
The WPAT stressed the development aim that bilateral aid be targeted towards the 
poorest It was intended that this apply to ATP, but the guidelines on the criterion 
of ’minimum development soundness1 were vague. Projects had to be of ’minimum 
economic adequacy' and need not be targeted to the poorest income groups. 
Investment expenditure should be cost effective and represent a reasonable 
allocation of recipient’s resources (this criterion is of less importance the lower the 
ATP share in the project). Aid funds should be costed at their full opportunity cost 
to both the recipient and the development aims of the aid budget The suitability for 
development of the goods and services involved in the project should be evaluated 
in the context of the economic management and social policies record of the 
recipient and also its technical, managerial and financial capacity. Ex-post 
monitoring of projects was introduced to ensure the proper use of funds.
While ATP has overt commercial objectives monitored by the DTI, it should have 
been constrained by the development requirements monitored by the ODA. The 
emphasis on development has depended much on the view of the respective 
Ministers. We have already indicated that Mr. Marten and Mr. Clark gave priority to
4 The DTI proposed to measure export business as the value of goods and services directly 
financed; additional goods and services purchased as part of the contract but not aid financed, and 
contingent future non-aid financed exports (given the size and expected growth of the market, the 
availability of future export credit cover and the competitive position and supply capacity of the 
UK firm). Labour intensive was defined as one person-year employment per £15,000 of exports.
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commercial interests; Mr. Chris Patten, the Minister for Overseas Development 
from September 1986 to July 1989, appeared to be concerned with development, 
stressing four main reasons for aid - political, commercial, humanitarian and 
development: "If one puts too much emphasis on any one of the other three 
reasons, it seems to me that one may well distort the developmental objective, 
which ... is assigned to us statutorily" (Mr. Chris Patten, FAC, 1987:140). He did 
not wish to stress commercial objectives, believing that many could be attained 
without aid money, but concedes that if British aid is financing imports by LDCs, it 
is reasonable that the imports be British.
Mr. Patten's successor, Mrs. Lynda Chalker, seems to have adopted a similar 
position: "... the Minister emphasised that not only did aid represent sustainable 
economic and social development ... but also that aid could benefit British 
companies [and] the Minister felt sure that, were bilateral aid untied, Britain would 
be the major competitor" (report in British Overseas Development, September 
1990, p. 3). In contrast, Mr. Nicholas Ridley, while still the Trade Secretary, was 
an adamant supporter of tying and generated controversy by insisting at cabinet 
level that a credit to Nigeria should be fully tied, contrary to the ffee-market 
aspirations of Mrs. Thatcher (iGuardian, 21.6.90). Of comparable importance with 
the views of the Ministers is the influence of the two departments.
The Administration of ATP
The administrative structure of ATP has not altered much since 1978 and is based 
on the inter-departmental Sub-committee on Aid and Trade (SCAT). In principle, 
the ODA must evaluate the proposal and verify the development value before SCAT 
can recommend ATP.5 In practice, the ODA has been under pressure to conduct 
its evaluation quickly and, in consequence, often superficially (FAC, 1987; 
National Audit Office, 1990). Requests for ATP funding are made by companies to 
the DTI which presents them to the SCAT, which has representatives from the DTI,
5 The criteria employed by the ODA are: is there a market for the output; how should the goods 
and services be supplied; is the recipient institutionally capable of executing the project; are the 
recipient's policies, such as pricing and supply, consistent with the project's objectives; is the 
project and its maintenance affordable and can debts be serviced (FAC, 1987:23-4). An attempt is 
made to assess the financial return and whether resources are being efficiently deployed.
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ODA, FCO, Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), Treasury and Bank of 
England. Final approval must come from an FCO minister, preferably the Minister 
for Overseas Development, and disbursements are administered by the ODA.
The ODA has a procedure and set of criteria for evaluating development potential 
and is proud of its record on the Bilateral Country Programme. These cannot 
always be used effectively for ATP since projects are selected for commercial 
reasons and require quick decisions. The ability to evaluate proposals has been 
eroded by government spending cuts and rationalisation of the ODA: from June 
1979 to September 1981, staff were reduced by 17 per cent; geographical offices 
were cut from nine to seven; advisors who had worked in small disciplined units 
were regrouped into two large divisions and a number of joint FCO/ODA units 
were formed, notably for economic planning, rendering ODA more subservient to 
FCO policy (Sutton and Hewitt, 1982:24-5). It has been argued that these changes 
and the need to appraise quickly without necessarily visiting sites or contributing to 
project design have reduced the performance capacity of the ODA, a claim the 
department rejects (FAC, 1987:25).
To obtain ATP, a company applies to the DTI regarding a contract it is initiating or 
competing for and, on the basis of information provided by the company, the DTI 
decides if the commercial criteria will be met; if so, ATP will be recommended 
pending ODA and SCAT approval. The company could use this recommendation in 
its bid but it is no guarantee of success. In the period 1977-80, of the ATP cases 
proposed to SCAT, about two-thirds were approved but only one-third resulted in 
contracts (MacQuaide and Toye, 1986, Annex 5). The take-up rate is now around 
66 per cent for negotiated contracts and 25 per cent for competitive bids, which still 
works out at about a third. While business groups argue that the DTI should make 
more recommendations so that take-up accounts for the total budget, the DTI 
responds that problems are due to the time required by LDC governments to decide; 
the normal take-up on outstanding awards would absorb the available budget.
The ATP provided the DTI with a greater input to aid policy and led to conflict with 
ODA. In the view of the DTI, the aid programme should be based on mutual
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benefit: there must be a development potential but the gains to the UK should be 
maximised.6 This viewpoint allied DTI with business groups. The ODA may 
have considered themselves as protectors of the policy of helping the poorest but, 
by the 1980s, were under external and internal pressures to increase the commercial 
focus of aid. This inherent conflict is reflected in many of the developments in aid 
policy during the 1980s.
4.4. The UK Aid Budget 1978-1989
It can be inferred that a lobby has some influence if the policies adopted conform to 
its demands. Insiders will tend to hold a set of values similar to the Government, 
and the appearance of policy conforming to these values is not itself indicative of 
influence; the exercise of influence will be shown by gaining specific concessions. 
The introduction of ATP was a concession to business interests and represented 
both influence and a strengthening of their insider status, as the DTI gained an 
enhanced role in determining aid policy.7 There are many instruments of aid 
policy and the composition of the aid budget can include concessions to various 
lobbies or off-setting measures, reflecting the relative influence of lobbies.
The Size of the Aid Budget
The aid budget was treated in a bipartisan manner from its inception in 1964 until 
1979; changes in government, from one party to another, had only minimal effects 
on the budget and the objectives, and aid tended to be sheltered from cuts in public 
spending (Horesh, 1984:110). This changed under the Thatcher government from 
1979 when the aid budget was severly cut The real value of aid in each of the years 
1978 to 1989 is given in Table 4.2. From the high of 1979, inherited from a Labour 
government to the low of 1987 the real value of aid fell by 23 per cent the fall has 
been offset slightly in recent years to 7 per cent over the decade.
6 The criteria for gains to the UK are: gearing, UK value added per £1 of aid; additionality, 
benefits that would not otherwise occur; leverage, control over aid disbursement and flexibility, 
being able to allocate to new recipients and programmes. ATP is the DTTs most favoured form of 
aid because it maximises gearing and additionality (evidence to FAC, 1987:77-92).
7 Note that it was a Labour government that introduced ATP. This is not surprising since 
Labour w oe traditionally willing to assist industry in general (Grant, 1987). It was a Conservative 
government that oversaw the evolution and application of ATP (see Toye, 1991).
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Table 4.2: Value of British Aid, 1978-89, in 1989 Prices
Gross Aid UK Aid as a percentage of DAC A
1989 prices CGCE GNP DAC % GN
£m Index % % % %
1978 1806 101 1.38 0.48 7.4 0.35
1979 1918 107 1.44 0.52 9.3 0.34
1980 1666 93 1.21 0.34 6.7 0.37
1981 1831 102 1.28 0.43 8.6 0.35
1982 1559 87 1.06 0.37 6.5 0.38
1983 1602 90 1.06 0.35 5.8 0.36
1984 1717 96 1.11 0.34 5.0 0.36
1985 1635 91 1.01 0.34 5.3 0.35
1986 1613 90 0.99 0.31 4.8 0.35
1987 1472 82 0.88 0.28 4.6 0.35
1988 1779 100 1.02 0.32 5.5 0.36
1989 1788 100 1.02 0.31 5.6 0.33
19-89 -6.8% -7 -0.42 -0.21 -3.7 -0.01
NOTES and SOURCES: Gross Aid £m is 'Gross Public Expenditure on Overseas 
Aid' in 1989 prices (British Aid Statistics 1985-1989, ODA, 1990; 1978 and 1979 
were linked using 1985 prices deflater from ODA, 1988); Index is constant price 
value for each year as a percentage of 1989 value. The volume of Gross Aid is 
expressed as a percentage of: CGCE, total central government current expenditure 
(CSO Blue Book, 1990 and 1989), GNP and DAC, which is UK aid as a percentage 
of total DAC aid; final column is total DAC aid as percentage of total DAC GNP 
(all from British Aid Statistics, ODA, various years). Since the data are often revised 
in successive sets of statistics we endeavour, here and in other Tables, to use the 
latest figures available. The final row gives percentage point change, except in the 
case of Gross Aid £m, which is percentage change.
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Both business and the development lobby failed in their primary objective of 
increasing aid, because this contravened spending policy, although intense pressure 
from both probably contributed to the increase in the aid budget in later years. 
Business did benefit from greater emphasis:
[In the 1980 Government Spending White Paper] the British Government announces its 
intention to reduce the level of aid appropriation in real terms as part of its general policy 
on public expenditure restraint and to give greater weight in the aid programme to 
political, industrial and commercial considerations (DAC, 1985:83)
Due to special factors and the timing of aid, year-on-year variations can be quite 
large so that policy changes take a few years to become evident The extent of this 
variability is clear: there were large cuts in aid in 1980, 1982 and 1987; the real 
value stagnated somewhat in the mid-80s. A probable factor explaining the 1980-82 
variability is that multilateral replenishments and some bilateral projects were 
bunched so that spending withheld in 1980 was incured in 1981. Aid bore a 
disproportionate share of public expenditure cuts; gross aid was 1.4 per cent of 
current government spending in 1979, around one per cent through the mid-1980s, 
but fell to 0.88 per cent in 1987 and registered a fall of about half a percentage point 
over the decade. Between 1979 and 1989 aid fell from 0.52 to 0.31 per cent of 
GNP (Table 4.2). It is evident that the UK has cut its aid by more than the donor 
community as a whole and Britain's share of the DAC total halved from 9.3 per 
cent in 1979 to 4.6 per cent in 1987, recovering to 5.6 per cent in 1989.
The Composition of the Aid Budget
The potential benefits from aid depend on composition and volume. The three 
forms relevant to commercial gains are in Table 4.3; non-financial bilateral aid (the 
implied residual in column three) is mostly TCA and administration costs. 
Multilateral aid as a share of the total rose in the early 80s but then fell back to about 
its 1982 level. This reflects the fact that the volume of multilateral aid is relatively 
fixed so changes in share match the trend in bilateral aid. Financial bilateral aid 
tended to fall throughout the mid-80s, and fell by 11 percentage points over 1979- 
89. The most severe cut, however, was in officially tied bilateral aid; its share fell 
by fifteen percentage points, some 20 per cent, over the decade. This figure relates
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to tied financial bilateral aid and understates tying since it excludes bilateral aid for 
training and TCA which is effectively tied. On the other hand, financial bilateral aid 
includes untied programme aid and debt relief.
Table 4.3: Composition of British Aid, 1978-89
Net Multi­ Bilateral
aid lateral financial Tied ATP
£m % % % %
1978 682 27.6 69.3 74.4
1979 825 30.7 69.3 71.7 6.5
1980 786 33.0 63.9 59.2 4.6
1981 993 34.3 70.4 58.9 5.1
1982* 932 42.7 63.6 60.6 11.8
1983 1018 45.1 61.8 53.4 9.1
1984 1080 46.9 65.1 46.5 9.1
1985 1119 41.6 62.2 47.5 6.4
1986 1162 40.0 60.8 59.7 11.2
1987 1131 42.9 51.3 50.0 4.5
1988 1467 42.1 54.4 50.6 6.6
1989 1562 40.6 58.0 56.2 5.5
19-89 89.3% 9.9 -11.3 -15.5
NOTES and SOURCES: Net Aid is the value of the aid programme (net) in current 
prices; Multilateral is net contributions to Multilateral agencies, as a percentage of 
net Aid. Bilateral financial aid and Tied Bilateral Aid are both expressed as a 
percentage of gross Bilateral aid; note that Tied includes ATP while financial 
includes both Tied and ATP. The value of ATP expenditure in each year is expressed 
as a percentage of net bilateral aid (from British Aid Statistics, various years).
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Business groups were successful in getting ATP but the benefits have been offset 
by the large fall in tied project aid. Closer examination indicates that the switch 
towards ATP favoured a small group of firms (Chapter 8). Annual expenditure on 
ATP, in volume and share terms, is extremely volatile as shown in Table 4.3. This 
arises because the granting of ATP support does not guarantee a contract will be 
won and, once granted, it may take over a year for the contract to be agreed (it is 
clear that many contracts were bunched in 1982 and 1986). The apparent shift from 
tied bilateral to ATP has benefited large insider firms, who used direct contacts with 
decision-makers to lobby for ATP, at the possible expense of less well connected 
companies who faced a smaller fund of tied bilateral aid (see Chapter 10).
The Sectoral Allocation of Aid
A more commercial aid budget would imply increased allocations to capital- 
intensive, engineering and transport projects, whereas an emphasis on helping the 
poorest would suggest rural, health, education and agriculture based projects. An 
examination of the trend in the allocation of project aid by sector reveals no clear 
trend. In Table 4.4, allocation indicates intentions and expenditure represents 
lagged outcomes; despite variability, there is a broad consistency in shares over the 
period. The sectors most likely to generate commercial benefits - Energy, Industry, 
Telecommunications and Transport - tended to absorb between half and two-thirds 
of Project Aid.
A comparison with the lending pattern of the World Bank can assist evaluating 
Table 4.4. In Table 4.5, IBRD represents a more commercial pattern to the richer 
LDCs, while IDA goes to the poorest countries and should reflect more basic 
development needs. Indeed, less than a third of IDA tended to go to the most 
commercially beneficial sectors, while in the early years almost half went on 
Agriculture and Rural Development with a relatively large amount on Education in 
later years. The pattern of UK Project Aid more closely resembles IBRD lending, 
with an even greater emphasis on Energy and Telecommunications. This is 
consistent with an aid budget oriented more towards gaining commercial benefits 
than promoting basic development. It may be, however, that Project Aid is the 
instrument within the aid budget used to promote commercial objectives.
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Table 4.4: Trends in British Project Aid by Sector,
Selected Years, 1980-88
1980 1985 1988
Alloc Exp Alloc Exp Alloc Exp
% % % % % %
Resources 20.8 13.0 45.2 18.4 12.2 19.3
Finance 2.3 2.3 r 0.8 7.2 8.6
Education - 0.8 2.4 0.4 0.5 1.6
Health 0.2 1.8 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.5
Water 0.7 2.6 5.9 5.9 1.2 1.3
Urban 0.6 0.8 - 1.0 3.2 3.1
Energy 44.3 19.6 13.6 35.9 30.0 18.2
Industry 1.7 7.3 3.4 4.3 11.1 7.1
Telecomm. 0.1 5.9 - 0.7 10.6 5.7
Transport 13.1 28.4 10.8 14.6 13.4 14.6
NOTES: Alloc, is sector share of budget allocation in the given year; Exp. is sector 
share of actual disbursements in the year. Resources includes agriculture, livestock, 
rural development, irrigation and other renewable natural resources; Finance is defined 
as 'other financial' (agricultural development banks received almost nothing in the 
1980s); Health includes welfare; Water includes sanitation and environmental 
protection (and urban development in 1980); Urban is urban and industrial 
development plus housing (but only housing in 1980); Industry is primary 
processing, fertiliser and other manufacturing; Telecommunications includes Post
SOURCES: Data are from British Aid Statistics, (ODA, various years).
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Table 4.5: World Bank Trends in Lending by Sector,
Selected Years, 1980-89.
1980 1985 1989
IBRD IDA IBRD IDA IBRD IDA
% % % % % %
Agric. & Rural 22.2 45.8 21.0 44.9 12.6 28.9
DFCs 9.7 1.9 5.9 4.5 13.5 2.9
Education 4.7 2.1 4.5 13.6 2.7 9.1
Health, etc. 0.9 2.0 1.4 1.0 2.4 4.5
Water 5.8 4.8 5.5 5.2 3.5 4.5
Urban 3.3 2.6 1.8 5.9 5.8 4.7
Energy 25.0 24.4 29.6 7.1 20.7 9.2
Industry 5.1 0.8 5.6 0.3 11.3 2.5
Telecomm. 0.9 1.7 0.5 2.0 0.3 2.2
Transport 15.8 6.2 16.4 9.0 6.9 14.0
..........a ■■■■■■■■■■■■. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NOTES: The first sector is Agriculture and Rural Development; DFCs are Development 
Finance Corporations; Health includes population and nutrition; Energy is mostly 
Power but includes Oil, Gas and Coal;
SOURCES: Data for 1980 are from World Bank (1982:125); for 1985 from World Bank 
(1985:124); and 1989 from World Bank (1989b:182).
The Geographical Allocation of Aid
We are not concerned with changes in aid to particular countries, which can vary 
for a variety of reasons, but wish to identify any trends in the allocation between 
different groups of countries, in particular the relatively poor against the relatively 
rich. There has been a decline in the concentration of British aid. In 1960-61 the 
concentration ratio for the top five recipients (the share of total aid going to the five 
countries with the highest shares) was 42 per cent, and that for the top ten was 67
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per cent; the figures by 1982-83 were 19 and and 27 per cent respectively. Only 
India and Kenya were among the top five recipients in both periods (DAC, 
1985:313). British aid is widely spread over numerous countries, a fact condemned 
by both the business and development lobbies for different reasons, but favoured 
by the FCO for the political benefits.
Britain has a good record on giving a large share of its aid to the poorest LDCs, 
which received 31 per cent of net UK aid (43.5 per cent if China and India are 
included) in 1982-83, compared to 20.5 (27.2) per cent of total DAC aid. The UK 
gave a greater share of its aid to the poorest than did any of the other major donors, 
by a considerable margin (DAC, 1985:127). The share of bilateral aid going to the 
fifty poorest LDCs rose from 62 per cent in 1985 to 68 per cent in 1987; on the 
other hand, the share going to upper-middle income countries rose from three per 
cent in 1979 to almost eight per cent in 1988 (British Aid Statistics, ODA, various 
years). The aid budget has recognised development interests through the quality of 
aid, untied for natural resources and poor LDCs, but not by increasing the quantity; 
the trend towards the richest LDCs indicates a desire for more commercial gains, 
which could be reinforced by devoting funds to capital projects in poorer LDCs. 
The share of Bilateral aid going to Commonwealth countries has fallen slightly from 
about 75 per cent in the early 1980s to 71 per cent in the late 1980s (Toye, 1991), 
which may simply reflect the increased importance of China and Indonesia.
The ATP exhibits a distinct allocation, being more likely to go to richer LDCs and, 
for this and other reasons, is less likely to facilitate development In 1978-9,50 per 
cent of ATP went to Africa, reflecting competition with French credit mixte in 
Francophone Africa, 48 per cent to Asia and two per cent to the Americas; the 
respective figures for Bilateral aid were 36 per cent, 47 per cent and 9 per cent By 
1983-4 the profile for other bilateral aid had changed little (Africa rose somewhat at 
the expense of Asia); Africa’s share of ATP fell to 20 per cent; the America's rose 
to 22 per cent, largely due to two projects in Brazil and Mexico, while Asia's rose 
to 58 per cent due to a number of large contracts in India and Malaysia. Between 
1978 and 1982, only a third of ATP went to the poorest 50 countries while these 
recieved about two thirds of normal bilateral aid (Toye and Clark, 1986).
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Table 4.6: Distribution of ATP by Recipient LDC, 1978-86
COUNTRY No. of ATP ATP Contracts ATP
Contracts £m % £m %
Cyprus U 1 0.37 - 2.50
Egypt P 12 39.02 8.86 124.83
Jordan U 2 13.61 3.09 48.57
Malta u* 1 0.13 - 0.13
Morocco M 1 13.51 3.07 51.50
Syria u* 1 0.01 - 0.01
Turkey M* 1 0.35 - 0.35









Belize M 2 0.77 - 3.08 25.0
Bolivia p* 1 0.03 - 0.03 100.0
BrazU[1] U 3 24.18 5.49 90.84 26.6
Caribbean M 2 6.43 1.46 12.93 49.8
Colombia M 5 0.74 - 1.90 39.0
Honduras p* 1 0.10 - 0.50 20.0
Mexico^ U 3 34.98 7.94 200.06 17.5
Paraguay M 3 5.24 1.19 17.61 29.8
Peru M 1 4.85 1.10 25.63 18.9
LA&C 21 77.32 17.56 352.57 21.9
Botswana M 2 5.76 1.31 21.86 26.4
Cameroon M* 4 1.41 - 1.41 100.0
Ecowas^ 2 0.32 - 0.32 100.0
Guinea Bissau P 1 1.29 - 3.50 36.9
Kenya P 7 13.96 3.17 51.76 27.0
Madagascar P 1 0.60 - 2.80 21.4
Malawi p* 2 0.31 ' - 1.05 29.7
Mozambique P 2 2.09 - 8.45 24.7
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Senegal P 1 1.00 - 3.00 33.3
Sudan p* 1 0.01 - 0.01 100.0
Tanzania P 4 4.20 0.95 31.41 13.4
Zambia P 1 1.76 - 1.76 100.0
Zimbabwe M 4 11.13 2.53 33.13 33.6
AFRICA 32 43.83 9.95 160.46 27.3
Bangladesh P 1 4.68 1.06 17.30 27.1
Burma P 9 17.83 4.05 76.04 23.4
China p* 1 0.15 - 0.15 100.0
India P 4 65.33 14.84 441.43 14.8
Indonesia P 12 35.15 7.98 211.45 16.6
Malaysia U 7 75.82 17.22 237.74 31.9
Mauritius M 1 6.31 1.43 18.96 33.3
Pakistan P 1 9.57 2.18 27.00 35.5
Papua NG P* 1 0.10 - 0.10 100.0
Philippines P 2 2.01 - 8.67 23.1
Sri Lanka P 3 24.70 5.61 86.09 28.7
Thailand p* 4 3.16 - 3.16 100.0
Vietnam P 2 7.35 1.67 27.60 26.6
ASIA 48 252.16 57.27 1155.69 21.8
TOTAL 120 440.29 100.00 1896.60 23.2
NOTES AND SOURCES: ATP and Contract value from FAC (1987); - designates 
share in all ATP less than 1%; * designates ATP for training/consultancy only 
(which could be 100% funded between 1980 and 1988); final column, ATP%, is 
ATP/Contract value in percentage terms. P indicates a country among the fifty 
poorest by 1982 GNP per capita; M indicates a lower middle income country (51 to 
72 in world rankings of poorest countries); P indicates an upper middle income 
country (73 to 94 in world rankings, all from World Bank, 1984)
[1] Almost 99.9% of ATP in Brazil and Mexico went on one large project, a power 
station and a steelworks respectively.
[2] Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS).
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There are a number of reasons why the geographical distribution of ATP differs 
from the rest of British aid. First, ATP was directed to countries not normally 
receiving UK aid or whose normal allocation was fully allocated. Second, the 
rationale was to support UK business and requests for ATP were initiated by 
companies, hence tended to come from firms with major overseas operations. 
Finally, ATP requires export credit cover which many African states lost in the 
1980s; this may explain the falling share for Africa. All these point to richer LDCs 
as being most likely to attract ATP. Table 4.6 shows the geographical distribution 
of all ATP awards in the period 1978-86. Eighteen per cent went to the Americas 
(LA&C); the amount going to the poorest recipients was negligible, and by far the 
greatest amounts went to Brazil and Mexico. Some 15 per cent went to 
Mediterranean countries (EMENA), with Egypt, the only poor country among 
them, receiving about half. In stark contrast, only 10 per cent went to Africa; this 
included nine of the poorest countries in the world but, excepting Kenya, the 
amount they received was negligible. The remaining 57 per cent went to Asia and 
included 11 of the worlds poorest countries but only four received significant 
amounts. Malaysia, an upper middle income country with 17 per cent of the total, 
was the largest single recipient. Ten countries received 78 per cent of ATP, of 
which six accounting for 34 per cent were among the worlds poorest. Put another 
way, some 37 per cent went to countries classified as 'upper middle income'.
4.5. Aid Trends Among M ajor Donors
As indicated in Chapter 3, aid can be used as an instrument of donor trade policy. 
The potential of aid to support donor export competion will depend on the volume 
offered and the degree of tying. Table 4.7 shows the extent of the fall in British aid 
relative to other donors (the seven countries in Table 4.7 we define as the major 
donors, and they account for over four-fifths of all DAC aid). In terms of aid as a 
percent of GNP, the UK ranked 3rd in 1979 but was among the three lowest by 
1988. British aid increased by only slightly over half in nominal terms and there 
were only two other countries which did not more than double the nominal value of 
their aid. The case of the Netherlands reflects slow economic growth and the share 
of GNP increased to almost one per cent. Germany was the only country like the 
UK in allowing aid as a share of GNP to fall. The increase in Italian aid was quite 
phenomenal while that of Japan owes much to rapid economic growth.
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Table 4.7: Aid From Major Donors, 1979-88, selected years
DONOR 1979 1985 1988 A’79-88
£m % GNP £m % GNP £m % GNP
USA 2152 0.19 7253 0.24 5489 0.20 155%
France 1583 0.59 3082 0.78 3907 0.73 147%
Germany 1579 0.44 2269 0.47 2639 0.39 67%
Japan 1243 0.26 2929 0.29 5128 0.32 313%
UK 974 0.52 1184 0.33 1485 0.32 52%
Netherlands 662 0.93 876 0.91 1252 0.98 89%
Canada 485 0.46 1258 0.49 1314 0.50 171%
Italy 132 0.09 847 0.26 1691 0.37 1181%
DAC 10489 0.34 22706 0.35 26730 0.35 155%
NOTES and SOURCES: All figures refer to the DAC definition of official 
development assistance and are from ODA (various years); A'79-88 is percentage 
change over the period. In any given year the ranking of donors in terms of the value 
of their aid budget depends not only on the volume of aid but on the exchange rate 
and whether comparisons are made in £Stg. or $US. Denominated in £Stg, the UK 
ranked 5th in 1979, 6th in 1984 and 1985 when passed by Canada, which then fell 
back. Italy doubled its aid budget in 1986 and, with the Netherlands, relegated the UK 
to 7th place until 1988. By 1990 Japan is expected to be the largest donor 
denominated in $US.
In addition to the volume of aid, the degree of tying and the project allocation are 
determinants of the commercial potential. There was a tendency for the major 
donors to increase the degree of tying during the 1980s, reflecting the collapse of 
Middle East markets in the early 1980s and the related contraction in LDC markets 
during the debt crisis and since. Table 4.8 shows that the degree of tying of total 
DAC aid rose from 48 to 51 per cent between 1985 and 1987. Although it reduced
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the degree of tying slightly, Britain along with Italy and the USA ties a greater share 
of aid than others (although the figure for France may be an underestimate). While 
they increased the degree, Germany and the Netherlands had least recourse to tying. 
With the exception of the USA and, to a lesser extent, France, all donors tended to 
direct their aid towards capital projects, which would be most capable of helping 
their exporters. In general, Italy, France and Japan adopt the most export-oriented 
aid policies while Germany and the USA offer the least support to their exporters 
(see Morrissey, 1989d, for more detail).
Table 4.8: Aid Tying and Allocation by Major Donors
DONOR TIED AID PROJECT ALLOCATION
1985 1987 Industry Utilities
% % % %
USA 59 64 0.18 8.30
France 44 47 7.31 22.91
Germany 36 43 3.81 47.66
Japan 44 44 12.13 53.10
UK 69 58 4.13 39.12
Netherlands 35 43 11.26 46.04
Canada 56 48 5.20 56.83
Italy 69 62 22.06 26.71
DAC
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NOTES and SOURCES: TIED AID is the estimate of the total share of aid both 
fully and partially tied (Jepma, 1989:18). PROJECT ALLOCATION is for 1984; 
Industry is the share of bilateral project aid allocated to 'Industry, Mining, 
Construction'; Utilities is the comparable share to 'development of public utilities', 
largely civil engineering (DAC, 1985:302-3).
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Developing countries will be concerned with the cost of aid to themselves. Britain 
fares well on this criterion with a grant element in total aid of 99 per cent in 1983-4, 
exceeding the DAC average of 91 per cent, below which fall a number of major 
donors (Japan, France and Germany, see DAC, 1985:106), so that UK aid is 
relatively cheap in terms of repayment obligations. The UK is also more likely than 
other major donors to provide aid to the poorest countries although this trend is 
largely explained by the traditional prominence of India as a recipient of UK aid. 
Although India is very poor in per capita terms, it is industrialised and much of the 
aid goes on capital goods which supports British companies but has had very mixed 
results in terms of assisting India's development (National Audit Office, 1990). On 
balance there is little to support a claim that UK aid is any more likely to promote 
basic development than the aid of other donors.
4.6. Has British Aid Been Commercialised?
Section 4.1 outlined a perception that the aid budget had been commercialised 
during the 1980s. This belief was justified by the introduction and expansion of 
ATP and the adoption of a commercial rhetoric by Ministers for Overseas 
Development. On the evidence reviewed, it is the rhetoric on aid that has been 
commercialised, not the aid budget itself. The business lobby demanded more tied 
aid to match other donors but the government was committed to cutting spending 
and neither aid nor subsidies were part of its ideological baggage. So the budget 
was cut, severely. Although a few firms benefited from ATP, the business lobby 
failed to get its primary interests enshrined in the aid budget, despite a rhetoric of 
government aid policy supportive of commercial interests. Donors do define aid 
criteria in terms reflecting business interests: development means economic growth; 
successful projects are those profitable in terms of internal rates of return; 
construction and capital-goods projects are favoured. Aid is structured to benefit 
donor exporters more than it meets development interests. Insider firms were able 
to present a coherent view and identify visible costs and benefits in support of ATP, 
which sheltered large exporters from the commercial costs of the reduced budget 
Insider status was not the only reason they were favoured: mixed credits tend to be 
for capital-intensive projects which require large contractors; only large firms can 
maintain the local contacts to operate in LDCs; large projects are easier to administer 
and are of high visibility for political purposes.
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The business lobby has had a limited influence on the Thatcher governments in 
respect of the aid budget; firms are expected to compete as if there were a free 
market, despite evidence of distortions introduced by other donors. International 
and internal political interests, notably public expenditure restraint, have been the 
predominant determinants of the budget British business has been unable to exert 
the influence required to elicit a real increase in tied aid. We have reviewed the aid 
budget from a particular perspective, that of business groups extolling commercial 
benefits and seeking to alter its composition and emphasis. The remainder of the 
thesis pursues this issue in greater detail, presenting a model for measuring the 
benefits of aid-supported exports to the UK economy and then, in successive 
chapters, applying this to measure the impact of various types of aid.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 5 98
CHAPTER 5. INPUT-OUTPUT METHOD OF IMPACT ANALYSIS
It was argued in Chapter 3 that the commercial benefits of aid, the impact on the 
donor economy, are an important factor influencing aid policy, especially in respect 
of the tying of aid. Existing literature on the imapct of aid on the UK economy was 
reviewed and the Input-Output (IO) method of impact analysis was proposed as the 
most appropriate technique for estimating the gross commercial benefits from aid. 
Three extant studies have used this technique (HSPE, 1986; Love and 
Dunlop, 1990; May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989) but none fully exploit the 
possibilities. This Chapter sets out the IO approach which forms the basis of the 
measures of gross commercial benefit in the following four chapters.
Section 5.1 sets out formally the manner in which aid impacts on the economy. 
Section 5.2 then presents the basic elements of the IO Table and how this can be 
used for impact analysis. A number of extensions to IO impact analysis are 
discussed in Section 5.3, notably the treatment of consumption and the estimation 
of multipliers. The data set employed in this study is discussed in Section 5.4, 
which defines the process for aggregating IO Tables and then presents the equations 
to be estimated. Finally, in Section 5.5, some limitations of the approach are 
considered.
5.1. How Aid Impacts on the Economy
The basic argument has already been presented: some portion of aid will be spent 
on importing goods produced by donor industries, and this proportion will be 
greater to the extent that aid is tied. Donor industries may also win export orders 
financed partially out of the aid granted by other donors, due to substitution effects; 
this may be offset as aid-financed orders displace normal commercial orders. 
Furthermore, due to radiation effects and the needs for maintenance and spare- 
parts, exports will tend to generate future orders. The IO method measures only 
economic activity due to donor exports financed out of donor aid; the implications 
of other effects are considered in Section 5.5 and subsequent chapters (and are 
unlikely to be affected by the type or tying status of aid).
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 5 99
It is not aid itself which impacts on the donor economy but the exports which are 
attributable to its aid budget. Thus, the fundamental determinant of impact is the 
export ratio of aided exports (xa) to initial aid (a), ie. the extent to which aid is 
transformed into exports, which we designate by the parameter p, which has three 
basic components. These are the degree of tying (f), the level of leakages (A) and 
the degree of competitiveness (x )• All three of these components will vary 
according to the type of aid and the nature of the exporting industry (the type of 
product to which the aid relates). The discussion can be framed in terms of a simple 
equation, for industry i and type of aid a:
Pia ~  i^a ~  ^ia +  %ia (5*1)
We will ignore, for the present, the possibility of time lags between the granting of 
aid and the winning of export orders. The r  is relatively straightforward and 
measures the degree of tying; if a particular type of aid is fully tied it assumes the 
value of one while partial tying implies a value below unity. This component can 
also incorporate aid which is effectively an export subsidy; for a subsidy of value 
<x, expressed as a proportion of the contract value, then T = 1/cr. The value can 
differ between industries; for example, the nominal export subsidy under ATP in 
1980 was 25 per cent for capital projects ( t =  4) but up to 100 per cent for 
consultancy ( r=  1). The second component, leakages, is most easily interpreted 
as the proportion of the aid which can be allowed as local costs (approximately 30 
per cent for UK bilateral aid) but could also include the proportion of an order 
which contractors can procure from third countries (expressed relative to the aid 
value). The range 0.2 < X < 0.4 seems likely.
The competitiveness component, £, generally represents the degree of informal 
tying. A specific example, relating to our application of this component in 
estimating impact, will be more useful than a generalisation. In the case of 
multilateral aid, such as contributions to the World Bank, there is no formal tying to 
the donor (t = 0) but there is a broad tendency for donor firms to win orders, as a 
share of total Bank contracts, in rough proportion to the donor’s share of total 
contributions. The more internationally competitive a particular donor industry, the
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more likely it is to win such orders and hence the greater the value of which we 
measure as the value of contracts won as a proportion of the value of contributions. 
Since, in practice, contributions are not industry-specific although competitiveness 
may be, any observed value of %a will be the aggregate over all industries for a 
particular type of aid (ie. contributions to a particular MAA). Note that this 
component could be extended to incorporate spare-part and follow-on orders, in 
which case the value would vary by industry but not necessarily by type of aid.
The value of aided exports for any industry would therefore depend on the amount 
of each type of aid going to that industry (aia) and the relevant values of pia, as 
given by the equation:
x i =  ? aPia%aia (5*2)
This can be expressed in matrix notation:
X =  ^cflct (5*3)
where
x = a column-vector of i elements, aided exports per industry,
Pa = a matrix of elements along the principal diagonal, otherwise 0 
sta = a column-vector of i elements, value of type of aid a per industry; 
tied bilateral aid (t)1, multilateral aid (ji) and ATP (a).
We can extend (5.2) to consider time. The x-t in any year t will be a weighted sum 
of Pia-Ufa the potential exports, over a number of years (n), with the length of the 
distributed lag varying between industries. Thus, if the aid relates directly to 
manufactured output, such as coaches or rolling stock, the exports are likely to 
accrue after a lag of about one year. However, if the aid relates to a large 
construction project, the capital exports are likely to accrue in stages over a period 
of years. In equation form:
* We do not consider the use of r for tied bilateral (as a subscript) and for the degree of tying to 
be confusing; the two are closely related and it will always be clear which is meant
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x it =  2, n,,-l ( I a Pia,t-l a ia,t-l> (5 -4 )
where
yi t_[ = the proportion of potential exports for industry i in year t-l that
accrue in year r, / = 0, 1, 2,..., n; n = n(i).
The factors determining the level of exports directly supported by aid are 
encapsulated in equations (5.1) and (5.4). Essentially, these depend on the nature 
of the aid and the nature of the product or project. The estimation of xit, however, 
is only the first step in quantifying impact These exports have to be produced, and 
therefore represent an increase in output and in the demands for inputs. 
Furthermore, given that industries are inter-related (each industry demands inputs 
from some or all other industries hence an increase in the output of one will lead to 
an increase in the output of all) this increase in economic activity has a multiplier 
effect on the economy. IO analysis is an appropriate way to evaluate such multiplier 
effects; before outlining the method in Section 5.2, it will be useful to discuss the 
basic structure of IO Tables (see schematic representation in Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1. Schematic Input-O utput Table
INDUSTRIES FINAL DEMANDS TOTAL
INDUSTRIES Z c g V e q
h ch 8h 0 eh * h
PRIMARY t ct St vr t
INPUTS K 0 0 0 0 K
m cm 8m V/n em m
TOTAL q C 8 V e GNI
N ote: In this representation, and at various points, we may use t as a subscript to 
represent the intermediate taxes. In such cases it should always be clear that the 
subscript is not to represent time, for which t is also used.
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The IO Table divides the economy into a number of industries (102 in the 1984 
Table, on which much of our analysis is based) covering all economic activities 
from agriculture and extractive industries, to manufacturing and service industries, 
and including energy and public administration. The core element of the Table is the 
inter-industry matrix (Z) showing the value of inter-industry trade (the diagonal 
elements represent intra-industry trade). The value of the sales of an industry to 
other industries represents the intermediate inputs provided by that industry to 
others (eg. sales of steel to metal goods, vehicle manufacturing and construction 
industries); these are given along the rows of Z. The entries in the columns of Z 
represent the purchases of intermediate inputs by one industry from others (eg. 
motor vehicle manufacturing purchases steel, rubber, metal goods, services, etc.). 
This matrix is the basis of the analysis detailed in Section 5.2.
Intermediate inputs comprise only a portion of total inputs, the remainder being 
termed primary inputs. The IO Table gives the value of primary inputs divided into 
five types, four of which are of interest to us. Labour (the vector h) measures 
household income from employment, therefore includes the total wage and salary 
bills for an industry. Profits (the vector n) measures gross profits and other trading 
income, including rents, and implicitly includes, as being the source of, household 
investment income. Imports (the vector m) is the value of imported inputs while 
taxes (the vector t) measures all taxes on industry expenditure less subsidies and 
includes VAT that cannot be reclaimed, some excises and taxes on imported inputs. 
The fifth primary input is sales by final demand and is a sort of residual category 
for purchases that cannot be elsewhere classified; it is not pertinent to our study.
Industry output is either purchased by other industries or sold to final demand, for 
which the IO Table has five categories (we combine two of these). The most 
important is consumer expenditure on goods and services (c), which is self- 
explanatory. The other three categories are government expenditure on goods and 
services (g), exports (e) and investment (v) in which we include both gross fixed 
capital investment and changes in stocks. An increase in final demand for an 
industry will elicit an increase in output for that industry which, through Z, requires 
increased output from other industries supplying inputs, and a general increase in
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the demand for primary inputs. It is in this way that aid-supported exports, which 
are elements of e, impact on the economy, and thus IO is a suitable analytical 
method for quantifying impact
A few comments on the entries in the primary inputs by final demands matrix are 
warranted; convention, rather than theory, usually decides if these entries are non­
zero. For example, represents final consumer demand for labour (eg. domestic 
help) and is zero if such labour is classified under a particular service industry, as is 
the case for UK Tables. Similarly, g/, is government final demand for labour and is 
zero in the UK Tables since public employment is included as an industry in Z. The 
entry is wages paid as exports, or net remittances. The interpretation of the final 
demands corresponding to imported inputs or taxes are fairly clear. UK practice 
allocates VAT to consumer spending but then deducts it from IO values so that it is 
not included as industry output; this is convenient for our analysis since VAT is not 
paid on exports anyway. More information on the UK IO Tables can be found in 
Central Statistics Office (CSO, 1988).
5.2. Basic Elements of Input-O utput Analysis
The economic relationship underlying IO is the inter-dependence between industries 
in an economy; part of the output of one industry is an intermediate input for others, 
and each uses the products of other industries to make its output We use the term 
industry loosely to designate the firms comprising a column/row set of entries in an 
IO Table, so that it is our basic level of classification. Industry output depends on 
the demand for its product as an input to other industries and the final demands 
from consumers, government investment and foreign trade.
The essence of IO impact analysis is that, due to the linkages in the economy, an 
increase in final demand for the output of any industry will induce an increase in the 
output of all related industries and in the derived demand for primary inputs (labour 
and imports in particular). In the same way, given the structure of the economy we 
can estimate the level of economic activity sustained by any component of final 
demand. We can represent an economy with n industries as a series of 
simultaneous linear equations of the form:
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Qi =  Ztf +  z*2 + —+ zij +•••+ z in +  (5-5)
The <7/ represent the total output of industry i, which is composed of the demand 
for f  s output from each other industry j ,  the zzy (elements of Z), and the row- 
vector of final demands for z's output, the dz. In an IO table (5.5) represents the 
rows, ie. the industry outputs. The columns of the table are the industry inputs and 
can be represented as:
qj = + Z2j  +...+ zzy + ...+  znj  + tj (5.6)
where
qj = total inputs to industry j ,  where qi = qj if i = j,
tj = column-vector of primary inputs to j ,
Zij = output of industry i required as an input to j.
In disaggregating the inputs in (5.6) a particular distinction is drawn between the 
intermediate inputs, which are demanded from other industries and define the inter­
dependence of the model, and the primary inputs. The intermediate inputs can be 
represented as a share of total inputs (outputs):
0^ = Zfj/qj 0 < 0y < 1 (5.7)
where 0zy is the technical coefficient defining the proportion of f  s inputs 
purchased from z, generally defined in value terms. Two fundamental assumptions 
underlie the IO model, given that the 6y are constrained to be fixed once known:
i) all industries face constant returns to scale (the 0zy are independent of the level of 
output); ii) there is no substitution between intermediate inputs and output is 
constrained to the level implied by the lowest z^Qy ratio in this static model.
The Leontief Inverse.
Availing of equation (5.7), we can rewrite (5.5):
<li = 0il.qj +. . .+  dy.qj + . . .+  6in.qn + dz (5.8)
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which can be rearranged to yield,
<7i - Sa-qi - ... - dij.qj - ... - 6in.qn = df (5.9)
The system of equations (5.9) can be represented compactly in matrix notation:
(I - 0 )  q = d (5.10)
and,
q = d - e ) - 1* = L .d  (5.11)
where
q = column-vector of the <7z's, i = l,...,n,
d = column-vector of the d - s ,  i  = 1
I  = Identity matrix; all elements along the principal diagonal are unity,
all other elements are zero,
0  = Matrix of Off, elements along principal diagonal greater than unity, 
all other elements positive but usually less than unity,
L = The Leontief Inverse, as defined in the equation.
The element /,y of (1-0)"1 is dq^/ddj (the interdependence coefficient) and 
represents the effect of dj  on qt-. Equation (5.11) allows one to evaluate the effect 
on output (q, equivalent to inputs) of a change in final demand (d). The matrix 0  
can be derived from a published IO Table and the inverse (I - 0 )"1 calculated. This 
inverse, called the Leontief inverse (see Leontief, 1988), henceforth denoted L, can 
be used to calculate the value for q associated with any d.
In addition to the matrix of technical coefficients, 0 , the published IO Tables permit 
one to calculate the primary input coefficients for each industry. These are the share 
of total inputs accounted for by each primary input and do not identify the primary 
inputs required to meet an increase in output (contrary to claims in HSPE, 1986). 
An increase in demand (Adz- > 0) has a direct effect on the industry's input 
requirements, which is proportional to the input coefficients, and an indirect effect 
on the input requirements of industries whose produce is required by i  as an 
intermediate input. Because i requires supplies from other industries, the output of 
the economy must expand by more than Adz* if i is to meet its new demand. This
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indirect effect is proportional to the 0,y and the input coefficients of the supplying 
industries, and can be considered as the first round indirect effect The second 
round occurs when supplying industries demand intermediate inputs from other 
industries, which then demand supplies and services. An injection of demand into 
one industry sets off a multi-round effect such that the output of the economy 
increases by more than the initial demand. The ratio of the total increase in output to 
the initial demand can be termed the aggregate output multiplier.
Given the meaning of its ly elements, L measures the direct and indirect multi­
round effects of a change in demand. These effects are slightly more complex than 
indicated in the previous paragraph. Intra-industry transactions, inputs required 
from within the industry, imply that output of i itself will increase by more than the 
increase in demand, ie. Aqz- > Adz- and /zz- > 1. Allowing a simultaneous increase 
in demand for more than one industry, the increased output of any industry will 
depend on the increase in its demand, the scale of intra-industry demand and the 
level of intermediate demands from other industries trying to increase their output. 
The Leontief inverse accounts for all of these effects.
5.3. Extensions to the Input-O utput Fram ework
The purpose of this section is to discuss the concept of IO multipliers. The 
procedure encapsulated in (5.11) allows one to evaluate the impact on the economy 
of an increase in demand; by concentrating on individual industries one can estimate 
the effect on the economy of an increase in demand for the products of one 
industry, given the inter-connections between that industry and all others. This 
effect is represented by the IO multipliers for that industry.
By calculating the Leontief inverse we can evaluate the impact of a change in final 
demand on total output and, in so doing, on the output of each industry. Similarly, 
we can calculate the effect of an increase in demand for one industry on the whole 
economy to give the output multiplier for that industry. Since production 
technologies vary, some industries will rely more heavily on intermediate inputs 
than others and will, therefore, have a higher output multiplier. Output implies 
income; the income multiplier will depend on the share of wages in the inputs of all
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industries benefiting from an increase in the output of an industry. Furthermore, 
labour-intensive industries, or those which demand inputs from labour-intensive 
industries, will have a greater effect on increasing employment, ie. a higher 
employment multiplier. We focus on these three multipliers.
Output Multipliers
An output multiplier for sector j  is defined as the total value of production in all sectors 
of the economy that is necessary in order to satisfy a dollar's worth of final demand for 
sector fs  output (Miller and Blair, 1985:102)
The definition of the output multiplier for industry j  (Op is quite simply the sum 
of the n elements in the f i 1 column of the L matrix:
Oj =  2 , / y  (5 .12 )
On a simple objective of obtaining the maximum output for a given change in final 
demand, the basic IO approach would suggest that the demand should be in the 
industry with the greatest Oy. This ignores the possibility of there being 
distributional or strategic reasons why one may not wish to do this and, of course, 
one may not have any discretion in targetting increases in final demand. More 
importantly, it ignores the possibility of there being capacity constraints which 
would prevent the full multiplier effect from being achieved. If any industry i faces 
a capacity constraint then / ,y  is constrained and Oj is under-attained, the more so 
the larger is / zy . Such constraints will exist in practice (and IO analysis can be used 
to identify where they are likely to occur), or the supply of primary inputs could be 
limited, so that multipliers calculated from (5.12) will be biased upwards. 
Nonetheless, relevant conclusions can be drawn from the relative values and order 
of magnitude of multipliers for different industries.
So far we have been talking of open IO models where only industries are included 
in 0  and, by implication, in L. It can be argued that households should be included 
in the inter-industry matrix since they constitute such a large part of final demand 
while consumption relates directly to income which, in turn, depends on the 
demand for labour in each industry. On this basis, the household sector is
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sometimes moved inside the matrix and the IO model is said to be closed with 
respect to households. This is not normally done for other components of final 
demand because their magnitude and relationship to primary inputs is less.
Although the assumptions embodied in the IO model, as stated under (5.7) above, 
are restrictive they are not entirely unreasonable for short-run production functions. 
Closing the model for households, however, applies these assumptions to 
consumer behaviour which results in what we consider to be untenable restrictions. 
In particular, where h denotes households, the 6^  are the average propensities to 
consume the output of i; the assumption that they are constant implies that they 
equal the (also constant) marginal propensities to consume. This, in our view, is a 
substantive theoretical objection to using closed models, and we do not use them. 
We make these points because closed models are often used for calculating 
multipliers on the justification that increases in output will increase income and 
generate demand for more output Closing the model incorporates these effects and 
yields multipliers with a greater magnitude than those estimated from (5.12).
Income Multipliers
As mentioned earlier, an output is matched by an income effect. The income 
multiplier, the effect of an increase in final demand for an industry on the income of 
households, need not be of the same relative or absolute magnitude as the Oj.  The 
direct income effect is on those employed in the industry i but there will be indirect 
effects on all industries supplying inputs to i. The household income multiplier, 
Hj, is the portion of increased output which accrues to labour inputs:
Hj = I  iVki-hj (5-13)
where
Tjfa = labour’s share of total inputs to industry i.
Note that the Hj relate only to total labour income and are independent of whether 
the increase is due to higher pay or increased employment; increases in investment 
income, to shareholders for example, are excluded from this approach. A multiplier 
is formally the ratio of direct and indirect effects to the initial injection of demand,
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which is taken to be a single currency unit and is ignored in (5.12) and (5.13). 
While the initial effect of £1 demand on output is £1 of output, this need not hold 
for the effect on income. Moore (1955) argued that the initial effect on income is 
£1/7] hi, which leads to what is termed a Type I income multiplier equal to 
Hj/rihi.2 As for the closing of IO models (which would yield a higher income 
multiplier), we mention this measure only to argue that we consider it inappropriate. 
Inherent in the multiplier concept is the fact that it is the initial expenditure that is 
being multiplied. Hence, the Type I measure exaggerates the size of the true 
multiplier, a point succintly understated by one commentator
Instead of forming a ratio between the ultimate increase in income and the increase in 
expenditure, as is usually done, Mr. Moore takes the ratio of the ultimate increase in 
income to the immediate increase in income. (Moses, 19S5:152)
To reiterate our principle argument, the appropriate measure of a multiplier effect is 
the increase in output or income relative to the initial injection of demand, as 
measured in an open IO model. There are two advantages in using the forms (5.12) 
and (5.13). First, it is computationally easier to estimate them since the closed 
model requires the calculation of a second Leontief inverse from a larger matrix. 
Secondly, the estimated multipliers are smaller in magnitude, which makes some 
allowance for the fact that capacity or input constraints in any industry imply that an 
estimated multiplier may not be fully realised.
Employment Multipliers
Much of the existing literature on the impact of aid has emphasised the effects on 
employment; we will have much more to say about this but, for the present, it is 
useful to define employment multipliers (Qj). These can be calculated in exactly the 
same way as income multipliers provided there is information on industry 
employment (wj). The employment, measured in physical labour inputs, resulting 
from increased demand is:
2 Miller and Blair (1985) use the term Type I multipliers but Moore (1955), in the context of 
regional IO analysis, actually used the term 'simple' income multiplier for this measure. If Moore's 
approach is used for a closed model, the result is a Type n  income multiplier.
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Qj = 'Li(wi/<liUij (5.14)
The actual value for Qj will be quite small since it represents the number of jobs 
created per additional £1; in practice, the currency unit would be £lm  which gives 
more readable figures. The calculation of wjqi is discussed in Chapter 6. It only 
remains to note that IO multipliers can be calculated in respect of any primary inputs 
and, indeed, we will calculate them for imported inputs and taxes on intermediate 
inputs. The procedure is analagous to that discussed above.
5.4. The Data and the Method Used
The data on which our analysis is based are estimated total aided exports for 1978- 
84, classified by industry, in current prices (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989); 
these are presented in some detail in Appendix A, which describes the adjustments 
made so as to render the source data compatible with the IO model used. A 
separate, and more suitable, data set was available for ATP and is discussed in 
Chapter 8 and Appendix B. The principal deficiencies in the data were that it was 
not possible to identify the values of individual parameters in (5.1), although the 
overall value of p  could be inferred, or in (5.2), since the distribution of aid by 
industry was unknown; nor was it possible to identify the year in which exports 
were won, nor the length of time over which the order was met, ie. it was not 
possible to even approximate elements of equation (5.4). Essentially, the base data 
presented an estimated value of x covering the period 1978-84; our first problem 
was how to link aid and aided exports for particular years, which required 
assuming time lags and breaking down the elements of x, so that (5.11) could be 
estimated (where x = d, L is derived from IO Tables and q is to be estimated).
Input-Output Tables for the UK were available for two relevant years, 1979 and 
1984 (Business Monitor, 1983 and CSO, 1988, respectively), although since the 
basic structure of the economy changes slowly, Tables are useful over a number of 
years (CSO, 1988:11). Our intention was to estimate the amount of economic 
activity accounted for by aided exports over the period 1978-84 on average and 
specific estimates for 1980 and 1985. Distinguishing the data on x for the latter 
years required two assumptions. First, that the value of aided exports over time is
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proportional to the value of UK aid with a one year lag, ie. we assume / = 1 for all 
aid and industries in equation (5.4). Thus, exports due to bilateral aid in 1980 as a 
share of the known total over 1978-84 are assumed to be the same proportion as 
1979 tied bilateral aid was of total 1977-83 tied bilateral aid. Similarly for 
multilateral aid and exports (Appendix A).
Second, we assume the distribution of exports by industry to be the same in each 
year and equal to the period average. This is clearly untrue but is necessitated 
because only the average, or more accurately the total over the period, is known, 
and is consistent with the prior assumption that the lag is one year for all industries. 
These assumptions are not as restrictive as they may seem. It is reasonable to expect 
a time lag of about a year between the granting of aid and the negotiation of export 
orders; a shorter period is unlikely given the normal length of time taken to disburse 
aid while a longer period is more likely to be an exception rather than the rule. 
Although the exports themselves will occur over a longer period, depending on the 
nature of the product, firms will begin to plan and place orders once the agreement 
is reached, so they will start to impact immediately.
Furthermore, since there will be random changes in the industry distribution of 
aided exports and, indeed, of IO linkages and economic activity, on a year to year 
basis, it is appropriate to base our arguments on a period average, and to estimate 
values for each end of the period. It is important to emphasise that we estimate 
retrospectively the outputs o f various industries that can be attributed to the volume 
o f aided exports in the relevant period. This gives an indication, but not a forecast, 
of the importance of aid now or in the future.
Aggregation of IO Tables
The 1979 IO Table for the UK comprises 100 industries, and the 1984 Table has 
102; the data on aided exports, however, covers a smaller number of industries. 
Tied aid benefits only a few industries directly, and it would simplify the 
computations and presentation of results to aggregate some industries to create a 
smaller matrix. Aggregation introduces bias: let the total change in output, the 
impact of a given increase in final demand, Ad, calculated using the disaggregated
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matrix, be Aqj and let the impact using the aggregated matrix be Atfc. These two 
measures will differ by an amount representing the aggregation bias, save in two 
cases for which Aqj = Aq2 and the bias is zero (Miller and Blair, 1985:178-81):
i) If the industries that are aggregated have identical input structures, ie. their 
respective vectors of technical coefficients are the same. This is unlikely to arise 
in practice.
ii) If those industries that are aggregated are not directly affected by Ad, ie. there is 
no increase in final demand for their products. This meets our purposes since 
many IO industries do not win aided exports while those that do are known.
The process of aggregation is quite simple. Where the initial matrix, Z , is of 
dimension n by n, and the aggregated matrix, Z, is to be of dimension m by m, 
we construct an aggregation matrix, N, of dimension m by n with elements either 
zero or unity. The elements in the ith row of N which are unity represent the 
sectors in Z* which will be combined to form the f t1 sector of Z. The aggregated 
matrix is then given by the equation:
where N', the transpose of N, is an n by m matrix with elements of unity in the
Z N . Z* . N' (5.15)
7th column representing the industries combined to form the f i 1 sector of Z.
Similarly,




where D and F are the original pre-aggregation matrices of final demands and 
primary inputs respectively.
Formal Model for the Impact of Aided-Orders
From the full 1979 and 1984 IO matrices of 100 and 102 industries respectively, 
we construct aggregate matrices with the 28 industries listed in Table 5.1 (page 114
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below) and calculate the Leontief inverse for each. Retaining the standard notation 
but remembering that we are now refering to aggregate matrices, the value of the 
output (q) required to support the volume of aided exports (x) for each and all 
industries is given by equation (5.11). We then decompose q into its constituent 
inputs by calculating:
F = O .Q  (5.18)
where Q = diagonal 28 by 28 matrix of total output required to meet the aided 
exports, ie. industry outputs are along the principal diagonal and all 
other elements are zero,
O = the 5 by 28 matrix of Input coefficients (z,m,r,/z,;r, see below),
F = the 5 by 28 matrix of q in (5.11) decomposed into its inputs.
Equations (5.11) and (5.18) are the ones estimated. The IO Tables identify five 
inputs which are included in F, as previously discussed in reference to Figure 5.1. 
The value of output met by intermediate inputs from other industries is z; m is the 
output accounted for by imported inputs (with an i-vector of 28 input coefficients 
Om); t is the value of taxes on material inputs (with coefficients vector Ot); h is 
labour inputs (and Oj, = T|) and tu is profits and trading income (with On). By 
disaggregating q into the input components we have been able to cany out a more 
extensive analysis of the impact of aid, as in the next few chapters.
We can express the elements of q in terms of the elements of L and x. For an 
economy with n industries, and in this study n = 28 for bilateral and multilateral 
aid, the aid induced output of the Ith industry is:
q, = Z j h j - X j  (5. i9)
In (5.19) the /^represent the impact of an increase in demand for the products of 
the7th industry on the output of the Ith industry, and the x- measure the value of 
the increase in the demand for the produce of industry j. That is, aided exports are 
an increase in demand for some industries and we measure the increase in total
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output, by industry, to meet the increased demand for all industries, ie. the share, in 
value terms, of total economic activity attributable to export demand from aid.
Table 5.1: Industries in the Aggregate IO Matrix
1. Mineral Oil Processing (MOP)
2. Iron and Steel, Steel Products (I&S)
3. .non-Metal Mineral Products (nMMP)
4. Fertilisers (Frt)
5. Pharmaceuticals (Phm)
6. Metal Goods n.e.s. (Mtl)
7. Industrial Plant and Steelwork (IPlt)
8. Agricultural Machinery, Tractors (AMch)
9. Textile, Woodwork etc. Machonery (TWMch)
10. Process Machinery and Contractors (PMch)
11. Mining, Construction etc. Machinery (MCMch)
12. Other Machinery, Mechanical Equipment (OMch)
13. Office Machinery, Computer Equipment (OfEq)
14. Insulated Wires and Cables (IW&C)
15. Basic Electrical Equipment (ElEq)
16. Telecommunication etc. Equipment (TIEq)
17. Electronic Components, sub-Assemblies (ECA)
18. Motor Vehicles and Parts (Mot)
19. Shipbuilding and Repairs (Ships)
20. Other Vehicles (OVch)
21. Instrument Engineering (InstE)
22. Timber, paper, rubber, plastics (TPRP)
23. Construction (Const)
24. Banking, Finance and Insurance (FSer)
25. Agric., utilities, metals and chemicals (MiscP)
26. Miscellaneous engineering and manufactures (MiscM)
27. Food, drink, tobacco and clothing (FDTC)
28. Miscellaneous Services (MiscS)
NOTE: See Appendix A for more detail.
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S.5. Lim itations of the Method
There are two general sources of limitations in the method oultined as a means of 
estimating the impact of aid on the UK economy: those inherent in IO Tables and 
those resulting from data deficiencies which act, and interact, in two ways. First, 
there are factors preventing us from applying the model as set out in Sections 5.1 
and 5.2. Second, this model itself does not address the range of issues relating to 
impact as set out in Chapter 3. The principal limitations of the data have been set out 
in the previous Section, are addressed in detail in Appendix A and are discussed in 
subsequent Chapters. Consequendy, attention here is confined to those limitations 
pertaining to the IO method per se. We consider only two: classification of 
industries and the static nature of our approach.
Classification of Input-Output Industries
The data on which IO Tables are based derive from survey material collected at the 
level of business establishments, which correspond roughly to the theoretical 
concept of the firm. Implicit is the view that firms (or at least plants) are specific to 
industries and that industries produce a single product. In practice, firms and 
industries are multi-product. By convention, firms are allocated to the industry 
appropriate to their primary product, that which accounts for the largest share of 
their output. This leaves a problem regarding the proper treatment of secondary 
products although, as will be shown, this is not a serious consideration for us. -
Recall that IO embodies a production function with fixed technical coefficients for 
each industry. This implies that each industry has a fixed production technology, 
which is not unreasonable for single-product industries, and it is therefore 
inaccurate to include in that industry a secondary product with a different 
production technology. The recommended procedure is to reclassify secondary 
products to their respective industries. One way of doing this is to treat secondary 
products as being sold from the producer industry to the appropriate industry. In 
this way they are properly allocated to consumers but, since they are treated as 
fictional inter-industry trade and as final sales, they are double-counted and total 
output is inflated by their value. This approach is probably satisfactory if secondary 
products are not considered as very significant (for most industries they account for
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less than 20 per cent of output) and is largely unavoidable if the associated inputs 
cannot be separately identified.
Provided their input structure is known, secondary products can be allocated to the 
correct industries without any double-counting. The best way of doing this is to use 
the 'commodity by industry' IO Tables. In these, the rows represent the demand for 
commodities, for which each product is independently classified and there is no 
secondary product problem; final demands are by commodity. The columns 
represent industry purchases of commodities as intermediate inputs. Although this 
matrix is not identical to the 'industry by industry' IO matrix, there is a general 
correspondence between commodity and industry classifications and it is this matrix 
from which we calculate the Leontief inverse. The basic interpretation of the results 
is as discussed, and there is the added advantage that the commodity classification " 
is consistent with our data, especially in the case of ATP.
The Static Nature of Input-Output
The IO Table for a given year is a snapshot of the economy rather than a movie so 
that our approach does not capture any dynamic effects af aided exports. It must be 
emphasised that this is a limitation of our analysis, not of IO: the IO method itself is 
flexible and dynamic models exist at both the theoretical and empirical level (see 
Leontief, 1988, especially discussion of the dynamic inverse). The static model is 
suitable for our purposes and, in fact, our data base is barely adequate for this 
model, never mind one more complex. There are a number of questions which the 
static model, and hence our analysis, is ill-equipped to answer.
First, the Leontief inverse is calculated from the Z matrix and is independent of 
which component of final demand is increased; the measured impact on industry 
outputs will be the same for a given increase in any component of final demand. 
This is not fully satisfactory from a macroeconomic viewpoint since one may 
believe that an increase in export demand has different implications to an increase 
in, say, demand from government or investment If there are differences, however, 
they are likely to be manifested in firm's expectations or competition, not in the 
derived demand for inputs. Thus, an increase in aided exports may encourage a
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firm to give more thought to overseas operations, even to setting up an office 
abroad, and may affect strategic planning. Increases in government demand may, 
on the other hand, sometimes be seen as a windfall gain. In either case the effect on 
the demand for inputs is the same, and depends on the existing inter-industry 
structure. In other words, dynamic and especially behavioural effects may differ but 
the structural implications, in immediate gross terms, are the same.
Second, and related, is the particular case of consumer demand and its relationship 
to household income. Following from the earlier discussion of income multipliers, 
there is the potential for a Keynesian multiplier effect An increase in final demand 
will increase the demand for labour inputs, amongst others, which can in turn 
increase consumer demand. The use of an open 10 model implies that this potential 
effect is not being picked up. There are two reasons why we do not consider this of 
major concern. First, any effect is likely to be fairly small, given that aided exports 
are small in macroeconomic terms, and will depend on marginal propensities to 
consume whereas the IO Tables only incorporate average propensities. Secondly, 
the argument for a Keynesian multiplier rests on there being an injection of new 
demand, whereas we are estimating the share of activity due to x. The issue is 
relevant, but not intrinsic.
Third, the 10 approach does not incorporate displacement, radiation or substitution 
effects. While we acknowledge their potential importance, we stress again that the 
10 analysis is being used to estimate the gross commercial benefits from aid. The 
trade creation and opportunity cost issues can be explored to investigate the extent 
to which aided exports are necessary to achieve the indirect benefits, and to examine 
the justifications for tied aid. These issues need to be addressed, but can be treated 
separately after the commercial benefits have been estimated. Having detailed the 
model that we employ, we can now turn to a presentation and discussion of the 
estimates. Attention is confined to tied bilateral aid, multilateral aid and the ATP, 
which are treated in separate Chapters. They will be brought together in Chapter 9, 
which utilises the 10 model to estimate the impact of alternative aid policies and to 
try and account for some opportunity costs.
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CHAPTER 6. THE IMPACT OF TIED BILATERAL AID
The greater part of UK Bilateral Aid is tied, over fifty per cent in 1983 and roughly 
two-thirds in 1987 (ODA, 1988:xii), meaning that it must be used by the recipient 
to purchase goods and services from the UK. As detailed in Chapters 3 and 5, this 
generates exports, with associated benefits in terms of output and employment, 
which in turn generate tax revenue. These benefits are often cited by business 
interests as justifying an increased use of tying. The principal objective of this 
chapter is to quantify and evaluate the impact of tied bilateral aid (TB A) on the UK 
economy. The analysis is confined to the impact of orders direcdy associated with 
TBA; excluded are benefits from ATP (Chapter 8), TCA and untied Bilateral Aid 
(but see Section 6.5 and Chapter 9). Also, at this stage we make no attempt to 
account for the impact of orders indirectly associated with aid such as spare parts, 
follow-on orders or contracts paid out of the untied aid of other donors.
Section 6.1 reviews the nature of the direct benefits from aid: the process by which 
firms win aided exports, the importance of these to firms and how they help form 
business views on UK aid policy (which, as argued in Chapter 4, are not without 
influence on government policy), and the differences in the importance of aid to 
various industries. The estimated impact results are then presented. Section 6.2 
generalises the results by focusing on their significance for the economy and major 
industrial groupings. The basic results are presented at a fairly detailed level of 
industry disaggregation in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we consider some extensions 
of the analysis, in particular an example of how industry multipliers can be used to 
provide impact estimates for individual projects, and consider whether TBA is 
trade-creating. A summary is presented in Section 6.5, which also reiterates some 
of the limitations of the approach.
6.1. The Direct Benefits of Tied Bilateral Aid1
In this section we wish to distinguish the views of different industries on aid; 
although we here refer to TBA, the arguments will be applied to other forms of aid
1 Much of this section is based on discussions with representatives of major firms, consultants 
and business lobbies, to all of whom I am grateful.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 6 119
in subsequent chapters. The potential benefits from aid depend on a firm's activity 
in aid-recipient countries, which will tend to be greater in some industries than in 
others, and for large firms rather than small ones (many of the issues are closely 
related to those in Section 4.2). While large firms are more likely to export to 
LDCs, many small firms do so successfully, and more might do so if they received 
more assistance or encouragement from the government We will argue that in 
certain industries the benefits are more likely to go to large firms and that because 
aid is more likely (in volume terms) to be tied to the type of products exported by 
these firms, large firms derive by far the greater share of direct benefits.
Business Benefits from TBA
The views of an industry towards aid will be shaped by the importance of LDC 
markets and the extent to which prominent fiims are engaged in overseas activities 
in LDCs. The economy is a network of business interests; increased exports for one 
industry will benefit others and there will tend to be a shared attitude towards aid. 
Four broad interests can be distinguished. There are consultancy firms, the 
foremost of which, at least in terms of overseas markets, are Consulting Engineers. 
Related to these, and dominating trade with LDCs, are the large contractors who 
compete for major projects overseas, normally based in construction and 
engineering. Next come the manufacturing industries which export to LDCs in their 
own right and as suppliers to contractors. Finally, there are supply and support 
industries which tend to benefit only indirectly.
Parallel to this industry distinction, but not necessarily in direct correspondence, is 
the distinction between the types of projects that can be won. First are the long-term 
planning projects, usually financed by MAAs, and feasibility studies for individual 
projects, often financed by bilateral aid. This stage can be viewed as establishing 
the set of potential projects, and is a major source of business for consultants. The 
second stage, once a project has been selected from the set, is the design phase 
which is normally open to international tender and, unless financed by an MAA, the 
succesful bid will normally require an aid element This stage is also primarily a 
source of business only for consultants, although they are in much closer contact 
with potential contractors (which threatens their impartiality).
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The third stage, which is often combined with design, is the construction project 
itself and the tendering process is subject to competition. A contractor is more likely 
to win a project if it can minimise competition, which suggests a number of 
strategies. First, close contacts with the consultant gives contractors a 'foot in the 
door', and can lead to a design specification that favours them. Second, if the 
project is financed by TBA they only need to compete with other firms in the donor 
country. Third, and more generally, they can cultivate relations with the host 
country, best exemplified by setting up local offices which represent a local 
commitment, or with the financing body, so that major firms keep in close contact 
with MAAs. Finally, early information can be very advantageous to a potential 
bidder, thus they cultivate local contacts and links with consultants and MAAs, as 
stated, but also seek the government, via its overseas missions, to assist them, at 
least by providing information on potential contracts (as done by the DTI) if not by 
actively promoting the company. Furthermore, a successful bid will generally 
require an aid element, which is the most direct help the government can give. The 
two core issues here are the speed at which aid can be agreed and the volume of aid 
available, both relative to other donors.
The three stages of a construction project provide the principal opportunities for 
British firms to win aided exports. The international prominence and reputation of 
British consultants provides a relatively high success rate in the first two stages. 
This is partly because UK consultants are from large, long-established and very 
experienced firms but is not unrelated to the perception that they are impartial and, 
unlike many consultants from other countries, will not try to promote UK 
contractors or suppliers in their report (nonetheless, British firms are far more likely 
to win orders if UK consultants are involved). The relative level of UK success 
tends to be lower in the third stage, largely because international competition is far 
greater but partly because the UK deploys a lower volume of aid than other major 
donors and, in the views of business, does so relatively less efficiently in terms of 
maximising commercial gains.
We do not wish to give the impression that construction projects are the only source 
of aided exports, but they do account for about three-quarters of the total.
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Manufacturers benefit in a number of ways. First, some win aided exports, most 
commonly for ships, railway equipment, coaches, agricultural machinery and 
chemicals. Second, many win orders to supply contractors which fall into two 
types. Major orders are similar to sub-contracting and, effectively, the manufacturer 
wins an aided export via the contractor. Supply orders arise where the contractor 
manufactures the aided export but requires inputs from others; these are measured 
as indirect benefits in the analysis of the impact of aid.^ Third, manufacturers will 
benefit from spare-part and maintenance orders, although these will tend to be 
future benefits and are not financed by aid (if they were, they would appear as aided 
exports for the manufacturer). In discussing aided exports related to large projects 
we will refer to the contractors and may often attribute all of the direct benefit to 
them; since most large contractors are conglomerates with manufacturing plants or 
subsidiaries, this is not unreasonable.
Finally, let us briefly distinguish the various forms of project finance. In the case of 
TBA, the donor pays for some portion of the project, not necessarily all, and 
exports accrue to the donor industries without international competition. If projects 
are paid for by MAAs, the orders are open to international tender and no aid element 
is required. Where the host country is financing the project, or controls the funds 
made available to it, competition is normally international and an aid element is 
usually required. It is becoming increasingly common for major projects to be 
undertaken by a multinational consortium or joint venture, where a number of 
donors and MAAs provide finance (a firm must usually have prearranged aid so as 
to buy in to the venture). In this chapter only exports financed out of TBA are 
relevant, and their importance is discussed in respect of the various business types.
Consultants
Engineers are the consultants most directly concerned with aid and LDCs account 
for over a third of their overseas business (Association of Consulting Engineers, 
1987). They are internationally very competitive with a success based on a
* The data on aided exports measure the commodities exported, not the firm involved, and will 
therefore include major orders, as defined here, but not supply orders. Aid is important to firms, as 
discussed here, but the data are for commodities/industries. We will be able to consider firms when 
discussing ATP, the data for which identify the companies involved.
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reputation for providing top quality impartial advice. British consultants are less 
likely to favour British contractors, by providing them with advance information or 
by writing them into the specification, than are consultants from other countries to 
support contractors in their own country, and have come under attack for this 
reason (Mansfield, 1987a, argues that no more than a quarter of British consultancy 
in LDCs results in orders for British contractors). However, it is precisely this 
impartial attitude which underpins their reputation and success (and consultants 
claim that contractors often fail to respond to the information they are given). The 
share of British firms in new international design contracts rose from 12.7 per cent 
in 1985 to 13.6 per cent in 1986, behind only the US and much higher than the 
share of British contractors in international business (Thomas, 1987:35).
In the 1980s roughly a third of consultancy contracts in LDCs resulted from 'direct- 
targetting1, where the firm itself identified a potential study and approached the host 
government, whereas over half resulted from local contacts and offices (Mansfield, 
1987b: 1228). In these situations aid support is essential and the consultants are 
unhappy with British aid which has failed to meet their needs (see Section 4.2). The 
cost of a major feasibility study is very high and can only be borne by large firms; 
given the low success rate of turning a study into a design contract, even the large 
consultants seek support to compete widely. The lack of adequate aid support has 
forced consultants closer to contractors which limits their ability to be impartial. The 
Overseas Projects Fund will finance half the cost of a feasibility study, to be repaid 
if successful, without a formal requirement to guarantee that orders will go to 
British contractors. However, major contractors are often approached to finance all 
or part of the remaining costs and will wish a guarantee of orders if the project 
materialises. There is an increasing tendency for consultants and contractors to 
work more closely, often forming joint ventures; contractors provide finance and 
consultants provide local contacts and intelligence, and base specifications on 
British products.
Other types of consultants, especially in agriculture, work in LDCs but the size of 
their projects, and the total volume of work, tends to be smaller than for engineers. 
There is a trend towards polarisation between large international firms with a
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network of local offices, and small specialised firms who are successful overseas 
but tend to concentrate on Europe and the Middle E ast The BCB, of which 
engineers are slightly less than a third of members, argues for more aid support to 
consultants, especially small firms.3 They point out that specialised firms are 
often very competitive but cannot afford the costs of investigating LDC markets.
Contractors
The contractor industries are general construction, civil engineering (including 
irrigation) and heavy engineering, including chemical and industrial plant and 
power generation. The UK share of new international construction contracts in 
1986 was 9.5 per cent, worth some $7bn, behind only France, Japan and the US. 
(Thomas, 1987:35). Its share of LDC markets was somewhat lower, at 8.9 per cent 
for the period 1982-86, well behind Italy, France, Japan and the US (Thomas, 
1987:4). A number of reasons have been put forward to explain Britain's relatively 
low share of LDC markets.
The first is that British firms tend to be cautious and were slow getting into LDCs 
so that competitors had time to establish a local presence and reputation, gaining a 
first mover advantage. Second, foreign firms have displayed a greater willingness 
to establish a local presence and provide long-term backup for completed projects 
(particularly true for the French and Germans). Third, competitors have had more, 
and better coordinated, support from their governments: larger volumes of aid, with 
effective use of tied aid and mixed credits; quick decisions on granting aid; long­
term credits at competitive rates and a willingness to provide long-term aid so that 
completed projects can be maintained. This argument is most convincing for 
French, Japanese and, in the 1980s, Italian firms but German and American firms 
are unlikely to get any more assistance from their governments than do UK firms 
(see Morrissey, 1989d). Finally, it has been argued that British firms are not price 
competitive and, in particular, try to charge higher prices if a project is tied to UK 
aid. While this may be true for particular firms, we do not consider it a convincing 
argument for UK industry in general.
3 In 1988 some 32 per cent of BCB members were engineers, 12 per cent were architects and 
planners, 10.5 per cent were management and economic and 6.5 per cent were agricultural.
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Most businessmen agree that the single most important factor in overseas success is 
having a local presence; the best source of information on forthcoming contracts is 
the intelligence derived from being in a country, which also provides the 
opportunity to identify potential projects, and firms need to establish a reputation. 
However, overseas operations are risky and expensive to administer and the cost of 
maintaining local offices, or establishing subsidiaries, can only be borne by large 
firms. One of the major benefits of aid to firms is that it helps them to get into LDC 
markets, allowing them to demonstrate their capability, make local contacts and 
hopefully win follow-on orders. For example, Balfour Beatty obtained a project in 
Indonesia in the early 1970s with aid support and then formed a joint venture with 
their Indonesian sub-contractor; they have subsequently been quite successful in 
winning contracts in Indonesia (Pick, 1983). Because LDC governments are 
severiy resource constrained, especially in the 1980s, and competition for orders is 
intense, aid can be almost a prerequisite:
A large part of the world capital projects market is now open only to those companies 
which can demonstrate the technical and managerial ability, plus the resources and 
experience to execute the project... provided that the company can make available a 
finance package as good as those on offer from... competitors. (McGregor, 1985:11)
Manufacturers
Roughly a quarter of aided exports went to non-contractor manufacturing 
industries, mostly chemicals and vehicles. Manufacturers are distinguished from 
contractors by the nature of their products and the importance of LDC markets. In 
particular, while construction is clearly a new product (although the capital 
equipment involved need not be), manufactured exports could well be from surplus 
stock and would therefore generate few benefits for other industries. On the other 
hand, it is better for firms to be able to sell surplus stock and so engage in further 
production. Thus, the impact is the same but the dynamic gains may be less. 
Manufacturer's exports to LDCs are rarely sufficient to justify the expense of 
overseas offices, but this is not to deny that there are many opportunities.
The Chemical Industries Association (CIA), which can be taken as representative of 
manufacturers, emphasises that due to the nature of most chemical products, as
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consumable raw materials, LDCs do not at present feature prominently in the 
industry’s growth plans. However, exports are important and aid assists market 
penetration in the usual ways: chemical products are required in many projects; 
chemicals will be demanded as production inputs to meet increased UK output and 
local presence helps to secure future orders. The CIA argues for a more commercial 
aid policy but would like to see a shift in emphasis away from large capital projects 
and major contractors towards the smaller firms, which are often more competitive. 
In a number of cases, not usually in chemicals, small firms can be the most likely to 
supply small-scale, appropriate technology.
6.2. The Impact of Tied Bilateral Aid
The general results on the impact of TBA are given in this section, identifying the 
major industrial groupings which benefit and evaluating the importance to the 
economy. Detailed results by industry, on which this section is based, are presented 
and discussed in the next section. We begin with the estimates of total impact and, 
in so doing, explain the procedures used to estimate both employment effects and 
the effect on tax revenues. We then consider how the benefits differ between 
industrial groupings, a process of disaggregation taken further in the next section.
The Overall Impact on the Economy
The total value of aided exports due to tied bilateral aid over 1978-84 inclusive was 
£1327m, and the total value of TBA over the same period was £1969. Some 17 per 
cent of the TBA total was granted in 1979 and, on the assumption that aided exports 
were proportional to aid with a one year lag (see Appendix A), this leads to an 
estimated x ^  of £224m in 1980 for aid of £339m in 1979. Similarly, £157m of 
Xj. in 1985 are associated with the £237m of TBA in 1984. This procedure is less 
than perfect but gives a reasonable value for the export ratio (pT = 0.66) and 
accounts for the fact that aided exports will fall as the volume of aid falls.
Thus, the direct benefit from TBA is estimated as £224m in 1980 and £157m in 
1985, a decline reflecting the reduction in TBA over the period. The 197910 Table 
was used to estimate the impact of exports worth £224m in 1980, and the 1984IO 
Table was used for 1985. Consequently, the procedure assumes a constant export
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ratio but accounts for the declining volume of aid and the changing structure of the 
UK economy. The latter is important since structural shifts are reflected in changes 
in the elements of the L matrix, and hence affect impact. Since we have to assume 
the distribution of x % by industry is unchanged over the period, we are unable to 
allow for the possibility that this distribution will itself alter to match shifts in the 
economy. Given the data available, our procedure does apply the model of Chapter 
5 and, at a minimum, identifies the order of magnitude of the impact of TBA.
The effect of the changing structure of the economy is encapsulated in two 
aggregate output multipliers: Qa represents the total output in the economy per unit 
of aid, and fell from 1.20 (output worth £408m) in 1980 to 1.14 (£27 lm) in 1985; 
Qm  represents the total output per unit of aided exports and fell from 1.82 in 1980 
to 1.73 in 1985. For TBA, since p T is considerably less than unity Qr is less than 
Qxr because the former incorporates both p T and Qx r4 This fall in aggregate 
output multipliers reflects a reduced inter-dependence between the xT-industries 
and the rest of the economy, ie. the technical coefficients for these industries fell. 
Demand for intermediate goods benefits the economy via L but if this demand leaks 
to primary inputs the direct benefit will be lessened. The net effect on the economy 
depends on which primary inputs have become a greater share of output.
If demand shifts to imports, which are leakages from the economy, the net impact 
will be less. The same is true if the shift is to taxes, although this depends on how 
the government allocates the increased revenue. If the shift is to labour income, the 
loss of benefit will not be as great as in the previous two cases, although leakages 
from income to imports, taxes and saving suggest a lower net benefit than had the 
demand gone on intermediate inputs. The primary input coefficient that did increase 
most over the period 1980 to 1985 was, in fact, profits; the net effect on the 
economy depends on how these additional profits were used, a subject on which 
our analysis cannot comment. Because the share of intermediate inputs in total 
inputs fell, the immediate impact declined slightly between 1980 and 1985.
4 In fact, Qr = p r Qx r  Note also that these aggregate multipliers incorporate the combined 
effect of aided exports on all industries, via L, and are therefore different to the output multipliers 
for individual industries discussed in Section 5.3.
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The next issue to consider is the level of employment associated with qv  the 
output required to produce x v  A variety of means of estimating employment 
effects were discussed in Chapter 3 but the approach we adopt differs and is, in our 
view, more appropriate. The existing studies which apply IO to measure the impact 
of aid estimate employment by, first, using the labour input coefficient (0^) to 
estimate the share of total output in value terms, that will be spent on labour 
inputs and, second, dividing this by the average industry wage (May, Schumacher 
and Malek, 1989). This measures the number of average wages covered by qai. 
We favour an approach based on the industry employment-output ratio, Wqi, the 
number of employees per £lm  of industry output. This ratio explicitly incorporates 
productivity and is unaffected by the method of payment (wage, bonus, etc.) or the 
aggregate level of remuneration; it is a technical parameter more in keeping with IO 
analysis. Applying this ratio and summing over all industries, we estimate that TBA 
indirectly supported some 17,577 jobs in 1980 and 8,609 in 1985. Alternatively, 
the number of employees per £lm  of aided exports, Wx r  fell from 78.5 to 54.8, 
and the number of employees per £lm  of TBA, Wv  fell from 51.8 to 36.3. Not 
only did the level of employment supported by TBA fall, which would be expected 
given the fall in aid, but also the employment potential fell. This was due partly to 
the reduced Qxx but mostly to increased labour productivity, a point amply 
captured by our use of and discussed in more detail below.
The next issue is the indirect effect of aid on government tax revenues, which arises 
from a number of sources. First, there are taxes on intermediate inputs, the total 
value of which is 0^.^,- and was £6.9m in 1980 and £4.96m in 1985.5 This 
provides direct revenue, but the government will also receive revenue indirectly 
through taxes on increased income and profits. The value of labour income 
associated with x r is given by Zi 0/„.<7j and was £128.3m in 1980 and £84.9m 
in 1985. Similarly, the total value of profits was 0^.^-, equal to £39.8m and 
£36.4m respectively (the relative rise in profit's share mentioned above is reflected
5 Recall that O is the matrix of input coefficients, hence <X>, is the vector of coefficients for 
taxes on intermediate inputs (with corresponding interpretation for the subscripts / t ,  7T, and m), 
and (j>ti is a scalar for industry i. For details of the calculation see Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5. 
The values of the input coefficients for 1984 are in Table A.9.
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in the fact that the value of profits fell by only 8.5 per cent, compared to a 33.8 per 
cent fall for labour income, between 1980 and 1985).
Any estimate of the tax take from these income figures is bound to be ad hoc; the 
formal tax rate (tax burden after allowances, etc.) on a basic wage was 19 per cent 
in 1980 and 24 per cent on twice the basic wage (Morrissey and Steinmo, 1987), 
excluding national insurance, but marginal tax rates were much higher. Assuming 
that most of the employment was at the basic wage, and making some allowance for 
higher tax rates, perhaps 25 per cent went in income tax and national insurance, 
yielding £32. lm. Corporation tax is impossible to estimate; the nominal rate was 52 
per cent but few firms paid this and many paid nothing (Kay and King, 1983). We 
feel that 20 per cent is a generous estimate of the effective average rate, yielding 
£8.0m. The total estimated tax revenue from qr in 1980 is therefore £46.9m, 
representing almost 13.9 per cent of TBA. The same approach can be applied to the 
1985 figures. The formal income tax rate had fallen but national insurance 
contributions rose and we retain the figure of 25 per cent, yielding £21.2m income 
tax. The effective rate of profit tax had increased after the 1984 reform to about 30 
per cent (Devereux, 1987); on the estimated profits this yields £ 10.9m in tax 
revenue. Total revenue to the government was about £37. lm, 15.7 per cent of 
TBA. The notional rate of return to the government increased slightly, largely 
because a higher share of profits attracted a higher average tax rate.
The final general point to consider is transfer theory: aid is a capital outflow which 
reduces the balance of payments, but the size of the net transfer is lower if aid itself 
generates exports. One cannot simply take the value of xr since imported inputs are 
required to produce qv  and equal (p^qf, these amounted to £45.7m in 1980 
and £29.2m in 1985. Deducting these from x ^  in each year yields net trade 
balances of £178m and £127m, negligible relative to total exports but still 
equivalent to 13 per cent of the visible trade surplus, or six per cent of the current 
surplus, in 1980 and equivalent to four per cent of the current deficit in 1985 (trade 
figures from Economic Trends, 1988). However, since these net exports are of 
considerably less value than the aid outflows, TBA constitutes a net outflow on the 
balance of payments.
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Clearly, TBA generates commercial benefits and, although these are very small 
relative to the entire economy, the implicit rates of return are quite good (for a 
summary of the results and comparison with multilateral aid, see Section 7.2). 
Taking simple averages for 1980-85, each £lm  of TBA supported output worth 
£1.17m and 44 employees, and provided a return to the exchequer worth 14.5 per 
cent of its expenditure outlay. Before presenting results on impact by industry, a 
good appreciation of the distribution of benefits can be obtained by considering the 
impact on a number of industrial groupings.
The Principal Industrial Groupings
The industrial groupings are Mechanical Engineering (MecEng, mostly machinery 
and plant); Electrical Engineering (ElEng, mostly electrical and telecommunications 
equipment); Vehicles (motorised road vehicles, shipbuilding and railway stock); 
Chemicals (fertilisers and pharmaceuticals); the Construction and Iron and Steel 
industries. These six groups accounted for almost 80 per cent of x x in the period 
1978-84 (the same, by assumption, in each year), and the values of x v  qx and 
wTfor each group in each year is given in Table 6.1. We will discuss these results 
by reference to the issues raised above.
The importance of inter-industry linkages is obvious in that the groups accounted 
for only 61 per cent of qx in 1980 and 64 per cent in 1985. This arises as the 
demand for intermediate inputs goes to other industries, especially services, and the 
higher 1985 figure partly reflects increased profitability (intermediate inputs were a 
lower share of total inputs). Iron and Steel is the exception among the major 
industries: the demand for its output as an intermediate input to engineering and 
vehicles means that its share of qx exceeds its share of xT The groups account for 
almost 65 per cent of supported employment in 1980 but only 51 per cent in 1985, 
indicating that they experienced an above average increase in labour productivity.
The reduced employment in 1985 is due mostly to increased labour productivity. 
Taking the average Wqi for all production industries the fall was from 36.6 to
20.3, almost 45 per cent It was even more dramatic for some industries: Iron and 
Steel from 34.6 to 13.4 (-61%) and Motor Vehicles from 42.9 to 18.9 (-56%).
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Table 6.1: The Impact of Tied Bilateral Aid on Exports, Output
and Employment, Industry Groups, 1980 and 1985
GROUP 1980 1985
wT
£m £m £m £m
MecEng 72.12 84.06 3681 50.43 62.50 1586
% 32.2 20.6 20.9 32.2 23.1 18.4
ElEng 31.15 38.47 1981 21.78 25.94 804
% 13.9 9.4 11.3 13.9 9.6 9.3
Const 23.08 32.28 1564 16.14 21.50 618
% 10.3 7.9 8.9 10.3 7.9 7.2
I&S 19.65 38.50 1330 13.74 25.00 335
% 8.8 9.4 7.6 8.8 9.2 3.9
Vehicles 42.05 45.76 2527 29.40 31.52 957
% 18.8 11.2 14.4 18.8 11.6 11.1
Chemicals 8.68 10.25 259 6.07 6.74 91
% 3.9 2.5 1.5 3.9 2.5 1.1
SUB-TOTAL 177.08 249.32 11342 123.82 173.20 4391
% 79.0 61.0 64.5 79.0 63.9 51.0
ALL 224.09 408.48 17577 156.68 270.98 8609
NOTES: xr  is exports directly due to tied bilateral aid; qT is the output required to 
meet these exports and wr  is the associated employment The Groups include 17 
three-digit industries (defined in Appendix A) and are: MecEng, six mechanical 
engineering industries; ElEng, four electrical engineering; Const, the construction 
industry; I&S, the iron and steel industry; Vehicles, three vehicle industries; 
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals and fertilisers. ALL refers to the entire economy.
SOURCE: Own estimates using Input-Output impact analysis, see Appendix A.
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Most x t  go to capita^exporters, the very industries which have to shed labour and 
increase productivity to be profitable (vide British Steel), and are not therefore an 
effective means to promote or protect employment, contrary to business arguments 
(eg. McGregor, 1987; OPB, 1988). The main source of employment is in services 
but is fully utilised only if linkages are high; declining linkages imply that industries 
able to provide employment are not called upon to do so (the values of W ^  are in 
Tables A.4 and A.5).
We acknowledge that a strong case could be made for excluding the Construction 
industry from the employment estimates since most employment on construction 
exports will be foreign workers on site. Our estimates assume the construction 
takes place in the UK and there are two reasons for retaining them. First, overseas 
employment of UK workers on construction projects is considerable. Second, the 
possibility of cross-subsidisation, whereby profits on overseas projects are invested 
in UK work, should not be ruled out. It can also be noted that x T account for a 
high share of construction exports (see Table 6.2) and LDC markets are very 
important (Strassmann and Wells, 1988).
The remaining issues, taxes and net exports, depend on the industry input 
coefficients which vary within groups and are therefore covered in the next section. 
The main point is that six industrial groupings account for the greater part of the 
direct, and indirect, benefits of TBA. Contractors, which incorporate four of the 
groups (MecEng, ElEng, Const and I&S), account for 56 per cent of xv  48.5 per 
cent of q x and 44 per cent of wT on average over 1980-85. It should be 
remembered that within this total there is further concentration in large companies.
6.3. The Impact of TBA by Industry
The results discussed in the previous section were obtained by aggregating the 
industry level estimates generated by evaluating equations (5.11) and (5.18). The 
results, by industry, are given in Appendix A, especially Tables A.4 and A.5. The 
most important of the results are reproduced in Table 6.2, which considers the 
significance of x Tto various industries in terms of the contribution to exports in 
1985. The columns in percentage terms are respectively: x^/e^  the importance of
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x T to an industry; e j q the share of exports in industry output (interpreted as the 
industry’s export orientation) and eje, the share of total exports contributed by the 
industry, interpreted as its export importance. So that the Table is easier to read, the 
values for the ten industries with the highest value in each of these columns are 
underlined. Also included, but given in percentage point changes from 1979 to 
1984 are A(ejq$ and A(e /^e), which represent trends in export performance.
Some comments on figures reported only in the Appendix are warranted here. The 
importance of x T in terms of the x Ti/ei and q^iq^ varies considerably and, in 
most industries, virtually halves between 1980 and 1985 (due to the combination of 
a falling volume of TBA and lower linkages; compare Tables A.4 and A.5). In only 
three industries did qr account for over one per cent of output in 1980; OVech, 
PMch and ElEq; it accounted for over 0.5 per cent of output in a further four 
industries (Table A.4). By 1985, qT exceeded 0.5 per cent of output in only four 
industries, and exceeded one per cent in two of these, OVch and PMch (with ElEq 
ranked third). It is unsurprising that UK businesses became increasingly concerned 
with British aid policy over this period.
Aided exports represent a considerable share of total exports for some industries, 
less so in 1985 than in 1980 (Tables A.4 and A.5), and x Ti/ei exceeded one per 
cent for eight industries. While xT represented 14 per cent of Construction exports 
in 1980 (5 per cent in 1985) this is slightly misleading since exports are a very 
small share of Construction output (less than one per cent in both years); the capital 
goods exports associated with construction projects are most likely to be classified 
under mechanical or electrical engineering industries, for whom exports tend to be a 
significant part of output. Five industries exported more than 50 per cent of their 
output in 1984, and for all exports became increasingly important between 1979 
and 1984, and a further five exported between one third and one half, and also 
experienced a growing importance of exports. From Table 6.2 it is relatively easy to 
identify the ten industries for which ejq^ is greatest, and compare this with their 
ranking for x T and x^je^  Of the ten industries for which x Ti/ei is greatest (and 
near or above one per cent), eight are among the ten industries receiving the most 
x r (£5m or more in 1985) but only two are among the ten industries for which 
ejqi is highest (greater than 33 per cent), namely ElEq and MCMch.
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Table 6.2: Tied Bilateral Aid and Industry Exports, 1985
INDUSTRY x d ei eM A (ejqj) eje Aieje)
£m % % %
1. MOP 0.80 0.02 24.5 2.3 4A 0.5
2. I&S 13.74 0,86 21.9 2.0 1A -0.7
3. nMMP 0.96 0.10 12.5 -0.7 JLi -0.3
4. Frt 1.88 3.24 7.2 -7.5 0.1 -0.2
5. Phm 4.19 0.43 32.3 -1.9 n -0.2
6. Md 1.12 0.19 19.0 -0.6 0.7 -0.4
7. IPlt 5.11 0.96 17.1 -9.9 0.6 -0.6
8. AMch 1.88 0.25 62.9 1.2 0.9 -0.4
9. TWMch 1.89 0.27 56.3 1.0 0.8 -0.4
10. PMch 18.22 4.09 27.1 -27.1 0.5 -1.0
11. MCMch 14.38 1.16 43.6 2.7 1.4 -0.7
12. OMch 8.95 0.44 34.9 2.5 2A -0.5
13. OfEq 0.64 0.03 20.7 1A 0.9
14. IW&C 3.56 1.64 18.6 0.4 0.3 -0.1
15. ElEq 14,00 1.21 46,3 9.8 1.3 0.0
16. TIEq 3.46 0.17 35.9 6.9 2A 0.8
17. ECA 0.73 0.06 53.1 12.1 LA 0.4
18. Mot 12,94 0.38 34.5 -0.5 1 2 -2.3
19. Ships 5.15 1.35 18.2 -4.2 0.4 -0.2
20. OVch 11.30 6.39 23.3 -3.1 0.2 -0.2
21. InstE 1.92 0.17 52.2 5.0 LI 0.0
22. TPRP 3.04 0.10 11.8 0.3 3.6 -0.6
23. Const 16,14 5.03 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1
24. FSer 3.36 0.11 9.5 -7.9 1 4 -1.5
NOTE: See Table 5.1 for full industry titles; all values rounded, see Tables A 5  and A.9 
for more detail. For each industry i, x^  is exports due to TBA, e-t is exports and 
qi is industry output; e is total exports and A is change in percentage points over 
1979-84. Values for xv  xrile it e jq i and e je  are underlined if the industry is 
among the ten industries for which the value is highest.
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There is a tendency for x^/e-  to be greater in industries for which exports 
constitute a relatively low share of demand, suggesting that x x are not central to 
major exporters (Section 6.4). We can approach this another way by considering 
the ten industries which contribute the greatest proportion of total exports, for all of 
which e je  > 0.01 and six of which each provide over 2 per cent of total exports, 
and we note that only three are among the ten highest recipients of x x while only 
one, I&S, is also among the highest ten for x^/e^  Again, x x do not appear to go 
to the major exporting industries, a point to which we return below.
6.4. Applications and Extensions
Three issues are covered in this section. First, we consider if TBA is trade creating 
by examining its importance as a share of industry exports, extending the above 
discussion. Second, we rank the industries according to their multipliers, to asssess 
if the aid benefits go to industries of most benefit to the economy. Third, we 
consider a relatively quick way to apply our method to evaluate the impact of an aid 
project and provide a worked example.
Aided Exports and Industry Exports
Although xx and qx are generally a low share of industry totals they are often a 
significant share for individual industries. A proper investigation of whether aid is 
trade creating would require combined time series and cross-section data, by 
commodity or industry, on the pattern of UK trade with individual LDCs so that 
one could test if lagged aid was an influence on exports. Such an undertaking is 
beyond our scope and we confine ourselves to some general inferences on probable 
substitution and radiation effects. We do have IO data on the trend of industry 
exports between 1979 and 1984, and can avail of some other studies.
Excluding Construction, xxi/ei exceeded one per cent in seven industries - notably 
OVch at 6.4 per cent and PMch (which receives the largest share of xx) at 4.1 per 
cent. If we rank all industries in descending order of their xxJei shares, only two 
of the top ten export more than a third of their output (ElEq which ranks 7th and 
MCMch which ranks 8th). We can conduct the same exercise in yet another way, 
this time ranking the top ten exporting (ejqj) industries and examining the
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importance of x x to them (six of these ten industries are among the ten major 
exporters in terms of their share of total exports). As argued above, there is a 
tendency for x x to be of greater importance to industries whose export share of 
output is relatively low. It could be inferred that xx are effectively export subsidies 
to internationally uncompetitive industries.
We are not convinced by such an inference. A view more favourable to British 
exporters is that xx can go to industries which are internationally competitive 
because all donors are helping their industries. The subsidy is a prerequisite to 
competing in LDC markets. There is evidence that all donors assist their 
international construction industries (Strassmann and Wells, 1988) and that tied aid 
helps donor industries to increase their export market share (Morrissey, 1989d). 
The major deficiency with the data in Table 6.2 is that we are unable to isolate the 
importance of exports to LDCs. However, we can note that of the ten industries 
with the highest x^/e^  exports declined as a share of industry output for five and 
as a share of total exports for eight over 1979-84. Only one of the ten largest 
recipients of x v  Const, increased exports as a share of its output and of total 
exports. On the other hand, exports were of declining importance, both for the 
industry and as a share of the economy total, for five of the ten largest x x 
recipients (PMch, IPlt and all three Vehicles industries). This is consistent with a 
declining UK aid budget in markets subject to intense donor competition. It is also 
consistent with declining performance by these industries. The two possibilities 
cannot be resolved with our data and both may hold.
Some 40 per cent of Britain's non-EC exports are to LDCs, and about 70 per cent 
of these are from the chemicals and capital goods industries (in a general pattern not 
dissimilar to that for x x). Britain's main competitors in LDCs are West Germany 
(capital goods, I&S, Chemicals) and Italy (metal products, IPlt and Railway stock) 
with, to a lesser extent, Japan (Ships and ElEng) and the US (aircraft, OfEq and 
foodstuffs); while France exports similar goods to the UK, it tends to concentrate 
on different countries (all data from May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:168-172). 
In the context of the relationship between aid and trade, three issues arise: the 
degree of donor tying, the industry distrubtion of aided exports and the total volume
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of aid, all relative to the practices of other major donors. These issues are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 9.
We can note here that other major donors increased their aid disbursements by more 
than the UK during the 1980s (Table 4.7). Britain's share of LDC markets has 
fallen, relative to other major donors, fairly steadily since the 1960's and the ratio 
of UK TBA to its LDC exports has been lower than the average for major donors 
during that period, and has fallen considerably (May, Schumacher and Malek, 
1989). One interpretation is that the UK is now getting relatively more exports per 
£1 of aid, but this ignores possible detrimental long-run effects. There is clear 
evidence that competitors receive more aid support, at least in volume terms, from 
their governments, and this may help them to increase their market share. Italy 
introduced mixed credits in 1977, expanding them in 1981, and its share of 
international construction rose from 6 per cent in 1980 to 10 per cent since 1985, 
bringing it to third place in the world market (Norsa, 1988).
May, Schumacher and Malek (1989, Chapter 10) present a fairly detailed, if not 
entirely convincing, attempt to analyse the statistical relationship between UK aid 
and market shares of exports to LDCs. They found that, unlike France and Japan, 
UK aid (as a share of the total) was not a significant determinant of UK export 
share; however, historical ties and direct investment were significant and correlated 
with aid, subjecting the results to problems of inference, while the econometric 
work did not account adequately for lags. On a more general level, the correlation 
between UK shares of exports and aid over 1969-82 and 1978-82 were similar to 
Italy and Japan (all between 0.44 and 0.56), lower than France (at 0.75) but much 
higher than either Germany or the US (both almost zero in the second period). 
Generally, over recent decades, Britain's share of LDC exports has fallen at a 
slower rate than its share of aid; consistent with a resilience of historical trading 
links and a slow process, perhaps aid assisted, of building up new trading links. 
We may understate the true contribution of aid to exports since x t  increase the 
chances of the UK firm winning further orders in the particular, or a neighbouring, 
market (as argued in Section 6.1).
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Industry Multipliers
We merely observe here, keeping further consideration until Chapter 9, that the IO 
industry multipliers discussed in Section 5.3 can be used to evaluate if the x T- 
industries have relatively high linkages. Consider the multipliers listed in Table 
A.9, and let the values for MiscM be taken as economy averages. On this basis, for 
1984, the ^-industries perform well: of the ten receiving the highest x v  1 had 
above average output multipliers, 8 had below average import multipliers, 8 had 
above average tax multipliers, 7 had above average profits multipliers and 7 had 
above average labour income multipliers. Overall, they had relatively high linkages. 
The three Vehicles industries performed generally well but tended to have relatively 
low profits, while Mot has a high imported inputs multiplier. Interestingly, OfEq, a 
major exporter, had relatively poor multipliers as did IW&C, TIEq and ECA, except 
these three displayed relatively high profit multipliers. Overall, in terms of linkages, 
the industries receiving aided exports are above average.
Measuring Impact Using IO Multipliers
We have argued that the IO method is appropriate for estimating the impact of aided 
exports and takes into account the industry distribution of these exports. As pointed 
out in Section 5.3, the application of the IO method allows one to calculate industry 
multipliers for output and primary inputs. These IO multipliers are of two general 
uses. First, they permit comparison between industries (as above). Second, they 
provide a ready means to make a quick estimate of the impact of a particular aid 
project, or to contrast the impacts of competing projects. We present an application 
of this form here and, in doing so, demonstrate that the multipliers provide an 
improvement on methods previously used without increasing the complexity of the 
calculation. We use a project for which data are available and impact estimates have 
been made - HSPE, 1986); while the project was in fact supported by ATP, this has 
no bearing on our application except that the export ratio is higher than would be the 
case for tied bilateral aid.
In 1985 HSPE won a contract for the turnkey provision of 23 diesel generators to 
Indonesia worth a total of £36.2m in orders for UK goods (exports), £24.8m to 
HSPE itself. The Indonesian government had stipulated that contract bids be
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supported by concessional finance thus, while HSPE claimed to have made the 
lowest bid net of ATP, an aid element of £11.8m was required "...to counteract the 
effects of competitor's government aid packages on their prices." (HSPE, 1986:8). 
The industry breakdown of aided exports, the values of the industry IO multipliers 
and the employment coefficient used by HSPE, which was actually the labour input 
coefficient (<^-)6, and our impact estimates, identifying output, labour income, 
employment, imported inputs and taxes are are in Table 6.3.
The range of industry IO multipliers are a by-product of the IO impact analysis that 
encapsulate both the direct and indirect effects on output of a change in demand for 
the produce of one industry (but not the effect of inter-relationships if demand 
increases for more than one industry at a time) so that impact estimates can be 
derived, and decopmosed into primary inputs, as shown in Table 6.3. The 
procedure in HSPE (1986:11-18), by comparison, utilised the (p^ (inaccurately) to 
estimate direct labour effects as being 909 man-years. To do this, they divided the 
estimated value of labour inputs by average industry wage. To estimate indirect 
effects, they traced the four industries with orders exceeding £lm  back to the 
impact on their suppliers, using the technical coefficients matrix, and estimated that 
the first round indirect effect generated employment amounting to a third of the 
direct effect. Assuming this relationship held for all industries over seven rounds, 
indirect employment effects were estimated at 445 person-years, implying a total 
impact on employment of 1354 person-years. This estimate was boosted by adding 
a Keynesian multiplier arguing that the income from these 1345 new jobs would 
generate increased demand capable of generating 958 jobs so that the aided exports 
of £24.8m were associated with a total of 2355 person-years of employment, some 
95 person-years per £lm  of exports.
Our quick approach underestimates impact to some extent: the impact measured by 
multipliers is less than that by L (since no account is made of the cumulative inter­
action of demand increases in a number of industries). Also, no allowance is made
6 The authors of the report incorrectly assert that their employment coefficients are "...the 
percentage input of employment needed to create the total UK output for each [industry]... which 
accounts for taxes, subsidies and foreign imports." (HSPE, 1986:10) In truth, they measure only 







































247 0.38 0.626 1.680 0.161 0.039 0.14 235.2 22.5 5.5 87.5 8.965 9.77
255 0.26 0.370 1.919 0.308 0.035 0.02 38.4 6.2 0.7 7.4 9.313 0.79
316 0.24 0.501 2.141 0.213 0.028 0.13 278.3 27.7 3.6 65.1 8.533 7.63
320 (7) 0.33 0.604 1.826 0.178 0.030 1.54 2867.5 274.1 46.2 * 930.2 8.960 103.82
324 (10) 0.36 0.574 1.633 0.187 0.032 0.15 245.0 28.1 4.8 86.1 8.960 9.61
325 (11) 0.27 0.551 2.016 0.201 0.030 0.11 221.8 22.1 3.3 60.6 8.960 6.76
328 (12). 0.34 0.607 1.815 0.172 0.032 16.59 30111.0 2853.5 530.9 10070.1 8.960 1123.90
341 (14) 0.26 0.348 1.484 0.463 0.022 0.06 89.0 27.8 1.3 20.9 9.480 2.20
342 (15) 0.37 0.657 1.742 0.234 0.031 3.60 6271.2 842.4 111.6 2365.2 9.480 249.49
343 0.35 0.593 1.677 0.227 0.035 0.05 83.9 11.4 1.8 29.7 9.480 3.13
3442 (16) 0.40 0.603 1.595 0.197 0.030 0.08 127.6 15.8 2.4 48.2 9.480 5.08
344/5 (17) 0.37 0.565 1.586 0.264 0.026 0.02 31.7 5.3 0.5 11.3 9.480 1.19
371 (21) 0.33 0.620 1.709 0.214 0.033 0.12 205.1 25.7 4.0 74.4 8.533 8.72
614 0.38 0.632 1.554 0.028 0.077 0.50 777.0 14.0 38.5 . 316.0 8.590 36.79
740 0.15 0.202 1.330 0.709 0.014 1.69 2247.7 1198.2 23.7 341.4 8.298 41.14
TOTAL 24.80 43830.0 5375.0 808.0 14514.0 1610.00
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NOTES to Table 6.3: We list the 15 industries at the SIC level identified by HSPE 
(1986:10-11) and match these to the 1979 IO industries; numbers in parenthesis refer to 
the number of the industry in Table 5.1. Those excluded from that Table are: other glass 
products (247); paints and varnishes (255); packaging products of metal (316); electrical 
equipment for industry (343); wholesale distribution (614) and sea transport (740). 
Multipliers are as explained in Chapter 5; to maintain comparison with HSPE (1986), 
these are calculated from the complete 1979 IO Table and therefore differ from those 
reported in Appendix A which are derived from the 1984 aggregated IO Table, 
labour input coefficient for .industry i 
x value of exports by industry as given in HSPE (1986:11)
q total output, by industry, required to meet x-.
m imports required to produce q^ .
t taxes on imports and intermediate inputs to produce q^
h household (labour) inputs required for
w industry employment = h$wage (industry average). The wage figure for SIC 740 of
£8298 is the average wage for the whole economy in 1985.
for possible Keynesian multiplier effects, but capacity constraints and leakages may 
offset these anyway; and we can only include fully the £24.8m going to HSPE out 
of the total of £36.2m orders in the UK. We estimate total output required to be 
£43.8m implying an aggregate output multiplier of 1.8, entirely consistent with our 
earlier results. This output will require labour inputs worth some £ 14.5m which, 
using average industry wage levels, implies employment of some 1610 person- 
years. This approach estimates that 65 employees at the average wage can be 
supported by each £lm  of exports, a somewhat higher ratio than implied by our 
analysis of tied bilateral aid.
The use of average wages rather than output-employment ratios results in a higher 
estimate of employment effects, which is perhaps unsurprising since the former is 
less likely to incorporate productivity or overtime payments. Since much of the 
employment associated with aided exports is either absorbing spare capacity or 
being met out of overtime or increased productivity, the latter approach is 
preferable. We use the wage approach here for comparability, noting that our 
estimated 1610 person-years exceeds the direct plus indirect HSPE estimate of
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2355, since the labour multipliers exceed the but is well below the Keynesian- 
boosted estimate. Our approach, however, is less ad hoc and provides, in addition, 
ready estimates of imported input requirements (£5.4m, implying net exports of 
£19.4m). Taxes on intermediate inputs amount to some £0.8m and, if we assume 
an average tax rate of 25 per cent on labour income, income taxes would have been 
about £3.6m implying a minimum tax revenue of some £4.4m, a return to the 
Exchequer of 37.6 per cent This tax return was well above that for TBA in general 
because, being an ATP project, the export ratio was high.
Finally, we can avail of Table 6.3 to indicate the industries with greater linkage 
effects which, in this case, are SIC 316 (packaging metal products), 325 (MCMch) 
and 255 (paints and varnishes), all with output multipliers near or above two. 
However, all have relatively low labour input multipliers and relatively high 
imported input multipliers so that a substantial part of the impact leaks out of the 
economy. The weakest linkages are in SIC 740 (sea transport) and 341 (IW&C): 
output, labour and tax multipliers are low while the imports multipliers are relatively 
high. The two most important industries, SIC 328 (OMch) which received two- 
thirds of export orders and SIC 342 (ElEq) which received 15 per cent, had 
relatively high output and labour multipliers and relatively low imports multipliers. 
Hence, in terms of benefiting the UK economy, this project would be rated highly 
insofar as it benefits industries with relatively high linkages.
6.4. The Commercial Value of Tied Bilateral Aid
Taking simple averages for 1980-85, each £lm  of TBA supported output worth 
£1.17m and 44 employees, and provided a return to the Exchequer worth 14.5 per 
cent of its expenditure outlay. Six industrial groupings accounted for the greater 
part of the direct, and indirect, benefits of TBA. Contractors, incorporating four of 
the groups (MecEng, ElEng, Const and I&S), accounted for 56 per cent of x v  
48.5 per cent of qx and 44 per cent of wt  on average over 1980-85. Within these 
groups there was further concentration at the industry level, with eight industries 
each receiving over 5 per cent of x v  and accounting for 70 per cent of the total.
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There was a tendency for jct  to be greater, in volume terms and as a share of 
industry output, in industries whose export performance (measured by export's 
share of industry output and industry share of total exports) deteriorated over 1979- 
84. This does not reveal a clear interpretation but probably reflects both a decline in 
international competitiveness and an increase in the use of aid to support trade by 
other donors. Those industries with little reliance on x T could either be 
internationally competitive and/or operate in markets where aid is not important. Aid 
is of most importance to industries in construction-related business and xT tends to 
be concentrated on such industries; as such, it may simply indicate the prevalence of 
tied aid in certain industries. Since the volume of UK TBA has fallen considerably 
relative to other donors, it could be anticipated that the performance of these firms 
in LDC markets would also be in decline. The evidence supports, but does not 
confirm, this argument.
There are a number of senses in which our approach underestimates the benefits 
from bilateral aid, most notably because we restricted attention to TBA. The 
granting of untied bilateral aid will confer some benefits, if only through creating or 
reinforcing goodwill and supporting existing trade ties; if a country is a strong 
trading partner it may be unnecessary to formally tie aid (as has been claimed in 
respect of France in Francophone Africa and Japan in South-East Asia). 
Furthermore, a large portion of untied aid is in the form of TCA or training 
programmes which do benefit the UK both directly, via the employment of UK 
personnel or financial support for overseas students living, and therefore spending, 
in the UK, and indirectly by training people in British practices who will tend to be 
influentially placed in their own country. In other words, untied aid can be very 
important in creating the goodwill and local contacts so important for winning 
export orders. Finally, we made no attempt to measure any long-run benefits.
There are also, however, a number of senses in which we have overstated the 
economic benefits to the UK, notably because we made no attempt to account for 
displacement effects. These were considered in Chapter 3 where we argued that the 
available evidence suggested that they are unlikely to be very large, if only because 
they presuppose capacity constraints which do not appear to have been great in the 
relevant industries (see Table 3.1). Furthermore, given the general decline in LDC
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markets in the 1980s and increased competition, it is unlikely that aid substituted for 
commercial exports to any great extent It seems reasonable to conclude that exports 
supported by TBA in the 1980s were an important factor in the performance of a 
number of industries in LDC markets and probably secured orders that would not 
otherwise have been won.
Such a conclusion does not, of itself, provide a justification for tying. In the short- 
run, TBA may play a role in protecting domestic exporter's market share against 
competitors supported by aid from their own government On the other hand, tying 
is a subsidy which imposes welfare costs on the donor economy and on recipients. 
From the donor’s perspective, it would be necessary to show that the net economic 
gains from tying exceed the welfare costs and that tying is the best means of 
capturing such gains. We will discuss these issues again in Chapters 8 and 9. It can 
be noted that tying is not, in the long-run, optimal for aid recipients while the 
granting of untied aid can generate a goodwill which will assist internationally 
competitive donor industries in maintaining their market share. There are 
commercial benefits from TBA, but these do not justify tying and do not imply that 
there is a net economic benefit, to the donor or in terms of global welfare.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 7 144
CHAPTER 7. THE IMPACT OF MULTILATERAL AID
The argument that bilateral aid, especially if tied, confers direct benefits on the 
donor through support for exports is easy to accept. To posit that the same can be 
applied to multilateral aid requires one to demonstrate that contributions to MAAs 
directly generate exports for the donor. It suffices to demonstrate that even if MAAs 
award contracts subject to strict international competition, the anticipation is 
warranted as each donor could expect to win exports in proportion to its share of 
the relevant LDC markets. Since each MAA tends to have a geographical focus, 
donors can contribute more to those MAAs which support projects in LDCs where 
the donor has a relatively large share of the market. Thus, for example, the US 
would be expected to be a major contributor to the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) while Japan would be a major contributor to the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). There are other ways in which a contributor can attempt to maximise 
its 'return' by way of export orders, as we will consider. Even if the relationship 
between contributions and exports is weak, it is generally the case that contributing 
to an MAA is a prerequisite for eligibility to tender for contracts, and the global 
volume of MAA contracts is large. Thus, it is valid to incorporate multilateral aid 
into an analysis of the impact of a donor's aid on its economy.
Section 7.1 begins by outlining briefly the general arguments for multilateral rather 
than bilateral aid depicting, in the process, the increasing importance of MAAs in 
the global allocation of aid. The remainder of the section is devoted to the principle 
of juste retour whereby donors come to expect that their contributions will result in 
proportional exports. Some commentators have argued that the impact of TBA is 
greater than that of multilateral aid and that the aid budget should be increased with 
a shift in allocation favouring TBA (eg. McGregor, 1985; see Chapter 4). This 
argument is evaluated by measuring the impact of multilateral aid in Sections 7.2 
and 7.3, which follow the pattern of Sections 6.2 and 6.3 respectively, and 
comparing it with TBA in Sections 7.2 and 7.4, with the latter addressing the aid 
and trade relationship. Since the presentation of results here follows closely that of 
Chapter 6, less need be said by way of introduction. Concluding comments are 
offered in Section 7.5.
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7.1. An Overview of Multilateral Aid
Over the period 1974-76 annual aid flows to LDCs were slightly over $13bn; 70 
per cent came from bilateral donors, two-thirds of which was in the form of grants, 
and the remainder from MAAs, less than half of which was in grant form. In 1982 
bilateral assistance accounted for two-thirds of the $28bn of aid, and similar 
proportions were in the form of grants. Bilateral assistance, and grants, grew in 
importance during the debt crisis and, by 1985, almost 75 per cent of the $29bn in 
aid was bilateral, over 80 per cent of which was grants and the share of grant-aid in 
multilateral aid had risen to just over 50 per cent (Todaro, 1989:482). Thus, by the 
1970s and throughout the early 1980s, almost a third of global aid was disbursed 
by MAAs, most of which only came into existence in the 1960s. It is worth briefly 
reviewing this evolution.
The Growth of Multilateral A d
International cooperation in the economic sphere has a progeny dating back at least 
to the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945 which established the IMF, to ease 
repayments, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), which had the initial objective of supervising the Marshall Plan for 
rebuilding Europe. The idea of soft-loan facilities to help the poorest countries came 
with the establishment of the International Development Association (IDA, which 
with the EBRD comprises the World Bank) in 1960. The IDB was established in
1959, the ADB and African Development Bank (AfDB) followed in the mid-1960s 
but it was the late-60s before the regional development banks established soft-loan 
affiliates, which required funding from developed, and often non-regional, 
countries. In 1965 the Special Fund and Technical Assistance branches of the UN 
were combined to establish the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The EC 
established a development programme by the late-60s, formalised with the signing 
of the first Lome Convention in 1975 which introduced the notion of contractual 
relations between donors and recipients. The European Development Fund (EDF), 
being restricted to EC members, is perhaps a form of collective bilateralism, but it is 
becoming a major source of development finance. Finally, the DAC, established in
1960, provides a forum for individual donors to discuss and co-ordinate their 
development policies.
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The evolution of MAAs reflected increased awareness of the deficiencies of bilateral 
aid combined with the view that global development required collective action. 
Dissatisfaction with bilateral aid became widespread in the 1960s as it was seen as 
politically motivated, being used often to demonstrate generosity rather than 
promote growth, and as perpetuating dependency instead of fuelling development 
(Balogh, 1967). It was argued that aid would have maximum effect if allocated, in 
adequate quantities, to coordinated programmes integrated on an international scale 
using multilateral consortia (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1968). Multilateral aid was not 
viewed as a panacea: large MAAs face many problems in democratic control, 
organisation, training and recruitment of non-partisan staff; they are frequently 
uncoordinated and fail to realise ’’that the problems of development are organically 
related." (Balogh, 1967:211). To make aid more effective, it is the cooperation of 
donors that is required:
The best solution would be reached on the basis of an international agreement on sharing
the burden of aid and on multilaterally supervised criteria on how to distribute that aid.
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1968:227)
The evolution of MAAs represented a move towards this, especially the DAC which 
monitors cooperation between donors and sets targets for the level of aid, the 
overall grant element and the grant component of mixed credits. Multilateral 
agencies are better suited to large-scale, long-term, progammes as they are believed 
to be more directly concerned with development objectives than bilateral donors. 
World Bank aid, for example, tends to be related more to economic need, 
performance and creditworthiness than to political allegiance or commercial interests 
(Bennett and Guzman, 1976; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984), although counter­
examples could be found (notably Vietnam and China). There are five basic 
arguments for multilateral, as against bilateral, aid (DAC, 1985:148): it is less 
subject to political and commercial pressures; it is more likely to reflect accepted 
geographical and sectoral development priorities; agencies are better able to engage 
in dialogue with the recipients than are bilateral donors; MAAs are a means of co­
operation and co-ordination and can act as central repositories of the experience of 
development programmes. In the words of a DAC chairman:
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Multilateral programmes collectively are better than the combined bilateral programmes 
in channelling resources to agricultural development. A large fraction of their flows goes 
to the low-income developing countries and they carry most of the burden of engaging 
recipient governments in dialogues concerning needed changes in the latter's policies.
(Lewis, 1981:7)
Multilateral aid, however, has not always been a success and has often failed to 
realise the hopes outlined above. The most obvious problems are in organisation 
and administration, and MAAs tend to disburse aid more slowly than can bilateral 
donors. A more deep-rooted problem, however, is that of collective action: donors 
have interests which they want to further, and would be very reluctant to support 
MAAs acting against these interests, and tend to be strongly influenced by each 
others positions. The DAC countries are the source of up to 90 per cent of the 
resources channelled through multilateral programmes, and retain considerable 
control over the operation of agencies (the UN being perhaps the only exception). 
Consequently, the major donors tend to set the pattern for multilateral aid, and 
development ideology tends to follow the dominant (Western) economic paradigm 
(see Toye, 1987). Thus, the 1960s was a time for large-scale infrastructure projects 
and Keynesian inspired modes of development, while the 1980s saw a focus on 
monetarist stabilisation and neo-classical structural adjustment. The MAAs, 
especially the World Bank, are repositories of development experience and do 
engage in policy dialogue, but with the economic interpretation and voice of the 
major donors (the UNDP being a possible exception).
The funding of MAAs also reflected the lead of major donors. In 1965-66,13 per 
cent of DAC aid was to multilateral institutions (14 per cent if EC included), rising 
to 24 (29) per cent in 1974-5 and 27 (32) per cent in 1983-84. The US has been the 
leader over this period, increasing the share of multilateral contributions in its aid 
from 14 to 28 per cent, although its share of total DAC contributions to MAAs has 
fallen from 64 to 33 per cent. Japan is now a major contributor, accounting for 18 
per cent of the DAC total (the only country other than the US whose share exceeds 
one-tenth). The strongest advocacy of multilateral aid has come from the Nordic 
countries and Switzerland: in 1965-6 they gave over half of their aid to MAAs and, 
although the share had fallen to about a third in the 1980s, remained committed to
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aid for development The EC countries have tended to increase the share of their aid 
going to MAAs other than the EDF, to between a fifth and a third for all but France, 
so that including EC contributions, all but France allocate between a third and a half 
of their aid to MAAs (all data from DAC, 1985:147; less than one fifth of French 
aid in 1983-4 was to multilateral agencies). The influence on a donor of the position 
of other donors has not necessarily benefited MAAs since a commitment to burden 
sharing may deter a donor from giving more multilateral aid if other donors won't 
do so. Furthermore, the whole process reinforces donor interest:
The extraordinary growth of multilateral aid in the mid-1970s, at an annual rate of 27 per 
cent, took place through the medium of agencies which the donors already knew well, and 
in circumstances in which donors had the dominant voice. (DAC, 1985:146)
The question of whether multilateral aid programmes are in fact better, from the 
development viewpoint, than bilateral aid is an issue in aid evaluation and 
effectiveness beyond the scope of this study. The point we wish to make here is 
that MAAs have grown in importance since the 1960s but hold a development 
ideology and a set of interests very close to those of the major donors. Hence, the 
policies advocated by MAAs are likely to promote the form of economic growth 
which will support increased North-South trade. In particular, many of the projects 
financed by the World Bank or regional development banks require capital goods 
from DAC countries, ie. the projects require donor exports. The extent of donor 
benefits will vary between MAAs, as we now consider.
The Principle of Juste Retour
While very little multilateral aid is formally tied and it is considered improper for 
donors to insist that their contribution be linked to the orders they receive, donors 
do collect, with a vested interest, information on the procurement of MAAs and 
may refer to juste retour: "This means that the procurement in the contributing 
countries should be more or less proportional to their contributions (after 
corrections for local costs). Although substantial deviations have no impact on the 
size of future contributions, they may lead the donor government to put pressure on 
the local firms and on the multilateral institutions to try and redress the situation."
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(Jepma, 1989:33). The ratio of contributions to procurement will vary between 
MAAs according to the relative scale of local procurement and whether non-local 
procurement is restricted to contributors.
We concentrate on the World Bank as being far and away the largest multilateral 
institution, accounting for about 70 per cent of cumulative MAA procurement up to 
1985 (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:51). The IBRD is a lending institution 
which funds its operations largely from borrowing on international capital markets; 
members subscriptions provide its capital base. The IDA offers concessionary loans 
to the poorest LDCs, financed largely by triennial replenishments from the richer 
members in addition to repayments of past loans. The World Bank finances a third 
of a project's cost on average, so that potential procurement is some three times the 
value of IBRD loans and IDA credits. However, the Bank has a strong commitment 
to local and LDC procurement so that no more than half of the total value of projects 
would be available to DAC suppliers, a figure which should exceed the value of 
their contributions.
It is difficult to compare donors contributions to the Bank with their procurement on 
an annual basis; while the procurement data is published annually by the Woij^ 
Bank, contributions tend to be lumped rather than regular. Since it is the IDA which 
is most directly financed by contributions, we can use data for the late 1980s to 
indicate the extent of juste retour (see Table 7.1). Perhaps the most important 
consideration is that the burden of IDA replenishments is shared, by negotiation, 
according to economic strength. For example, the US contributed 42.3 per cent of 
IDA-1 (1961-64), the UK 17.3 per cent, France and Germany 7 per cent and Japan 
4.4 per cent Changing economic power are reflected in the shares of IDA-9 (1991- 
93) with the US at 21.6 per cent, Japan 18.7 per cent, Germany 11 per cent, France 
7.3 per cent and the UK 6.7 per cent (Stem, 1990:23). The pattern for IDA-8 is 
almost identical (Table 7.1). The relationship between contributions and 
procurement would appear to be tenuous. Taking the first two years of IDA-8, only 
Germany has a share of procurement near its share of contributions, while the UK 
and, to a lesser extent, France have relatively high procurement.
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Table 7.1. IDA Procurem ent, M ajor Donors, 1980s
IDA-8 IDA 1988 IDA 1989
$m % $m % $m %
US 2875.0 25.0 181.0 7.3 212.0 8.5
Japan 2150.5 18.7 272.5 11.0 272.0 10.9
Germany 1322.5 11.5 232.5 9.4 237.0 9.5
France 839.5 7.3 267.6 10.8 275.0 11.0
UK 770.5 6.7 357.6 14.4 389.0 15.6
Italy 609.5 5.3 81.9 3.3 71.0 2.9
IDA 1981-85 IBRD&IDA 1989 (Consultant:
$m % $m % %
US 778.0 12.8 1408.0 15.2 (9.4)
Japan 834.0 13.7 1321.0 14.3 (1.3)
Germany 502.1 8.2 858.0 9.3 (5.7)
France 560.9 9.2 636.0 6.9 (15.3)
UK 862.1 14.1 935.0 10.1 (12.3)
Italy 373.0 6.1 384.0 4.1 (3.6)
NOTES and SOURCES: Figures give value and percent of total. IDA-8 refers to 
contributions to the 8th Replenishment, excluding any supplementary contributions 
(World Bank, 1987:29); other figures are procurement under IDA in fiscal 1988 
(World Bank, 1988:58), IDA in fiscal 1989 and IBRD&IDA in fiscal 1989, 
including consultancy as a percentage of country total (World Bank, 1989b:74-5) and 
cumulative procurement under IDA for 1981-85 (World Bank, 1985:29).
Considering the figures over the 1980s, the UK gets almost 15 per cent of 
procurement and France 10 per cent while the other donors, especially the US, get 
procurement shares much lower than their contribution shares. Over the first two 
years of IDA-8 the UK won procurement almost equal in value to its contribution, 
and France is the only other country that looks like achieving this over the full three 
years of IDA-8 (if the trend holds for 1990). If one interprets IDA replenishments
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as a cost of 'buying-in' to IBRD procurement then all donors could expect 
procurement to at least equal contributions on average over a period of years. It 
seems clear that the UK is relatively successful in procurement, in which context 
we can note that 12 per cent of the IBRD and IDA procurement was for consultants 
(only France had a higher percentage). However, there is little support for the 
general principle of juste retour in shares, though it may still hold in value.
The EDF is the next most important MAA for the UK and while it has traditionally 
received a low share of procurement relative to France and Germany this has 
changed in recent years, especially in respect of consultancy work. Thus, by the 
end of 1987 the UK had won 10.5 per cent of procurement (15.6 per cent of 
consultancy and technical assistance) under EDF-IV (1976-80), 14.6 (24.5) per 
cent of EDF-V (1981-85) and 30.7 (20.6) per cent of EDF-VI (1986-90). France’s 
share of procurement had fallen from 22 per cent of EDF-IV to 15.3 per cent of 
EDF-VI, while Germany's share remained fairly stable around 12 per cent (data 
supplied by European Commission). Since 20 to 30 per cent of EDF goes on local 
procurement, the value of procurements is generally less than of contributions and, 
in fact, if juste retour in shares held this would be similar to tied bilateral aid. Since 
Britain's contribution has been about 18 per cent of the total, procurement has been 
worth less than the outlay. Furthermore, the share of consultancy and technical 
assistance in total procurement has risen from about 20 per cent over 1976-85 to 50 
per cent in EDF-VI, and these have a lower impact than procurement of goods and 
civil works. The impact of EDF is thus similar to bilateral aid.
The regional development banks, like the IBRD, are lending institutions whose 
procurement can exceed contributions quite significantly, so that the US is likely to 
do well from the IDB while Japan benefits from the ADB. While the UK does not 
get much procurement, in share or value terms, from the regional banks, it is a 
minor contributer so that procurement tends to exceed the value of contributions by 
a large margin (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:55). Similarly for the UNDP: 
although the UN has increasingly moved toward LDC procurement during the 
1980s, Britain had won some 13 per cent of cumulative procurement to 1985 with a 
value almost double that of capital subscriptions (May, Schumacher and Malek,
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1989:52). The point of this section is clear: Britain has tended to win procurement 
from MAAs equal if not greater in value than its contributions, even if the evidence 
for juste re tour is lacking.
There is generally a high correlation between major donor's share of LDC export 
markets and their share of procurement from MAAs for which all are eligible (ie. 
excluding the EDF) with a correlation coefficient of 0.82, or 0.89 if UNDP is 
excluded. Britain and Italy tend to fare better than suggested by their export shares 
while the US fares worse (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:60-1). This can be 
taken as support for those who claim that procurement is determined by 
international competition, although it would have been useful had the estimation 
included the donors shares of contributions to the agencies. It seems likely that the 
UK derives considerable benefit from historic ties, especially trade links with 
Commonwealth countries, and the international competitiveness of its consultants.
7.2. The Impact of Multilateral Aid
The total value of UK contributions to MAAs was £2459m over 1978-84 and the 
corresponding exports were worth some £2526m; the UK derived considerable 
benfit from MAAs as evidenced by our estimate of the export-ratio for multilateral 
aid, p^, as 1.03. This ratio was greater than unity for most MAAs except the EDF 
(for which it was about 0.8). Since the procedure for estimating the impact is the 
same as for TBA, it is expedient to present the results for multilateral aid and 
compare them with TBA at the same time. The aggregate measures of impact for 
both types of aid are given in Table 7.2. While multilateral aid more than doubled 
over the period, TBA fell by 30 per cent, so that assumed much greater 
importance in volume terms. This is a product of the years chosen and, while 
important, we prefer to focus on the aggregate multipliers as measures of relative 
impact.1 It is clear from the Table, however, that the relative impact of multilateral 
aid is greater than that of TBA.
1 Because of the multiplier effects within L, these aggregate multipliers need not be entirely 
independent of volume but will be generally so. Note also that figures have been successively 
rounded at various stages of the analysis which may generate apparent slight anomalies.
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Table 7.2. The Impact of UK Multilateral and Tied Bilateral Aid
INDICATOR MULTILATERAL TIED BILATERAL
1980 1985 1980 1985
<h-l £252m £53 lm £339m £237m
Xat £259m £545m £224m £157m
Pa 1.03 0.66
Qat £476m £962m £408m £27 lm
Qxat 1.84 1.77 1.82 1.73
Qat 1.89 1.81 1.20 1.14
” at 20803 31247 17577 8609
W" xat 80.3 57.3 78.5 54.8
Wat 82.6 58.8 51.8 36.3
*J<*t-l 22% 24% 14% 16%
NOTES: The indicators, for time subscript t, are: at_j, lagged expenditure out of the 
aid budget; aided exports; p a, the export ratio; q^ , total output required to 
meet xat; Qxat -  qat/xat, output per unit export; Qat = q atlaa - i» output per 
unit aid; w ar  person-years employment supported by qat\ Wxat = ™at!xat' 
employment per Elm aided exports; Wat = wa,/<2f.y, employment per Elm aid; 
taJat-P ^  revenue from q expressed as a percentage of at j.
SOURCE: Own estimates derived from 10 impact analysis, see Appendix A.
Given the assumptions of a constant and exports lagged one year on aid, the 
estimated rose from £259m to £545m and the benefits to the economy 
increased, but not pro rata since industry linkages declined slightly and labour 
productivity rose considerably. Thus, while increased by 110 per cent, rose 
by 102 per cent from £476m to £962m. Since the export ratio was almost unity, it 
is unsurprising that the values for Qxfl and were almost identical; each £lm  of 
multilateral aid generated about £1.9m of output in 1980 and £1.8m in 1985. The 
Qm  was slightly greater than for TBA, and declined at a slightly slower rate (four 
per cent as against five per cent), suggesting that the ^-industries had a relatively 
greater, and more stable, demand for intermediate inputs.
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A similar trend holds for employment although this can be explained by the large 
share of Const in (Table 7.3). We estimate that supported 20,803 
employees in 1980, 83 per £lm  aid, and 31,247 in 1985, a fall to 59 employees per 
£lm  of aid. In both years WxfI was greater than for x T but this is unlikely to have 
been realised because it is due to the relative importance of Const (which in turn 
reflects Civil Engineering and consultancy orders which would not have generated 
much employment within the UK). Note also that the W^ in 1985 suggests a cost, 
in terms of aid expenditure, of £16,950 per employee. This is about double the 
average wage and suggests that aid, especially tied aid if one considers the 
corresponding Wv  is an expensive way to create employment.2 As with TBA, 
the benefits are concentrated in a small number of industries, for which the 
employment may be important
The value of imported inputs required by in 1980 was £49.5m, implying net 
exports of £209m, equivalent to 15 per cent of the visible trade balance in that year 
or 6.7 per cent of the current account surplus. Taxes on intermediate inputs 
amounted to £8.2m and, allowing for taxes on labour income and profits, total tax 
revenue was about £55m, equivalent to 21.8 per cent of multilateral aid (see Table 
A.6 for details of the decomposition into primary inputs). Imported inputs in 1985 
were £95.6m and led to net exports of £450m, equivalent to 13.5 per cent of the 
current account surplus and of even greater significance given that visible trade was 
in deficit. The total tax revenue was about £129m, or 24.3 per cent of multilateral 
aid (see Table A.7 for details).
We can summarise by taking a simple average of 1980 and 1985: each £lm  of 
multilateral aid supported exports worth about £ 1.03m and required total output of 
some £1.85m, which would have provided about 70 person-years of employment. 
The net exports were equivalent to over 80 per cent of the aid, implying that the 
transfer cost was less than one fifth of the outlay. Finally, almost a quarter of 
expenditure on multilateral aid returned to the Government in tax revenue.
<2
In this sense we tend to support Byatt (1984) in his criticism of export subsidies as a means 
of creating employment There is much interest in the employment-creating possibilities of aid 
which we refer to in Chapter 9.
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Table 7.3: The Impact of M ultilateral Aid on Exports, Output
and Employment, Industry Groups, 1980 and 1985
GROUP 1980 1985
XH & xn
£m £m £m £m
MecEng 88.29 102.51 4499 185.97 228.56 5711
% 34.1 21.6 21.6 34.1 23.8 18.3
ElEng 34.06 42.33 2173 71.74 85.92 2663
% 13.2 8.9 10.4 13.2 8.9 8.5
Const 57.74 77.28 3744 121.62 157.35 4520
% 22.3 16.2 18.0 22.3 16.4 14.5
I&S 13.46 32.29 1116 28.36 62.63 838
% 5.2 6.8 5.4 5.2 6.5 2.7
Vehicles 17.35 20.70 1026 36.54 40.80 1015
% 6.7 4.4 4.9 6.7 4.2 3.2
Chemicals 3.81 4.83 120 8.02 9.14 123
% 1.5 1.0 0.6 1.5 1.0 0.4
SUB-TOTAL 214.71 279.94 12678 452.25 584.40 14870
% 82.9 58.9 60.9 82.9 60.8 47.6
ALL 258.91 475.62 20803 545.35 961.79 31247
NOTES: As for Table 6.1 except estimates refer to x^, aided exports due to multilateral 
aid, and associated output, and employment, n y
The Impact on Industrial Groupings
The industry groups accounted for almost 83 per cent of x^, which is slightly 
higher than their share of xT and their relatively greater linkages are reflected in the 
fact that their share of at 60 per cent, and w^, falling from 61 to 48 per cent,
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were lower than for TBA. Compared to x v  were more heavily concentrated in 
Const and, to a lesser extent, MecEng, and were far less concentrated in Vehicles 
and Chemicals and, to a lesser extent, I&S (compare Table 7.3 to Table 6.1).3 
The contractor industries, as we have defined them, absorbed 75 per cent of x^, a 
higher share than under xv  reflecting as much the nature of multilateral projects as 
the competitiveness of the UK industries. Nevertheless, British consulting 
engineers and contractors do keep in close touch with MAAs, especially the World 
Bank, and this clearly pays off.
The linkages of the industrial groups with the rest of the economy declined over the 
period, but this is almost completely attributable to MecEng which accounted for 
21.6 per cent of in 1980 but 23.8 per cent in 1985; this is largely explained by 
an increase in the share of labour and of profits in inputs for the most important 
constituent industries (MCMch, OMch, AMch and TWMch; see Table A.9). The 
linkages of the other groups remained stable and, as for TBA, I&S benefited from 
demands from MecEng so that it had a higher share of output than of exports.
The share of employment accounted for. by the groups fell dramatically over the 
period, from 61 per cent to 48 per cent, despite their increased share of total output. 
This arose because Const and MecEng absorbed an increasing share of output but 
experienced large increases in labour productivity, which were matched by the other 
major industries. Overall employment remained substantial because of demands for 
intermediate inputs from industries with a high employment potential. However, 
since Const is a very high component in the total and the employment estimates for 
this industry are questionable, the scepticism about taking the employment figures 
on face value expressed in respect of TBA have even greater force in the case of 
exports financed out of multilateral aid. The point remains that x^  are an important 
source of trade and output for specific, usually contractor, industries, and we now 
consider this in more detail.
3 As detailed in Appendix A (Table A.8), we have revised the industry shares of and re- 
estimated the impact in 1985 (the revised figures by industry are used in Section 7.3). The only 
noticeable differences are within ElEng, but the total for this Group changed little and was re- 
estimated as accounting for 12.6% of exports, 8.7% of output and 7.4% of employment in 1985.
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7.3. Industry Benefits From Multilateral Aid
This section follows the approach of Section 6.3, although direct comparison with 
TBA is left to Section 7.4. Table 7.4 presents the revised estimate of the allocation 
of Xp by industry (including only those industries for which the values of or 
xliJei were among the ten highest, underlined, for the listed industries; full details 
are in Table A.8). The final four columns are the same as for Table 6.2 (and only 
values for the ’top-ten1 industries in any category are included here). Only six of the 
ten industries which were the greatest beneficiaries from x^were also among the 
ten top beneficiaries from Const, MCMch and I&S were the only industries 
among the top five for both types of aid.
In 1980, x^  accounted for over one per cent of output in five industries, three in 
MecEng (Table A.6). By 1985, it accounted for over one per cent of output in 
seven industries, and over two per cent in two of these, four in MecEng and one in 
ElEng (Table A.8). The importance of x ^  is seen more clearly as a share of 
industry exports: in 1980, x^  accounted for more than two per cent of exports for 
five industries, two in ElEng and the figure for Const is very high at 36 per cent 
(Table A.6). The respective figure by 1985 was ten industries, including four in 
MecEng above three per cent, IW&C at 8.5 per cent and Const at 38 per cent (Table
7.4). We can avail of Table 7.4 to consider the export position of these industries.
Six of the ten industries for which x^  was highest feature among the ten industries 
with the highest export shares in output but only three of these also feature among 
the ten industries with the highest x^fe(. MCMch, for which x ^  were 5.5 per 
cent of exports; AMch (3.5 per cent) and InstE (3.4 per cent). Looking at this 
another way, of the ten industries for which exports were the highest share, x^  
were a relatively high share of exports (ie. among the ’top-ten’) for only four 
(TWMch is also included) but six were among the ten industries with the highest 
Xjj. This suggests that it is the export orientation of the industry which wins orders 
from MAAs, rather than the x^  which bolster export performance. On the other 
hand, x^  were a relatively high share of exports for four of the industries whose 
export performance declined (Fit, IPlt, PMch and OVch). This would be consistent 
with arguing that they were able to retain their share of MAA contracts in declining
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yorld markets or while losing market share to competitors (who may have had
nore tied aid to avail of).
Table 7.4: M ultilateral Aid and Exports, by Industry, 1985
INDUSTRY X\L e/e M e/e)
£m % % %
1. MOP 4.2 0.5
2. I&S 28.26 1.78 2.0 1.8 -0.7
3. nMMP 1.1 -0.3
4. Frt 2.18 3,76 -7.5
5. Phm 1.1 -0.2
6. Md
7. IPlt 18.00 3,40 -9.9
8. AMch 26,72 3.51 62.9 1.2
9. TWMch 15.82 2.25 56.3 1.0
10. PMch 20.18 4,53 -27.1
11. MCMch 67.62 5.45 43.6 2.7
12. OMch 34,36 1.67 34.9 2.5 2.3 -0.5
13. OfEq 90.0 20.7 2.6 0.9
14. IW&C 18.54 8.47 0.4
15. EIEq 46.3 9.8
16. TlHq 26.72 1,36 35.9 6.9 2.3 0.8
17. ECA 53.1 12.1 1.4 0.4
18. Mot 25,63 0.75 34.5 -0.5 3.9 -2.3
19. Ships
20. OVch 7.64 4 1 1 -3.1
21. InstE 37,08 3.35 52.2 5.0 1.3
22. TPRP
23. Const 121.61 37.89
24. FSer 3.4 -1.5
NOTE: Variables as defined in Table 6.2, except first two columns refer to exports 
financed by MAAs to which the UK contributed, ‘top-ten’ underlined.
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Generally, the industries with the highest values of displayed a positive export 
performance, seven excluding Const increased exports as a share of output, 
suggesting that they were internationally competitive. Of the eleven industries that 
each accounted for over one per cent of total exports, five appeared among the ten 
largest recipients of x^  but only one of these, InstE, was also among the ten for 
which x^li/ei was highest. Again, this suggests that industries with an export 
orientation tend to do well in terms of orders from MAAs. It is not juste retour 
which confers benefits to the UK, but the competitiveness of British industries in 
the markets in which MAAs are most frequently involved.
7.4. Comparing the Impact of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
Perhaps the single most important point is that the value of multilateral aid increased 
throughout the period whereas that for TBA declined, and this general trend can be 
applied to the 1980s as a whole. Furthermore, the can generally be anticipated 
to exceed p T as long as British firms continue to be successful at winning World 
Bank orders. In fact, any reallocation of the aid budget from TBA to multilateral aid 
is likely to benefit the UK (unless the level of contracts won is truely invariant to 
the value of contributions)4, even were there a reallocation of x^  away from the 
World Bank and towards Europe. A clear conclusion from the evidence is that, 
unlike x v  x^  were a significant and increasing share of exports and of output in a 
number of industries. A question of particular interest is whether there is any 
tendency for the x^-industries to be any more export oriented, or internationally 
competitive, than the jcT-industries?
We can try to answer this question by refering to some correlation coefficients 
between shares of aided exports and export performance.5 Since these are
4 It seems probable that contracts would not increase in proportion to contributions, and the 
export ratio may be maximised at the estimated level. This may appear to justify retaining the 
present share of TBA, but such a conclusion fails to allow for the greater competitiveness of those 
winning MAA orders. In any case, increased aid to the EDF appears probable but, as previously 
noted, this has the lowest export ratio. On the other hand, the Single European Market should 
reduce the scope for bilateral tying and increase competition.
5 The sample correlation coefficient between two sets of variables, Xj with mean x and Yj with 
mean y, is given by the formula: { ^ ( X j - x X Y j - y ) j 2).
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indicative rather than conclusive, we simply refer to them in the text without 
compiling a table (see Chapter 9 for further analysis). The correlation between 
industries' share of x^  and their share of x t  is positive but quite low, at 0.285, 
confirming that there are appreciable differences in the industries deriving most 
exports from each type of aid. The correlation between industries share of and 
the value for x flilei (0.577) is significantly higher than the corresponding 
correlation for x T (0.317). This tendency for x^  to be a more important share of 
exports than x T can be explained by the tendency for x^  to be worth more in 
money terms. Put simply, x^  tend to be of more commercial value to the economy, 
and to particular industries.
There is a negative, but insignificant, correlation between e jq i and both industry 
shares of x^  (-0.058) and x T (-0.069). At the least, there is no tendency for shares 
of aided exports to be greater in the more export-oriented industries. However, 
there is a low negative correlation (-0.224) between industry shares of x T and 
export performance measured as A(ejq^  whereas the corresponding correlation 
forXp is positive but insignificant (0.012). This supports the argument that TBA is 
more likely to benefit industries with a declining export performance. A similar 
conclusion is reached if we consider the importance of aided exports to an industry, 
as a share of exports. The correlation between x^/e^  and export orientation, 
e jq it is negative but low (-0.157), as is that for x TiJei (-0.168). However, while 
the correlation between x^li/ei and export performance is negative (-0.079) it is 
insignificant, whereas that between x ri/ei and performance is of considerably 
greater magnitude (-0.361). It is perhaps unsurprising that aided exports tend, if 
anything, to be of greater importance for industries with a relatively low export 
orientation, especially given the tendency for x^  to be of high value (multilateral 
projects are a large international market). It is more important that x x appear to be 
of greater importance for industries with a deteriorating export performance.
Some support for this argument can be found in May, Schumacher and Malek 
(1989:105-111) who demonstrate that industries in receipt of aided orders tended to 
grow, in gross output terms, more slowly than manufacturing as a whole over
1978-84, and that this was more pronounced for xT-industries. Likewise,
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employment fell faster in xT-industries than in ^-industries, but faster in both 
sets of industries than in manufacturing as a whole. Thus there is a tendency for 
aided exports, especially if due to TBA, to go to declining industries. This, 
however, is not inconsistent with arguing that international competition in these 
types of industries has become more reliant on the availability of aid support
7.5. Aid and Industry Performance
We consider our estimates of impact in 1980 and 1985 to be fairly reliable and 
roughly indicative of the trends over that period. No account is taken of the 
potential benefits from maintenance, spare parts or future export orders which 
require no aid. In total, these could add some 25 per cent to impact on an annual 
basis, and our results could be considered underestimates in this sense. There is 
little reason to believe that these indirect effects differ between the types of exports 
supported by multilateral as against TBA and their existence does not bear on our 
central purpose, the comparison of the two forms of aid. A possible exception is 
that multilateral orders won on the basis of demonstrating international 
competitiveness may be more likely to generate follow-on orders, and are largely 
independent of the size of the UK aid budget. Our evidence suggests, contrary to 
the claims by business groups and the Government that TBA is likely to confer 
greater commercial benefits, that multilateral aid tends to be of greater importance to 
the UK economy and to some industries. It should not be inferred, however, that 
an increase in contributions to MAAs would lead to a proportional increase in the 
value of contracts won by UK firms.
The principal conclusion is that multilateral aid has a greater impact on the economy 
than tied bilateral aid. This arises directly insofar as each £lm of multilateral aid is 
likely to generate £1.03in of exports and, in 1985, would have supported total 
output of £1.8m and 58 person-years of employment. On the other hand, £lm  of 
TBA would only generate £0.66m of exports supporting, again in 1985, £ l.lm  of 
total output and 36 person-years of employment. There is also some evidence that 
industries winning contracts from multilateral agencies were somewhat stronger 
than those supported by TBA, but this should not be over-emphasised. The period
1979-81 witnessed a dramatic fall in UK exports which tended to ‘weed out* weak
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firms so that only the most competitive firms remained by the late 1980s and their 
export performance, measured as the income elasticity of demand for UK exports 
by industries, has improved (Landesmann and Snell, 1989). The most stable and 
competitive industries were in Electrical Engineering while those in Mechanical 
Engineering recovered very quickly.
Aided exports tended to increase as a share of exports for those industries 
benefiting from multilateral aid, which can be largely attributed to the increased 
volume of such aid and does not question the competitiveness of these industries. 
The volume of TBA fell, and so too did its contribution to industry exports. These 
observations permit no inferences. However, the MAA beneficiaries operated in a 
more competitive environment and tended to perform marginally better overall. We 
will return to this important issue in Chapter 9.
The implication, for aid policy, is that greater commercial benefits cannot be used as 
an argument to favour tied bilateral aid over multilateral aid; if impact per se is the 
maximand for this choice, multilateral aid is preferred. It follows that the 
commercial case for tied aid is somewhat weaker than commonly supposed. While 
the nature of LDC markets and the proliferation of tying among major donors 
suggests strongly that any unilateral untying would lead to a drop in exports to 
LDCs, the success of British firms in the market for multilateral projects suggests 
that the UK may not lose from multilateral untying.
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CHAPTER 8. THE AH) AND TRADE PROVISION, 1978-89
The Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) was introduced in 1978 to help British firms 
obtain orders of industrial or commercial importance, and of sound development 
potential, in LDCs by matching the assistance available to foreign firms from their 
governments. It is only a small part of UK bilateral aid, varying from around five 
per cent in the early 1980s up to around ten per cent and over in the mid-80s and 
back to around five per cent by the late 80s, and is specifically directed to orders 
from countries not normally receiving British aid. The evolution of ATP policy 
since 1978, its principal objectives and its position in the UK aid budget have been 
reviewed in Chapter 4. This chapter examines in detail the experience with ATP, 
paying particular attention to its commercial impact
Section 8.1 sets mixed credits in their international context and outlines the basic 
arguments surrounding ATP. The evidence on the commercial benefits from ATP, 
which has been extensively written about and extends the arguments for tied aid, is 
reviewed in Section 8.2. The empirical core of the chapter is Section 8.3 which 
describes the distribution of ATP-supported contracts among industries and 
presents estimates of the potential impact of ATP in each of the years 1978 to 
1989/90, in terms of exports, output and employment. The importance of ATP to 
particular industries, and indeed companies, is explored in Section 8.4 in the 
context of viewing ATP as an instrument of strategic trade policy (STP, Chapter 3). 
We argued in Chapter 4 that the development benefits of ATP are questionable, and 
return to this issue in Section 8.5 where we look at some evidence on the 
geographical and sectoral distribution of ATP to assess if there is a conflict between 
commercial and development objectives.
It was noted in Chapter 4 (p. 79) that the WPAT in 1977 was critical of mixed 
credits because they would go primarily to the richer LDCs (as shown in Section
8.5), would lead to a blurring of the distinction between aid and mixed credits (eg. 
the Rihand project discussed in 8.4) and may induce an escalation in the global use 
of mixed credits. This latter point, for which some evidence is provided in Section
8.1, is salient to the potential for ATP to provide strategic benefits as presented in
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Chapter 3 (pp. 57-60). Section 8.6 reviews ATP from the perspective of whether 
the firm s benefiting from ATP meet the criteria necessary to justify an export 
subsidy as STP, and presents the conclusion to this chapter. A more detailed 
discussion of strategic criteria and the industries benefiting from aided exports is 
provided in Section 8.4 and Chapter 9. We should note that if ATP cannot be 
supported as an instrument of STP there remains no convincing argument that it can 
generate net economic benefits for the UK, and we also argue that it is unlikely to 
be in the best interests of LDCs.
8.1. International Use of Mixed Credits
Mixed credits {credit mixte or associated financing) are a direct outgrowth of tied 
aid in which a grant element (aid or soft loan) is offered to defray part of the cost of 
a commercial contract to the LDC Government. There are two principal differences 
between mixed credits and tied bilateral aid First, whereas TBA is generally equal 
to the contract value the amount of mixed credits are generally less, so that the grant 
element is less than 100 per cent, for which reason they are often compared to low- 
concessional aid (where the grant element is less than 50 per cent). Secondly, 
requests for mixed credits are normally instigated by the company seeking the 
contract; the project is not normally one initiated by the donor or an aid agency. 
Furthermore, mixed credits are only granted to LDCs with export credit cover, and 
are often closely associated with export credit insurance. Consequently, they are far 
more overtly commercial and trade-supporting than ordinary aid and critics argue 
that mixed credits divert scarce aid resources away from the poorest countries and 
the most developmentally oriented projects (see Section 8.5). Advocates counter 
that mixed credits provide an additional financial flow to LDCs when aid and bank 
credits are scarce. This dispute remains live (DAC, 1985:245) and most writers 
tend to position themselves clearly on one or other side of the divide (Section 8.2).
France was the only country making use of mixed credits throughout the 1970s but 
Italy passed the Ossola Law in 1977, permiting the provision of matching mixed 
credits and extended to pre-emptive assistance in 1981, and the UK introduced ATP 
in 1978. The 'explosion' in mixed credits followed the economic recession of the 
early 1980s when governments may have perceived a greater need to assist
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exporters1: the volume of commited mixed credits rose from $3.4bn in 1981 to 
$4.6bn in 1982 and had fallen back to $2.7bn in 1984 (DAC, 1985:245). France 
has traditionally been considered as the country responsible for promoting and 
expanding the use of mixed credits, and it is probably the most aggressive user. In 
1983-4,52 per cent of all DAC associated financing was French and mixed credits 
represented 11 per cent of French bilateral aid. Canada accounted for 14 per cent of 
DAC mixed credits (equivalent to ten per cent of its bilateral aid) and the UK came 
next with 11 per cent (14 per cent), followed by the six per cent share of Italy (11 
per cent). Thus, the UK allocated the highest share of its bilateral aid to mixed 
credits (partly due to the low aid budget at that time) and was among the major 
users. It should be mentioned that, in the same year, France, Germany, Italy, Japan 
and, to a lesser extent, the US, all had large volumes of low-concessionality aid 
(data from DAC, 1985:246).
From its inception the DAC has been concerned with reducing reliance on tied aid 
by exhorting members to open up their procurement procedures and/or render 
domestic competition for tied orders more competitive and subject to quality 
control. Success has been limited although members did agree that multilateral 
contributions should be untied and, in 1974, ten DAC countries signed an 
agreement to promote partial untying whereby procurement would be open to the 
donor and most LDCs (the UK and France were the most notable non-signatories). 
The expansion of mixed credits was seen as a further obstacle to reducing tying so 
the DAC tried to regulate the conditions under which associated financing can be 
employed. The first set of guidelines, in 1983, urged donors to confine mixed 
credits to priority projects meeting development standards as part of the recipient's 
development programme and where the grant element must be at least 20 per cent. 
This grant threshold was increased to 25 per cent in 1985 and the DAC began to 
draw up further guidelines to promote discipline and transparency in mixed credits 
(DAC, 1985:245). New regulations were proposed in 1987 which recommended a
1 As was the case for ATP in the UK, the Ossola Law was passed in response to business 
lobbying. Like their British counterparts, Italian firms complain that the relevant government 
agencies are slow at reaching decisions and inefficient, so that Italians lose orders, while French 
competitors have recourse to aggressively deployed credit mixte and the Japanese can avail of 
cheap yen financing (Norsa, 1988:100-2).
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minimum grant element of 30 per cent (increased to 35 per cent in 1988) or 50 per 
cent for the poorest LDCs. It is important to note that the grant element to the LDC 
is equivalent to the export subsidy to the donor firm.
The ATP sits in an international context of increased use of mixed credits by a 
number of major donors, particularly France but also Italy in recent years; it is part 
of a trend towards tied aid through export subsidies. The DAC has tried to restrain 
this trend in two ways. First, by increasing the minimum grant element it is trying 
to shift mixed credits from export subsidies to something more clearly resembling 
tied aid. Second, by promoting procedures for assessing requests for mixed credits, 
it is trying to minimise the commercial aspects and promote the development 
potential. A proper evaluation of ATP must accept the context of mixed credits as 
instruments of donor export competition; as such, they may generate an increase in 
net global welfare if they meet the strategic criteria. However, one of these criteria 
is that they are used pre-emptively rather than in retaliation, and this has not been 
the case nor is it likely to be given the prevalence of moxed credits now.
The Objectives of ATP
The problem inherent in ATP, as in mixed credits, has been the conflict between 
achieving both commercial and development objectives, with each the responsibility 
of a different department (the DTI and ODA respectively, see Chapter 4). The way 
in which one evaluates ATP, and the conclusion reached, depends on how one 
reconciles these objectives. There are three options: either both are given equal 
importance, or one is taken as predominant. Unsurprisingly, critics of ATP tend to 
emphasise development objectives and argue that these have not been met whereas 
supporters cite the achievement of commercial objectives and argue that the policy 
has been a success. The first option is to treat ATP as a policy instrument intended 
to achieve both commercial and development objectives but, as a single instrument, 
it cannot successfully achieve two policy objectives and must fail (Toye and Clark, 
1986). This argument is based on Tinbergen's principle that a separate instrument is 
needed for each objective of economic policy; a policy which maximises, or best 
achieves, the commercial objectives of the donor will not simultaneously maximise 
the development benefits to the recipient. The second view emphasises the need for
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ATP to match the mixed credits of other donors, which implicitly treats ATP as an 
instrument of trade policy, rather than of development a id2
Aid policy, however, can have multiple objectives, each associated with a distinct 
aspect of the aid budget. Thus, political objectives influence which LDCs receive 
aid while commercial and development criteria determine the choice of projects to 
support. From this perspective, ATP is an instrument of aid policy aimed at 
achieving commercial benefits subject to a development constraint. The question 
then becomes, once economic benefits are identified, whether ATP meets the 
development objective and "if it is less effective developmentally, can this be 
balanced against increased commercial benefits." (Toye and Clark, 1986:291). ATP 
may not contribute to development because commercial benefits are the source of 
ATP requests and, to many companies, development benefits are taken as given so 
that ODA appraisals of the development potential of projects are considered a delay 
rather than an important part of the process.
8.2. The Commercial Benefits of ATP
There is a direct commercial benefit to exporting companies and may be dynamic 
gains if ATP helps a company to penetrate a new market in which future orders are 
obtained without aid support. The fundamental issue in evaluating this benefit is 
whether the exports could have been won without ATP. Given the tightness of the 
LDC capital-projects market, the intensity of international competition and the aid 
support offered by other donors to their industries, the commercial argument that 
ATP assists UK firms maintain market share does not appear unreasonable (even 
with the promise of ATP many tenders are lost by UK firms). If firms are 
competitive, their ability to win follow-on orders will be greater (Pick, 1986, 
argues that ATP provided Balfour Beatty entry to the Indonesian market where they 
subsequently won a number of contracts without aid; Love and Dunlop, 1990, 
make a similar claim for John Brown Engineering in China). In essence, the 
arguments for the commercial benefits from ATP are the same as those of TBA, and 
need not be repeated, except that competition may be more intense for ATP projects 
(since they are initiated by companies rather than donors).
2 It can be argued that mixed credits are really instruments of trade policy that are only defined as 
aid because the GATT prohibits export subsidies.
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The most common method of measuring the benefits from ATP in the literature is to 
study particular projects and estimate the gain to the firms involved (HSPE, 1986; 
MacQuaide and Toye, 1986; NEI, 1988). A more elaborate procedure is to use 10 
impact analysis which, at the least, gives more generalisable results. May, 
Schumacher and Malek (1989) include ATP in some of their estimates for the 
impact of British aid, but do not isolate ATP sufficiently for our results to be 
compared with theirs. Love and Dunlop (1990) applied 10 impact analysis to a John 
Brown Engineering (JBE) project in China and we will refer to some of their results 
in Section 8.3.
MacQuaide and Toye (1986) examined six early projects representing total ATP 
spending of £15m with exports worth £34m. These exports provided employment 
in UK firms trying to enter new markets, or protect existing markets, against actual 
or purported foreign competition. There were two cases of orders for spare-parts, 
one of a follow-on order (in a new market) and two cases of subsequent sales to 
neighbouring countries (these were in areas where the companies had a market 
share, and the importance of ATP should not be overestimated). There were definite 
commercial benefits but it should be noted that only two of the projects made a net 
contribution to development (and two a negative contribution). Compared to impact 
analysis, however, this study was more qualitative than quantitative and did not try 
to measure the benefits to the UK. The study lends some support to the argument 
that aided exports generate future orders, but at a very low level, and presents some 
support for the view that ATP is trade-protecting, if not trade-creating. On the other 
hand, the study is not representative of ATP: in particular, two of the six projects 
were for aircraft (and were the two of negative development impact, but of 
subsequent sales to neighbouring countries) whereas only four of the 120 ATP 
agreements before 1987 were for aircraft
The commercial impact of ATP is most relevant to the individual firms and 
industries gaining exports. Over the period 1978-85,47.6 per cent of ATP went to 
Electrical Engineering, 22 per cent to Mechanical Engineering and 14.4 per cent to 
Shipbuilding and other vehicles; eleven large firms accounted for 77 per cent of 
ATT (Toye and Clark, 1986; see Section 8.4). Relating this to the industries which
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receive the most aid-support in other donors suggests that ATP has been focused in 
areas where foreign competition is strong. The five sectors most heavily assisted by 
French export subsidies are machine tools, electrical equipment, metalworking, 
aircraft-ships and construction (Melitz and Messerlin, 1987:162). German mixed 
financing, similarly, goes predominantly to electrical and mechanical engineering, 
construction and transport equipment (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:89).
One of the strongest advocates of greater use of ATP is McGregor (1987), 
representing the EGCI, who argues that ATP supported between 14,000 and 
17,000 jobs a year and paid for itself in increased tax payments out of the output 
generated so that there was no net cost to the Exchequer. We will find broad 
agreement with the lower bound of his employment estimate but feel that he 
generally overstates the benefits; in particular, his analysis is inadequate forjudging 
net benefits. Individual companies that have published ATP project studies tend to 
concentrate on the employment effects (HSPE, 1986, claim that each £lm  of ATP 
orders supported 65 jobs in 1985/6; the corresponding figure implied by Love and 
Dunlop, 1990, is 360 person-years3) or the large number of small sub­
contractors and suppliers that benefit (NEI, 1988, estimate that over 2,600 firms 
won contracts the £292m Rihand project). Most of these studies focus on the 
employment effect of ATP which we will address in Chapter 9.
8.3. The Impact of ATP on the Economy and on Industries
A fundamental difficulty with impact analysis is obtaining data on the level of new 
demand (ATP-supported exports, x a, in this case) for each year classified by 
industry. We began with FAC (1987) which listed all ATP agreements before 
February 1987 with the year of agreement, ATP and contract value, a brief 
description of the project and the name of the company and LDC. Using this, we 
estimated the export value of ATP agreements in each year for the industries listed 
in Table 8.1 by, first, allocating contracts to industrial classifications and, second, 
deducting an allowance for local costs from the contract value (for details see
3 The high Love and Dunlop figure arises because they measure the impact of three projects: 
only one was supported by ATP but, they argue, the others would not have been won without the 
initial aid to enter the market While the argument itself may be valid, the generalisation of the 
results to ATP is not
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Appendix B). The deduction was generally ten percent of the contract value 
(denoted ka ), for consultancy and goods exports, but 25 per cent for capital- 
intensive construction projects up to 40 per cent for very labour-intensive projects. 
While the choice of percentage to deduct is arbitrary, albeit based on the views of 
companies that operate overseas and have won ATP awards, the values are 
reasonable given that they can represent both local and sunk costs (the latter being 
primarily the costs of bidding for the contract).
Table 8.1: ATP-Recipient Industries
1 Industrial Plant and Steelwork (IPlt)
2 Textile, Woodwork etc. Machinery (TWMch)
3 Process Machinery and Contractors (PMch)
4 Mining, Construction etc. Machinery (MCMch)
5 Other Machinery, Mechanical Equipment (OMch)
6 Insulated Wires and Cables (IW&C)
7 Basic Electrical Equipment (ElEq)
8 Telecommunications Equipment (TlEq)
9 Motor Vehicles and Parts (Mot)
10 Shipbuilding and Repairing (Ships)
11 Aerospace (Aero)
12 Other Vehicles (OVch)
13 Construction (Const)
14 Business Services (BSer)
15 Research Services (RSer)
16 Other Engineering (OEng)
17 Other Production (OPrd)
18 Other Services (OSer)
NOTES: More detail on the composition of the industries and attribution of ATP 
contracts can be found in Appendix B, Table B.l
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Table 8.2: Distribution of ATP Aided Exports, 1978-90
Industry 1978-86 1987-90 x a Total x
£m % £m % %
1. IPlt 335.16 23.5 108.18 16.4 21.22
2. TWMch 11.25 0.8 14.71 2.2 1.24
3. PMch 33.82 2.4 26.13 4.0 2.87
4. MCMch 183.23 12.8 10.70 1.6 9.28
5. OMch . 64.24 4.5 176.54 26.7 11.53
6 . IW&C 114.30 8.0 25.53 3.9 6.69
7. ElEq 480.88 33.7 67.08 10.2 26.23
8. TIEq 6.44 0.5 83.31 12.6 4.30
9. Mot 6.25 0.5 8.01 1.2 0.68
10. Ships 58.63 3.8 28.85 4.4 4.19
11. Aero 20.01 1.4 - - 0.96
12. OVch 65.01 4.6 29.13 4.4 4.51
13. Const 40.64 2.8 66.82 10.1 5.14
14. BSer 12.27 0.9 10.74 1.6 1.10
15. RSer 0.16 - 1.08 0.2 0.01
TOTAL 1428.25 100.0 660.62 100.0 £2088.9m
NOTES: The xa  for 1978-86 are estimated from FAC (1987) and the average is based 
on division by eight (since 1978 was only a partial year for ATP, and the data for 
1986 may not have been complete). The *a *for 1987/8 to 1989/90 are estimated 
from data provided by the ODA (see Appendix B).
i
Industry Distribution of ATP-Supported Exports
Table 8.1 lists the fifteen industries which obtained ATP supported orders agreed 
between 1978 and 1990; for the purposes of presenting our results the 87 other 
industries in the economy (IO 1984) are grouped into three aggregate industries. 
ATP was highly concentrated in three industries between 1978 and 1986; 34 per 
cent went to ElEq, 24 per cent to IPlt, and 13 per cent to MCMch. Between 1987/8
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and 1989/90, however, the x a were somewhat more evenly distributed across 
OMch (27 per cent), IPlt (16 per cent), and TIEq, ElEq and Const above ten per 
cent (Table 8.2). With the exception of Aerospace, the industries in Table 8.2 figure 
prominently as recipients of x r and (Chapters 6 and 7; see Appendix Table B.2 
for the distribution of x a by year and industry).
The x a  are clearly more concentrated than either x z  or x ^  as is particularly 
evident at the industrial group level. Whereas virtually all x a were to MecEng, 
ElEng, Vehicles and Const (Table 8.2), these groups accounted for 64 per cent of 
x T (Table 6.1) and 76 per cent of x^  (Table 7.3). Since we have previously 
suggested that x^  are more likely to be associated with internationally competitive 
industries than are x v  it is worth considering which pattern x a most resemble. 
More than two-thirds of total x a went to just four industries - ElEq (26 per cent), 
IPlt (21 per cent), OMch (12 per cent) and MCMch (9 per cent) - and bears little 
resemblance to either TBA or multilateral distributions, for which these industries 
had similar shares (9 per cent, 3 per cent, 6 per cent and 9 or 12 per cent 
respectively, Table A.2). This point that ATP tends to benefit different industries to 
multilateral or bilateral aid is developed further in Section 8.4.
Having determined the elements of xa  we then estimated the potential impact in 
each year between 1978 and 1990 (Table 8.3). By potential impact we mean the 
assumption that the x a impact in the year in which the contract is agreed. In the 
previous two chapters we have assumed a one-year lag for measuring impact 
because the aid budget in one year is assumed not to generate orders until the 
following year. Companies seeking ATP have a longer lead time because they have 
been involved in negotiating for the contract before the aid is agreed. In the case of 
ATP the potential exports precede the aid, whereas the opposite is true for TBA or 
MAAs, and we believe this aid is transformed into physical exports much faster. 
Furthermore, since the impact is measured relative to a fixed (in time) 10 structure, 
the principal impact ratios are independent of the year in which the impact occurs 
(employment, the most suspect estimate, is the main exception to this because we 
utilise the Wqi for the year of impact).
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Table 8.3: Potential Annual Impact of ATP, 1978-90
YEAR Pa 4a
£m. £m. £m.
1978 6.766 32.134 ' 4.75 57.084 4363
1979 43.962 111.414 2.53 196.159 12818
1980 32.541 90.122 2.77 156.437 9928
1981 25.450 75.051 2.95 133.566 7153
1982 115.660 511.651 4.42 883.597 40226
1983 28.350 96.436 3.40 177.199 7179
1984 52.109 219.610 4.21 362.046 13049
1985 32.318 75.166 2.33 135.933 4459
1986 103.123 216.659 2.10 387.975 12259
TOTAL 440 .279 1428.243 3 .2 4 2489 .996 111434
Ave.1 55.035 178.530 3.24 311.250 13929
1987/8 65.125 144.740 2.22 251.848 11270
1988/9 156.332 326.371 2.09 567.886 25414
1989/90 128.047 189.509 1.48 329.746 14757
NOTES: For further detail see Appendix B; all values are in current prices and refer to 
calender years except for the final three rows. Potential impact implies no time lag: 
a a  is Annual value of ATP agreements; xa  is Export value of ATP contracts 
agreed in each year; p a  is the export ratio for ATP; ^ s  total output required to 
produce xa; w a  is Employment, in person-years, supported by xa , estimated as 
q ai the 1978 figure is an estimate because we did not have Wqi. The 
estimates for 1987-90 are based on applying the average (1978-86) Qxcc and Wxa 
to estimated xa  for 1987-90 inclusive; employment, at least, is overestimated.
* Since 1978 was only a partial year,the average is obtained by dividing the 
total by eight.
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The Impact of ATP
Table 8.3 presents estimates of the potential impact of ATP for each year to 1986, 
showing the value of ATP (aa), the x a, the p a , the total output required (qa) 
and the level of employment supported (w j. The periods 1978-86 and 1987/8 to 
1989/90 are distinguished for two reasons. First, they are from separate sources; 
the data for 1978-86 are from FAC (1987) and refer to calender years while the later 
data were provided by the ODA and relate to fiscal years.4 Secondly, the potential 
impact for 1978 to 1986 inclusive is based on applying 10 impact analysis to the xa 
for each year (and utilising the Wqi for each year), whereas the 1987-90 estimates, 
intended to bring the review up to date, are based on applying the aggregate impact 
multipliers (Q%a? and ^qoD f°r the 1978-86 average to the three later years. Given 
increasing labour productivity, this is less than satisfactory for estimating wa yet 
indicative overall.
The first obvious point is that ATP agreements tend to be quite bunched in 1982, 
1986 and, to a lesser extent, 1988/9 although x a are slightly more evenly spread as 
the export ratio varies. Annual variations are explained by two factors: the distortion 
due to a small number of very large contracts and the fact that ATP commited to a 
company in one year may not be realised in an agreement for a number of years, if 
at all (our figures relate only to when a contract is signed). The extreme bunching in 
1982 is probably due to a coincidence of both factors, perhaps related to the end of 
the 1979-81 recession as public investment in LDCs recovered. The export ratio 
was particularly high in 1982 also, which is attributable to two very large awards: 
NEI received £17m of ATP (in addition to TBA) to support a project in Rihand, 
India, with a contract value of £23 lm (NEI, 1988, and 8.5 below) and Davy 
McKee used £25m of ATP to support a Mexican contract worth £200m. The high 
pa in 1984 is largely attributable to GEC's Balco Power Project in India for which 
£33m of ATP supported a contract value of £130m. Finally, the low p a for 
1989/90 is largely due to a natural gas conversion project for AMEC International 
Construction in Turkey in which £62.5m of ATP was allocated to support a 
contract value of £68m (suggesting a strong desire to restore a foothold in Turkey 
after losing a Bhosporus Bridge project to the Japanese).
4 It is possible that our total for 1978-90 may miss some ATP awards since, in principle, the 
FAC data cover up to December 1986 while the additional data date from April 1987.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 8 175
Allowing for these special influences on the export ratio, two general points 
emerge. First, and to be expected, p a is considerably greater than either px or 
whereas £lm  of ATP generated, on average over 1978-86, £3.34m in exports, 
TBA generated only £0.66m and multilateral aid £1.03m. This point is emphasised 
by business interests (eg. McGregor, 1987, who assumes p a  is four) to promote 
the commercial effectiveness of ATP in preference to TBA and multilateral aid. The 
counter-argument is that because the export ratio is so great the commercial 
considerations are paramount to the detriment of development criteria (Toye and 
Clark, 1986). The second general point is that the trend in p a is downward from 
near three in the early 1980s to near two in the late 1980s, suggesting that the DAC 
have met some success in shifting mixed credits towards tied aid by increasing the 
minimum grant element. Given the high p a ATP is commercially more beneficial, 
in relative terms (per £lm  of aid), than other types of aid and also generates high 
exports so that, in volume terms over 1978-84, x a was almost as great as x x 
(£1136m compared with £1327m, for less than a fifth of the expenditure on aid).
The relative impact of ATP can be evaluated by comparing the aggregate impact 
multipliers with those for xx and x^  (Table 7.2). The average Qxa was 1.74, but 
as high as 1.84 in 1984, compared to a Qxx of about 1.77 and Qxfl of 1.8, 
suggesting that the industries benefiting most from ATP had relatively lower 
linkages. Given the high export ratio, the Qaa of 5.64 is far greater than the Qax 
(1.17) or Qap  (1.85). Table 8.3 shows that ATP supported about 14,000 person- 
years of employment on average (the lower bound of McGregor, 1987) which is 
not insignificant when it is accepted that about half would be engineering firms 
which tend to have their manufacturing capacity in areas of industrial decline. This 
gives rise to an Wxa of 78 person-years, higher than either Wxx or Wxfl, and a 
Waa of some 253 person-years. Thus, it appears that ATP goes to industries with 
a slightly higher employment potential than the pattern of industries benefiting from 
bilateral or multilateral aid (see Section 9.3, next Chapter).
Although imported inputs are required to produce qa the high export ratio again 
insures that net exports exceed the expenditure on aid so that, in transfer terms, 
ATP constitutes a net gain to the UK balance of payments. The tax return to the
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Exchequer can also be quite high: tax revenue has been estimated at £22m in 1979, 
about half of ATP expenditure, and £23.6m in 1983, equivalent to 83 per cent of 
spending on ATP (for estimates of impact in these years see Tables B.4 and B.5); 
given that the tax return is between a fifth and a quarter of x a, an export ratio 
above four suggests that the expenditure on ATP will be completely recouped. The 
export ratio of about two in the late 1980s is consistent with a tax return around 50 
per cent of the outlay.
8.4. The Commercial Importance of ATP
We have demonstrated that the relative impact is considerable and that x a are 
relatively heavily concentrated in only a few industries, therefore it is reasonable to 
expect that ATP will be of importance to those industries and companies given 
support From a business perspective, ATP is of greater benefit than other forms of 
aid, and this explains why business lobbies are so vocally supportive of increased 
use of mixed credits (Chapter 4). It is also apparent that ATP meets some basic 
requirements of a strategic trade policy (STP): it assists UK firms to win orders in 
oligopolistic international markets and it is relatively concentrated. This merely begs 
the question - are the relevant markets sufficiently oligopolistic and is ATP 
concentrated in the 'most deserving', from a STP viewpoint, industries? We shed 
some light on these questions in this section, first examining industries benefiting 
from ATP and then considering individual companies.
The Importance of ATP to Industries
To briefly summarise the arguments of Chapter 3, mixed credits can be justified 
under STP if the industry exhibits monopoly rents and/or external economies. 
Monopoly rents are likely to arise in a concentrated oligopolistic market with high 
barriers to entry. While we have insufficient data for a full analysis of ATP markets 
according to these criteria, we can draw on a number of sources to suggest that this 
may be the case for some of the industries. External economies imply that there are 
technological spin-offs from the industry, which will tend to relate to barriers to 
entry if R&D expenditure represents a sunk cost. Again, we have insufficient data 
but will be able to draw some inferences. Basic data on the importance of ATP to 
industries are in Table 8.4.
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<>i W  • qi c r 5
1 IPlt 41.90 7.91 17.11 1.77 28.76 24
2 TWMch 1.41 0.20 56.29 1.71 32.40 34
3 PMch 4.23 0.95 27.07 1.60 27.72 26
4 MCMch 22.90 1.85 43.59 1.88 27.04 12
5 OMch 8.03 0.39 34.86 1.76 32.06 12
6 IW&C 14.29 6.53 18.56 1.59 23.97 57
7 ElEq 60.11 5.21 46.27 1.61 38.37 43
8 TIEq 0.81 0.04 35.91 1.52 30.12 48
9 Mot 0.78 0.02 34.54 1.72 22.38 70
10 Ships 7.33 1.91 18.21 1.72 42.74 73
11 Aero 2.50 0.08 59.00 1.55 29.30 77
12 OVch 8.13 4.59 23.32 1.62 48.35 80
13 Const 5.08 1.58 0.73 1.94 32.80 n/a
14 BSer 1.53 0.05 9.50 1.26 49.54 n/a
15 RSer 0.02 - 7.63 1.38 107.97 n/a
DOTAL 178.53 0.19 9.58 1.76 22.57 n/a
NOTES: Average x a  are derived from Table 8.2; xai/e i and e jq i  are based on 
industry exports for 1984 as in the 10 Table (CSO, 1988); 0 .  is the 10 Output 
multiplier for each industry; Total Oi is the average for the entire economy; industry 
employment per £lm output, and the share of the five (six in the case of Mot) 
largest firms in sales, CR5> are derived from the 1985 Census of Industrial 
Production (Business Monitor, 1988); the figure for total is that for all production 
industries; n/a means not available.
As noted before, x a go predominantly to contractor industries, especially 
mechanical and electrical engineering, and a particularly salient aspect of 
international construction markets is the cost, and importance, of the biddding 
process. The cost of a full tender is about one per cent of the contract value, more if
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it is necessary to establish a local presence, compared to a profit margin of about 
five per cent; firms aim to win one in every five tenders to break even and US firms 
tend to avoid tenders where there are more than five serious competitors 
(Strassmann, 1988:43). There is no reason to believe that firms from other 
countries adopt different reasoning: "The rule of thumb is to be one of four or fewer 
serious competitors. But, if expected profits are exceptionally high or bidding costs 
exceptionally low (as with standard building) participation as one of about a dozen 
is often sanctioned" (Strassmann and Wells, 1988:234). Government support can 
alleviate the sunk cost implications of tendering; helping representatives of firms to 
make local contacts or promoting their product can increase the reputation of the 
firm while mixed credits are a precommitment which strengthens the position of the 
firm relative to other bidders, or matches other firms with government support
The number of tenders for a contract is a reasonable indication of the degree of 
oligopoly in international construction markets, the implication being that there are 
both product and regional sub-markets so that effective competition is limited. 
Between July 1986 and June 1987, UK companies placed bids for 223 World Bank 
contracts and were successful in 88; of these, 47 received five or less bids and 20 
attracted over 10 bids (there is no apparent relationship between size of contract and 
number of bidders; data supplied by the World Bank). Since firms are more likely 
to bid for World Bank contracts than commercial orders, if only because the tender 
costs are likely to be lower and administratively more convenient, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the effective competition for international contracting projects is quite 
low. This in itself is no guarantee that monopoly rents are earned; in fact, if firms 
can absorb the subsidy element of mixed credits into their margin, for example by 
charging higher prices for aid-supported contracts, then it is the quest for mixed 
credits themselves which becomes the rent-seeking activity, a possibility that cannot 
be discounted. On the other hand, price and mixed credit competition is fairly tight 
and the scope for increasing margins is limited - the World Bank reported that bid 
prices in 1986 were some 20 per cent below those of 1984 (Strassmann and Wells, 
1988:234). Thus, aid support is likely to be important to exporters.
In the case of ATP, more so than for other forms of aid, tends to be high
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for those industries for which xa is relatively high (Table 8.4). In particular, x a is 
equivalent to about eight per cent of IPlt exports, 6.5 per cent of IW&C exports and 
five per cent of ElEq exports, but only the last of these exports over 40 per cent of 
its output, while both others export less than 20 per cent. ATP is not strongly 
associated with export-oriented industries. However, these are all markets where 
competition has become more intense in the 1980s as demand in developed and 
Middle East countries fell while that in LDCs was constrained by lack of finance, 
especially in Latin America and Africa where the debt-constraints were greatest 
This is evident in the market for heavy electrical equipment where trans-national 
mergers have allowed firms to "widen the constituent companies' access to markets 
and technologies and limit their financial commitment to R&D at a time when cash­
flow from new orders is thin." (Thomas, 1990:7). Studies of the world markets for 
construction and heavy electrical equipment stress the importance of attractive 
financial packages, ie. aid support, in LDCs (Strassmann and Wells, 1988; Thomas 
and McGowan, 1990). The argument does not apply to all the industries receiving 
ATP, OVch being a case in point: while x a accounted for almost five per cent of 
industry exports, this is not a market with high global concentration, nor are British 
railway companies at the technological forefront
Technology is an important feature of global construction and heavy engineering 
markets, and is one of the spurs for trans-national mergers (see below). The US 
government has tended to offer less support to its firms than do other donors, so 
companies have tried to compensate with technology for what they lack in financial 
packages. The willingness and ability to transfer technological know-how is 
claimed to be the major comparative advantage for US construction companies, 
backed:up by a heavy R&D spending and a significant lead in computer-based data 
analysis for project management (Strassmann, 1988:38). It seems likely that British 
firms have slipped in the technology ratings and they have certainly fallen behind 
Germany and Japan in innovations. However, penetrating new markets is likley to 
assist technological development, by providing revenue and a potential outlet, so 
that ATP may encourage external economies rather than going to industries with the 
greatest technological spin-offs.
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Although the industry 10 output multiplier (0,-) is not a proxy for technological 
spin-offs it does represent linkages with the rest of the economy so that a relatively 
high Oi implies a high demand for intermediate inputs from other industries. 
Furthermore, technological innovation can arise from improved inputs in addition to 
creating demand for quality inputs. High linkages suggest the potential for external 
economies but, among the ATP-industries, only Const, MCMch and IPlt have 
above average O although most of the industries are near the average. This 
suggests that if the projects in LDCs are technology-intensive, the ATP-industries 
are well placed to spread external economies. The argument for external economies 
isj/strongest for Electrical and Telecommunications equipment which, together, 
accounted for 30.5 per cent of all x a and does not apply to vehicles (about ten per 
cent of the total); one cannot generalise about mechanical engineering industries. In 
sum, perhaps a third of x a have the potential to generate external economies while 
a greater share, including some of the same products, goes to industries where 
global entry barriers are high.
It is not possible to demonstrate that ATP has gone primarily to the industries which 
meet STP criteria although we have indicated that some of the ATP-industries are 
contenders for STP. It is easier to demonstrate that some of the industries, notably 
vehicles, do not meet the criteria. From its inception ATP was essentially a 
mercantile export subsidy; firms were not granted ATP on the basis of a coherent 
trade, or aid, policy but in accordance with commercial arguments or political 
pressures (ie. rent-seeking). As indicated previously, one of the more persuasive 
commercial arguments related to employment potential which offers a reason why 
Ships and railway equipment (OVch) have been relatively successful - both can 
claim that production is relatively labour intensive (Table 8.4) so that support for 
exports will protect employment. The ATP-industries tend to have an above average 
employment potential. However, ATP is requested by firms and to understand the 
pattern of awards one should consider which firms are prominent
The Importance of ATP to Individual Companies
Table 8.5 lists the twenty companies that won ATP-supported orders {k ^  worth 
more than £20m in the period 1978-90. It is clear that ATP is highly concentrated in
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a few companies: five firms together accounted for 45.5 per cent of all ATP 
disbursed and 54 per cent of ka while twenty companies together received 80 per 
cent of ATP to support 87 per cent of total ka. There is some evidence that ATP 
has been more evenly spread in recent years: between 1978 and 1986, 83 per cent 
of ATP and 88 per cent of ka went to fifteen firms and the top-five of these 
accounted for over half of ATP and two-thirds of contract value (Morrissey, 
1990b). The ratio k j a a is the inverse of the effective subsidy to companies and 
similar to the export ratio. The average ratio for the ATP-5 for 1978-86 was 4.6 and 
4.3 for all ATP (Morrissey, 1990b); the lower values in Table 8.5 reflect the effect 
of the minimum grant-element in mixed credits rising from 25 per cent in the early 
1980s to 35 per cent since 1988.
The data on ratios in Table 8.5 indicate that the DAC guidelines have not always 
been strictly adhered to. The lower the ratio the higher the implicit grant-element 
and the more defensible is ATP as a form of aid; a ratio below three could be due to 
consultancy or training contracts, where ATP finance can be up to 100 per cent,5 
or may reflect intensity of competition so that an attractive financial package is 
required (which appears to have been the case for the AMEC project in Turkey, 
mentioned above). On the other hand, a ratio above four suggests that the grant- 
element was below the DAC minimum. The most obvious cases of this are the 
Rihand project for NEI in India (implied grant-element of only 7 per cent)6, the 
Sicartsa steelworks project for Davy McKee in Mexico (implied grant of 16 per 
cent) and an STC order to provide submarine cables to Indonesia (implied grant of 
about three per cent). It is seriously questionable whether such awards qualify as 
aid of an form.
5 Since these contracts are normally small and go to consultancy firms, few are included in 
Table 8.5 except for a number of feasibility studies won by large contractors and often the 
precurser of large projects. The allowable ATP subsidy in consultancy was reduced from 100 to 50 
per cent in 1988 although some training and technical cooperation is still eligible for 100 per cent 
ATP/TC funding.
6 This is, however, misleading since although £17m of ATP was allocated to Rihand in 1982, 
the project is not yet complete and received a further £100m from the Bilateral Aid budget to India. 
Mixing ATP with TBA funds is an undesirable feature of aid policy which confuses the objectives 
of aid.
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Table 8.5: Companies Receiving the most ATP, 1978-90
Company ATP ka Ratio Contracts
£m £m No.
GEC 129.8 422.8 3.26 20
NEI 46.9 344.6 7.35 4
Davy McKee 58.7 284.5 4.85 5
Balfour Beatty 63.4 221.1 3.49 20
Biwater 59.5 194.0 3.29 1
ATP-5 358 .3 1467 .0 4 .0 9 50
45.5% 53.6%
JBE 49.0 155.3 3.17 9
STC 17.4 148.0 8.52 3
BMC 15.1 80.1 5.33 3
BRE 16.2 71.7 4.44 5
AMEC Int. 62.9 68.4 1.09 2
HSPE 18.8 56.4 3.00 2
Boving 17.9 51.2 2.86 1
Babcock 12.6 50.0 3.95 1
Comm. S. 14.8 47.9 3.23 2
A&P 14.0 45.0 3.21 2
Wimpey 10.0 35.0 3.50 1
Rolls Royce 10.0 28.0 2.80 1
Toyu (UK) 6.1 24.0 3.96 1
BAe 9.3 22.2 2.38 5
British Shipbuilders 6.7 22.2 3.32 1
A TP-15 275 .3  905 .4  3 .2 9  39
35.0% 33.1%
ATP TOTAL 787 .3 2738 .6 3 .4 8 203
NOTES: All figures rounded; where more than one company is named in an award the 
contract {k^} is allocated to the principal contractor. Balfour Beatty includes BICC 
(its parent company); GEC includes Plessey; Davy McKee includes Davy Leowy 
(both owned by Davy Corp.); HSPE includes Brush Electric. Unfamiliar 
abbreviations: A&P - Austin and Pickersgill; BMC - British Mining Consultants; 
BRE - British Rail Engineering; Comm. S. - Communication Supplies; STC - 
Submarine Transmission Cables. RATIO is the orders:ATP ratio as defined in text
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The Rihand project, in fact, provides an interesting case study highlighting many of 
the issues relating to ATP. First, the project was chosen by NEI as a case study to 
advertise the commercial benefits that can be obtained from relatively small amounts 
of ATP, emphasising the thousands of small firms obtaining supply contracts (NEI, 
1988). This report was circulated to a variety of Government Departments and MPs 
and, in the view of the company, was an effective publicity exercise. The project 
has been mentioned by the DTI as an example of the benefits of ATP (at a 
Conference to launch CBI, 1990). Second, however, is the fact that the project was 
not obviously a success. Poor management and cost over-runs earned NEI a bad 
name in India, and within parts of Whitehall; while NEI complained that designs 
were changed and local contractors performed badly, it was rumourde that the 
second stage of the project might be awarded to GEC (Investors Chroncle, 
4.11.88, p. 49). In fact, NEI invested considerable time and effort in saving the 
project and their reputation so that it looks like being completed successfully 
(National Audit Office, 1990)
This highlights the intensity of competition between GEC and NEI, Britain's 
leaders in heavy electrical engineering, especially power plant Within the UK, NEI 
has lost market share to GEC and both have been engaged in the merger activity that 
is transforming the structure of the global power plant industry. Three factors 
encourage such mergers: falling demand in traditionally protected home markets, 
the drive for large and complex technologies and an increase in supplier 
concentration (Thomas, 1990:6). In 1987, Brown Boveri of Switzerland merged 
with ASEA of Sweden to form the world’s largest electro-technical company, 
pushing Siemens into second place as the leading exporter. GEC formed a joint 
venture with Siemens to purchase Plessey and has recently merged its heavy 
electrical business with Alsthom of France. NEI formed a joint venture with 
Mitsubishi, which was beneficial in providing access to Japanese aid, while Rolls 
Royce, which has a joint venture with ASEA Brown Boveri, has been buying into 
NEI {Investors Chronicle, op. cit.) and now controls the company. Power plant is 
clearly an industry with high barriers to entry, is technology-intensive and probably 
exhibits monopoly rents. Trans-national mergers imply that a donor cannot be 
certain that its companies derive the full benefit from aid-assisted exports and 
thereby undermine the case for tying, especially in STP terms.
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The third, and final, point in relation to Rihand is that its contribution to 
development objectives has been questioned.7 While the ODA appraised Rihand 
as the cheapest means of meeting urgently required generating capacity and 
therefore likely to met development criteria, monitoring of the project revealed a 
number of problems. Some of these were local, due to poor infrastructure and 
inadequate coal and water supplies, but others related to NEI, such as poor co­
ordination and timing of civil and engineering works and doubts about the capacity 
of the power transmission system, while there was worry that it may create 
environmental problems (National Audit Office, 1990:12-16). This highlights the 
issue to which we turn in the next section, are the commercial benefits of ATP at the 
expense of development objectives?
8.5. ATP and Development
There are a number of reasons why ATP is less likely than normal aid to meet 
development objectives, arising because it is initiated by companies and commercial 
objectives have explicitly higher weight than development objectives. First, it is 
more likely than normal aid to go to relatively rich LDCs which are more likely to 
have access to the commercial credit and export credit guarantees necessary to 
finance the non-ATP part of a project Secondly, it is designed to support exports 
of capital goods. Third, the pressures from companies to minimise the time taken to 
process requests constrains the ability of the ODA to appraise the development 
potential of projects. These issues will be considered in turn but first it is necessary 
to dispel the view that ATP only determines whether UK firms win a contract 
chosen by the IJDC as part of a development programme:
An important consideration to emerge from these cases is the danger of taking a positive 
request from a developing country as prima facie evidence [of] beneficial consequences for 
development Requests are just as likely (some would say rather more likely) to be 
motivated by the search for prestige or the desire to escape urgent distress ... There are 
obvious possibilities of collusion between developing country governments and order- 
starved UK firms to present non-development projects as if they were developmental.
(MacQuaide and Toye, 1986:38)
7 Davy McKee's Sicartsa project another beneficiary of ATP, has also been criticised as a 
development failure (FAC, 1987)
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Table 8.6: Distribution of ATP by Recipient LDC, 1987-90
OUNTRY N o. o f k a a a as
Contracts £m % £m % k
Cyprus U 1 0.87 0.2 3.47 25.1
Egypt M 5 2.99 0.9 6.95 43.1
Jordan M 2 5.58 1.6 10.59 52.7
Morocco M 3 13.71 3.9 36.83 37.2
Red Sea 1 0.19 0.1 0.38 49.9
Tunisia M 2 0.91 0.3 2.70 33.6
Turkey M 4 65.01 18.6 74.26 87.5
Yemen AR. M 1 1.92 0.6 3.84 50.1
EMENA 19 91 .18 26 .1 139 .00 65 .6
Colombia M 1 4.94 1.4 8.60 57.4
Panama U 1 6.96 2.0 14.22 48.9
Peru M 1 0.15 - 0.15 100.0
LA&C 3 12.05 3 .4 22 .9 7 52 .4
Cameroon M 2 2.11 0.6 8.10 26.0
Kenya P 9 27.11 7.8 79.63 34.0
Malawi P 3 4.67 1.3 13.84 33.8
Swaziland M 1 0.12 - 0.41 30.0
Zimbabwe M 2 5.17 1.5 14.21 36.4
AFRICA 17 39 .17 11 .2 T16.19 33 .7
Burma P 1 0.04 . 0.04 100.0
China P 17 100.79 28.8 326.94 30.1
India P 3 29.24 8.4 96.15 30.4
Indonesia P 12 43.16 12.3 57.58 75.0
Malaysia M 4 4.97 1.4 7.46 66.7
Pakistan P 3 8.53 2.4 21.95 38.8
Philippines M 1 13.13 3.8 37.50 35.0
Sri Lanka P 1 2.68 0.8 8.89 30.1
Thailand M 2 4.64 1.3 12.94 35.9
ASIA 44 207 .17 59 .3 5 6 9 .4 5 36 .4
TOTAL 83 349 .57  100 .0  8 4 7 .6 1  41 .2
NOTES: See Table 8.7.
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Table 8.7: Distribution of ATP by per capita GNP, 1978-90
1978-86 1987-90
k a  a cJ^a a a k a a o!K
£m £m % £m £m %
P-countries 168.91 686.52 24.6 86.19 181.93 47.4
% 38.36 36.20 24.86 21.46
+China & India 234.39 1128.10 20.8 216.22 605.02 35.7
% 53.24 59.48 61.85 71.38
M-countries 56.49 188.35 30.0 125.33 224.52 55.8
% 12.83 9.93 35.88 26.49
U-countries 149.09 579.85 25.7 7.83 17.69 44.3
% 33.86 30.57 2.24 2.09
NOTES TO TABLES 8.6 AND 8.7: For each country Table 8.6 gives the number
of ATP contracts awarded; the value of aa  in £m and as a percentage of total ATP; 
ka  in £m and the ratio ct(J h a  as a percentage. The countries are grouped in 
regions, with EMENA and LA&C as defined for Table 4.6. The countries in Table 
8.7 are grouped according to relative poverty as measured by per capita GNP. The 
groups are: P - low income countries; for 1978-86, the fifty poorest countries in 
1982 per capita GNP; for 1987-90, the forty-two countries with per capita GNP 
below $500 in 1987; figures are given excluding and then including China and India. 
M - lower middle income countries; for 1978-86, those ranking between 51 and 72 
mclusive in the poorest countries; for 1987-90, those with per capita incomes 
between $500 and $2,000 in 1987. U - upper middle income countries; rankings 73 
to 94 in 1982, and 1987 incomes between $2,000 and $6,000. Countries with 
populations below one million are included in the relevant income group.
SOURCES: Data on ATP from FAC (1987) and ODA; GNP per capita 1982 from 
World Bank (1984), and for 1987 from World Bank (1989).
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We have argued, in Chapter 4, that ATP over 1978-86 was more likely to go to the 
relatively rich LDCs than was bilateral UK aid. The LDCs receiving ATP over the 
period 1987-90 are detailed in Table 8.6, and summary data for 1978-86 and 1987- 
90 are compared in Table 8.7. A number of trends can be discerned. First, among 
the poorest countries, China replaced India as the major recipient, largely due to the 
introduction of a soft loan form of ATP.8 The share of the poorest countries 
excluding these two in ATP fell from over a third to a quarter but, if they are 
included, rose from over half to over 60 per cent. Whichever way the poorest are 
grouped, the subsidy implicit in ATP rose. Again excluding China and India, 
whose large populations constitute a special case while large projects distort their 
averages, the increase in the implicit subsidy from 25 to 47 per cent is entirely in 
line with DAC guidelines and is therefore encouraging.
There are a number of indications that the allocation of ATP moved closer to the 
norms of aid in the late 1980s: the implicit subsidy rose for all country groups, and 
the value and share of ATP going to upper middle income countries fell 
appreciably. The increase in the subsidy to the poorest countries is desirable 
because it reduces the costs of projects, provided the projects are themselves 
desirable or releases resources for other development uses. However, the clearest 
change in ATP between the two periods is that the value and share of ATP to lower 
middle income countries increased, the share from 13 to 36 per cent, while the 
implicit subsidy rose from 30 to 56 per cent. This is likely to reflect commercial 
pressures rather than development objectives since these, not the poorest, are the 
countries with sufficient funds to initiate large energy and industrial schemes; they 
are the best source of present and future orders.
The most widespread criticism of ATP has been that excessive emphasis is placed 
on commercial considerations so that little has been done to ensure that development 
criteria are met (Toye and Clark, 1986; Toye, 1991). There is ample evidence that 
the ODA have had to rush appraisal of projects requesting ATP and that,
o
Pressure to introduce a soft-loan ATP came from China and Indonesia, who were believed to 
prefer aid in this form and were indeed major recipients of soft-loans in the first two years. As a 
percentage of total ATP allocated, the soft-loan facility varied from 22.6% in 1987/8 to 51% in 
1988/9 and 31% in 1989/90, and the implicit subsidy was normally greater than for mixed credits.
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consequently, they have been unable to properly evaluate the development potential 
(FAC, 1987; National Audit Office, 1990). There is also little difficulty in pointing 
to ATP projects that have failed, in development terms: Rihand and Sicartsa as 
already mentioned; two early ATP awards helped BAe provide aircraft to Senegal 
and Guinea Bissau and while BAe benefited from the sale of surplus stock the 
recipients found it a financial burden to maintain them (MacQuaide and Toye, 
1986). The provision of gas turbines to Egypt was rejected by the ODA on 
development grounds, as being a cost-inefficient means of generating power, but 
was accepted for ATP to assist Rolls Royce in entering a new market (Mosley, 
evidence to FAC, 1987:101). Two other large ATP-supported power projects in 
India at the time of Rihand also failed to realise their development potential. The 
Amlohri coal mine, intended to supply Rihand, fell long behind schedule, generated 
pollution and created difficulties in resettlement, land reclamation and re­
afforestation. However, the blame lay largely on the Indian side and, in fact, 80 per 
cent of the allocated ATP was never taken-up because the Indians preferred non- 
UK supplies. The B ALCO power plant was fully financed by the UK, with £33m 
in ATP, £61m in TBA and £37m local costs, although the ODA appraisal argued 
that it would be a sub-optimal use of resources, which transpired to be true (all 
evidence from National Audit Office, 1990).
It would be misleading to imply that ATP projects are any more likely to fail, in 
development terms, than TBA projects, while it is notoriously difficult to 
demonstrate that aid in general has assisted development (see Chapter 2). There are 
a priori reasons to believe that ATP is less likely to try to confer definite 
development gains than other types of aid, while the concept and administrative 
structure of mixed credits reveals that they are part of trade, rather than aid, 
strategies. The evidence on ATP is that it has developed in an ad hoc manner, it is 
not, and has not been, part of a coherent policy.
8.6. Is ATP a Strategic Export Subsidy?
The Aid and Trade Provision was originally introduced as an aid policy instrument 
to increase the commercial benefits from aid by offering a 25 per cent grant element 
in financing projects in LDCs which have development potential and are open to
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international competition. The second constraint was dropped as early as 1980 
when ATP could be given for projects initiated by UK companies, and negotiated 
contracts now feature prominently in ATP awards. There is little evidence of a 
concerted attempt to meet even the minimum development constraint; the ability of 
the ODA to evaluate proposals is hampered by limited resources and increasingly 
effective pressure from the DTI and business lobbies for faster approval of 
proposals. ATP is de facto an export subsidy to British companies operating in 
underdeveloped and developing countries, with the justification that foreign 
competitors have access to comparable subsidies. •
It is indisputable that ATP generates considerable commercial benefits per unit 
expenditure. Our impact measures can be interpreted as upper estimates of the direct 
commercial loss that would result if ATP were cut from the aid budget (the net loss 
would, of course, depend on how the money saved by government was 
reallocated). For an average year between 1978 and 1986, some 14,000 jobs could 
conceivably have been, lost if there was no ATP. This would be the cost of £180m 
less in exports, a small fraction of total exports but significant to some industries 
and firms. For the average year, each £lm  of ATP supported about 250 person- 
years of employment, made a net contribution to the trade surplus and repaid 50 to 
75 per cent of its cost in increased tax revenue. Again on average, each £lm  of ATP 
supported some £3.2m of exports and required total output worth up to £5.6m. The 
commercial benefits were great and tended to be concentrated in electrical and 
mechanical engineering industries and in the large companies.
As a policy instrument designed to increase the commercial benefits from aid, ATP 
can be said to have achieved its objective. This does not, however, imply that there 
has been a net economic gain to the UK, an issue pursued in Chapter 9. Although it 
does have some of the required features, going largely to a few firms operating in 
technology-intensive industries with high barriers to entry and highly concentrated 
international competition, ATP does not clearly meet the criteria for a strategic aid 
policy and could not, in its present form, be justified on that basis. The defence of 
ATP is in its commercial value in supporting exports and, as such, its rationale is 
not within aid policy.
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While one can argue that ATP may comply with the strategic criteria in regard to 
certain Electrical and Telecommunications industries, and hence that some of the 
firms listed in Table 8.5 may be deemed ‘deserving* of a strategic export subsidy, 
there are four counter-arguments. First, the companies in question are increasingly 
involved in international mergers and consortia so that the British Government 
cannot assume that the subsidy does indeed capture any monopoly rent for the UK. 
Second, where all major donors adopt matching mixed credit subsidies the strategic 
objective, premised on pre-emptive subsidies, is undermined. Thus the DAC policy 
of increasing the grant element in mixed credits under guidelines to be adopted by 
all donors achieves the objective of rendering such credits more like aid and also 
weakens the argument for such export subsidies.
Third, the firms most successful in winning ATP tend to be industries with 
relatively high employment levels relative to output (industries that could be called 
labour-friendly) and also with relatively high wage settlements. In the UK the 
engineering and automobile industries tend to set the pace in annual wage 
agreements. It follows that some of the benefit of the subsidy goes to labour in the 
form of higher wage payments rather than higher employment (since productivity 
tends to rise quickly in these industries). Consequently, firms or industries 
competing for similar labour but not deriving benefit from ATP face pressure to pay 
higher wages than need be the case. Providing a subsidy to one group of firms can 
impinge on the competitiveness of other firms using similar factors.
Finally, there is evidence that ATP has been associated with rent-seeking. At the 
very least, the ATP-5 and many of the ATP-15 actively lobby the government for 
support out of the aid budget, commission reports and studies to highlight the gross 
commercial benefits from aid support and, often, have close links with government 
decision-makers if not the party in power (see Chapter 4 and Morrissey, 1990b). It 
is reasonable to conclude that those firms that have benefited from ATP are those 
with political influence, not necessarily those that would be declared deserving 
under strategic economic criteria. Thus ATP would appear to ‘fail’ the strategic 
criteria test.
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CHAPTER 9. AH) IMPACT AND EXPORT COMPETITION
Although humanitarian prerogatives and development assistance are generally put 
forward as the raison d’etre for aid, a core theme of this thesis is that the economic 
and political interests, internal and external, of donors are the basic determinants of 
aid policy. The last few chapters have considered the three principal components of 
the aid budget - tied bilateral aid, multilateral aid and ATP - and have quantified 
their impact on the economy and evaluated their commercial importance. In this 
chapter these three components are considered together, to evaluate the overall 
impact of aid and compare the contribution of each type. This provides an indicator 
of the commercial self-interest in aid, especially certain types. We consider the 
implications for aid policy, and ask if this is an efficient means of providing 
commercial benefits, considering then the potential for net economic gains and the 
effect on global economic welfare.
Section 9.1 takes 1986 as a base year and presents estimates of the aggregate impact 
of aid on the UK, identifying the political weight of commercial self-interest A 
basic tenet of the political economy approach to aid policy is that the aid budget is 
formulated through a process reconciling competing objectives and pressures. 
Those promoting aid for development hold that the present budget is too 
commercially oriented while business interests counter that it offers them 
insufficient financial assistance relative to other major donors. In order to place 
more substance on these competing demands, in Section 9.2 we propose two 
alternative aid policies, one strongly directed towards development needs, the other 
explicitly commercial in its orientation, and present estimates of their impact. This 
allows us to evaluate the commercial costs of adopting an overtly development- 
oriented aid budget, which are a measure of the strength of opposition any 
government would face if it tried to reform aid policy in this way.
We then turn to the question of whether aid is an efficient means of promoting 
commercial interests. While the transfer principle explains why donors will want 
some return, economic and political, from their aid, it does not justify the use of aid
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as an export subsidy. The first issue we address, in Section 9.3, is the opportunity 
cost of using aid: is aid the best allocation of government funds to maximise 
impact? The method adopted to answer this question, in line with the theme of the 
thesis, is to present estimates of the 10 impact of alternative uses of government 
spending and compare these with aid. We then focus on the debate about the 
employment effects of export subsidies, concluding that they are generally 
overstated but depend crucially on whether the subsidies are trade-creating.
A related issue deserves mention although it is outside the scope of our analysis. In 
a broadly public choice perspective, allocating public expenditure to aid is justified 
to the extent that taxpayers are willing to transfer resources to poor countries, and 
public acceptance seems to be greatest for humanitarian assistance. Once aid funds 
are used to support exports, there is an implicit redistribution from domestic 
taxpayers to companies, which may be less acceptable to the public. To the extent 
that public support for development aid is mobilised, there may be political costs to 
the government from a more commercial aid policy. The development lobby, 
comprising outsiders, must mobilise public support if it is to counter the business 
lobby (which can quantify the gross benefits from tying by citing impact, although 
this shrouds the net economic effects).
Strategic policy considerations suggest that export subsidies can increase domestic 
firms share of LDC markets so that they are trade-creating and, under restrictive 
conditions, increase global welfare, implying that tied aid would be best used if it 
subsidised only the exports of industries earning monopoly profits or exhibiting 
external economies. This issue is addressed in Section 9.4, where we examine the 
contribution of aid to export competition and evaluate this against a set of criteria for 
how aid support should be targeted to derive the highest strategic gains. In terms of 
the net economic effects, only strategic arguments can provide a justification for 
tying on efficiency and welfare grounds; if this defence does not hold, no economic 
defence exists and political economy must then be examined for an explanation of 
tying. Building on the appraisal of ATP in the previous chapter, we argue that 
strategic criteria have not been met
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Section 9.5, the conclusion, presents a major argument of this thesis: political 
influence and commercial self-interest have been the principal determinants of 
British aid policy. Given the constraint of commercial objectives, what reforms are 
feasible to enhance the development effectiveness? The means to gain commercial 
benefits is through strategic policy; if aid is to subsidise exports, then specific 
industries should be targeted. If transfer principles require that the impact of aid 
must attain some level, multilateral aid and mixed credits are the best means to 
achieve this. Development objectives are best served through untied bilateral aid 
and, perhaps, large-scale aid provided by multilateral donors.
9.1. The Overall Impact of the UK Aid Budget
Availing of the earlier results of 10 analysis, the impact of UK aid on the domestic 
economy was estimated for 1986 and the results are in Table 9.1 which 
distinguishes four components of total aid. On the assumption that ATP impacts in 
the year of offer, the aa of £103m is for 1986; the other values were derived from 
impact analysis, and some were included in Table 8.3. The values for and ar 
are for 1985, but the corresponding impact values are for 1986 and derived as in 
Table 7.2, and some are indeed the same (because industry’ shares of aided-exports 
are assumed constant). The treatment of total bilateral aid (ap) deserves some 
comment. The formally untied components of bilateral aid include some which 
generate expenditure in the UK, most obviously where they support UK 
employment and indirectly when they support persons who will spend some of the 
money in the UK; we desired to include some allowance for these benefits.
Non-financial bilateral aid in 1985 included £36m for administration; since the 
number of employees per £lm  of output in Miscellaneous Services was 88, this 
could have represented 3184 employees, which we rounded up to 4000 to 
recognise other contributions, such as the teaching/training staff indirectly 
employed by the £62m on students and trainees (foreign but in the UK). Some 
£120m was spent in the UK services sector, which would have represented 
intermediate demand of about £23m, which we include as a contribution to output 
We allowed £25m as the value of exports associated with TCA and some £25in for
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income tax revenue from the personnel employed. These figures were added to the 
relevant figures for af  to derive the figures in the column. The totals for all aid 
(a) are the sums for a and aa; since the latter was 1986 rather than 1985, 
this total does not correspond to the official aid budget




xa £m 509.9 225.0





W rr a 55.68 18.59
Tax % 24.39 8.97
Trade % 5.36 -














NOTES AND SOURCES: All values rounded and estimate obtained from IOt impact 
analysis; the variables are the same as for Table 7 2 , except for those noted below. 
Total aid (a) is decomposed into multilateral (ji)y bilateral (/?), tied bilateral (r) 
and ATP (a). Tax denotes total tax revenues associated with qa expressed as a 
percentage of aid; Trade is xa expressed as a percentage of total exports to the Rest 
of the World', which is roughly equivalent to LDCs (total £9509m in 1986; The 
Pink Book, CSO, 1988, Table 2.1); BoP is xa as a percentage of the visible trade 
balance (-£8463m in 1986, Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1988:128).
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 9 195
The greatest benefit in volume terms is from and this is a general result since the 
value of dp tends to always exceed ar and has a higher export ratio. ATP, because 
it has the highest export ratio, will always be of the greatest relative benefit. 
However, as shown in Chapter 8, the value of ATP, and the value of associated 
exports, varies considerably from year to year. In respect of 1986, aa was higher 
than normal but p a was considerably lower so that in volume terms, is quite 
representative of ATP. Furthermore, the low value of p a implies that Qa and 
Wa are relatively low compared to normal. For comparative purposes, 1986 is 
largely representative of the period 1979-88.
The total output evoked by aided-exports is almost four times the value of aid for 
ATP, nearly twice the value of multilateral aid but 1.2 times the total aid budget due 
- to the effect of bilateral aid. Each £lm  of ATP could have supported 112 jobs, 
compared to 56 for a^ and 40 per £lm  aid for the budget as a whole. In volume 
. terms, accounted for 54 per cent of total xa compared to 36 per cent of a, and 
also supported the greatest number of employees. Although x a supported more 
employment than TBA, 12,260 compared to 10,484, once allowance is made for 
administrative staff and other personnel, the bilateral budget in total supports 
14,500 person-years of employment, second to a^and above ATP.
The output and employment effects depend on the set of industries winning the 
exports, whether collectively they have a relatively high employment potential 
(W^) or generate relatively high demands for the output of other industries (Q^)- 
On these two criteria, the industries winning ATP are of greater benefit to the 
economy; each £lm  of x a requires total output of some £1.8m which could 
provide 57 person-years of employment. Overall, there are only small differences 
between the sets of industries winning each type of aided export in terms of their 
relative collective impact (and we could not consider the differences to be 
significant). Quite simply, the initial volume of aid and the export ratio are the 
fundamental determinants of impact, and information on both is sufficient to 
generate reasonable estimates of impact
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We estimate the return to the Exchequer by way of increased tax receipts due to 
increased production as being about a fifth of the aid budget, ranging from almost a 
tenth for bilateral aid, to a quarter for multilateral aid and half for ATP. The 
contribution of aid to exports and the balance of payments is not negligible. 
Although xa were less than one per cent of total visible exports, they accounted for 
ten per cent of exports to LDCs (broadly speaking) and the value of net exports 
attributable to aid (once imported input requirements are deducted) was equivalent 
to almost nine per cent of the (negative) visible trade balance.
How does this information on impact relate to actual and prospective aid policy? It 
is easy to see why commercial lobbies promote ATP and tying, although we have 
shown that the emphasis on a T over is misguided, and not difficult to 
understand why the government has emphasised these gross gains. It is clear that 
aid generates a significant commercial return, but we do not know what return the 
government desires, or would accept (in fact, groups within government may desire 
different returns). It may be reasonable to accept the impact of as a standard and 
ATP as a measure of commercial objectives. If we can evaluate the impact of 
policies, it is possible to identify how interests will react and how policy mixes can 
compromise a variety of objectives. Perhaps of greater importance, we may compel 
the government to acknowledge the impact criterion, admit that it conflicts with 
other objectives, and indicate the weight attached to it.
9.2. The Impact of Alternative Aid Policies
We will find it convenient to assume that the UK aid budget is doubled, so that we 
can then analyse alternative packages for allocating the extra spending. It is 
reasonable to ask how likely such an increase is so we must consider the factors 
determining the size of the aid budget Given the state of the economy, is Britain 
now willing to respond to demands to increase the quantity of aid? The models 
reviewed in Chapter 4 suggest that falling unemployment and rising GNP would 
permit increased aid although, given the trade deficit, there would be strong 
pressure for tying. The present budget surplus can be interpreted as a measure of 
government frugality, supporting Beenstock’s (1980) approach, and bodes ill for
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any increase. We have already shown that the real value of UK aid has fallen 
dramatically during the 1980s; this was a direct consequence of Conservative public 
policy and parsimony and although the real value of aid has been increased in recent 
years there is no guarantee that this trend will continue. However, the estimates 
presented can be interpreted either as alternatives to existing policy or as possible 
allocations of an increased budget (one could scale the results to the appropriate 
magnitude of any increase).
We will estimate the impact of two alternative aid policies. The first is a strategy of 
‘Aid to the Poorest* (aj) in which relatively untied bilateral aid is directed at 
agriculture and rural infrastructure development. This could be considered as a 
minimum impact but high effectiveness strategy. The second is overt ‘Commercial 
Aid* (<22) a large increase in ATP and tied bilateral aid producing a high impact but 
low effectiveness strategy. These are intended to delimit bounds within which 
feasible aid policies could be constructed. We note that a development policy (aj) 
is justified by its effectiveness whereas the commercial policy must be defended 
according to its impact and opportunity cost (see Section 9.3).
An elaborate analysis of the economic effects on the UK of adopting alternative aid 
policies is the study by Cable and Weale (1982) based on the Cambridge Growth 
Project Model. They assume that the aid budget is increased to 1 per cent of GDP 
throughout the 1980s and that the extra aid is tied, with export shares allocated to 
industries according to their 1976-80 shares of tied bilateral aid. In a balanced 
budget scenario, where the aid is financed by increased income tax, employment 
would be increased by 130,000 and GDP by 1 per cent, with no effect on the 
balance of payments, by 1990. In a reflationary scenario there is an increase in 
government borrowing but employment is expanded by 257,000 and GDP 
increases by 1.8 per cent, although the balance of payments deficit increases by 1.7 
per cent of GDP. The authors then consider the effects of untying aid, and generally 
find resource costs lower than those estimated by Coverdale and Healy (1981). If 
aid was untied multilaterally the effects would be similar to the balanced budget 
scenario, given that UK export orders remain proportional to their world shares and
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orders from MAAs remain proportional to contributions. A major part of the paper 
then considers the effects of unilateral untying, assuming a variety of trade policy 
responses. These results can not readily be summarised but, in general:
All protectionism may be damaging but, in an imperfect world, the 'soft-hearted' 
protectionism of tied aid may be somewhat more beneficial to Britain - let alone ldcs - 
than the 'hardheaded' protectionist alternative of imposing import barriers against 'cheap' 
imports. (Cable and Weale, 1982:70)
The analysis broadly supports aid as having a positive effect on the economy, 
although the implicit defence of tying is predicated on the assumption that the 
unfavourable effects of unilateral untying would be offset by other forms of 
protection. The authors did not specifically consider whether tied aid is the most 
effective way of achieving the identified gains.
We assume that the 1986 aid budget is increased to 0.7 per cent of GNP and 
consider the impact of the £1160m of additional aid. The value of xa associated 
with aj is based on two arbitrary assumptions. First, the aid is treated as untied 
bilateral aid with p  = 0.3 and the value of UK exports realised directly is £348m. 
Second, we assume that 50 per cent of these exports accrue to the fertiliser and 
agricultural machinery industries and research/consultancy services, with the 
remainder going to other machinery industries, construction, railway equipment and 
business services (see Table 9.3). While the bulk of the aid goes to agriculture, 
there will be some irrigation and construction projects, rural railways and 
machinery for primary industries like mining, wood-processing and textiles.
The impact of aj is summarised in Table 9.2 and, while small, it is not politically 
unacceptable given that the aid should achieve development objectives (for a general 
defense of the effectiveness of rural development aid see Lipton, 1987). The 
increased output in the UK generated by this strategy will be worth about half the 
initial expenditure (Qaj  = 0.5) but will only generate tax payments worth 7.6 per 
cent of the Exchequer's outlay while the employment impact is low (Wal = 17.2). 
The resulting exports would represent some 4 per cent of exports to LDCs. Such a
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policy would not placate the advocates of commercial objectives, especially because 
so many mechanical and electrical industries would lose (relative to existing policy) 
a major source of orders. On the other hand, if this policy is considered as 
additional to the existing budget it is possible that a small sweetener, such as an 
increase in ATP, would meet the demands of business groups. From the 
development perspective, the commercial gains are more than adequate and if, as 
we argue later, much of impact is gross rather than net in economic terms, the 
policy may make a positive contribution to net global economic welfare.
Table 9.2: Impact of Alternative Aid Policies
al a . *2 a2
a £m 1160.0 290.0 870.0 1160.0
Pa 0.3 3.2 0.7 1.3
xa £m 348.0 928.0 609.0 1537.0
4a £m 599.7 1577.9 1027.4 2605.3
Q*> 1.72 1.70 1.69 1.70
Qa 0.52 5.44 1.18 2.25
wa 19957 51059 31035 82095
*xa 57.34 55.02 50.96 53.41
K 17.20 176.07 35.67 70.77
Tax % 7.59 73.45 15.82 30.22
Trade % 3.7 9.8 6.4 16.2
BoP % 0.3 8.9 - 5.7 14.6
NOTES AND SOURCES: As for Table 9.1, except: a j is the 'Aid to the Poorest' 
alternative aid policy; industry distribution of aided exports given in Table 9.3; a2 is 
the 'Commercial Aid' policy, comprising ATP (o^) and tied bilateral aid (r2), with 
industry shares of aided exports given in Table 9.3.
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The second policy is as commercial as we consider possible: 25 per cent of the extra 
aid, £290m, is allocated to ATP (this is more than five times the average annual 
ATP budget over 1978-86) and assumed to generate exports worth some £928m, 
allocated to industries according to their shares of x a over 1978-86. The remaining 
£870m of aid is assumed to be aT with exports worth £609m, with the x T industry 
distribution. This gives an overall p  = 1.3 for ^2- The impact of the additional 
ATP is considerable and would, assuming it is all trade-creating, increase exports to 
LDCs by some ten per cent of the existing level, would support 51,000 jobs (176 
per £ lm  of ATP) and the tax revenue would cover almost 75 per cent of the 
government's outlay. The TBA element brings down the overall impact but <?2 
could increase exports to LDCs by 16 per cent, provide 82,000 jobs and repay 
almost a third of the cost in increased tax revenue. If these were indeed net 
economic gains with trade creation, the policy would be difficult to refute provided 
there were benefits to recipients.
At the least, <22 would be difficult to defend in development terms; although aT 
may well be effective, it is quite possible that so much ATP would have a negative 
effect on LDCs if the projects are of low or negative development value as some 
critics argue (see Chapter 8). The defense of, and pressure for, this policy is its 
significant impact We next consider whether this would be an efficient use of 
government funds to achieve such objectives. It can be noted in passing that such a 
large increase in ATP would probably 'crowd out' non-aid contracts. That is, if 
LDCs were aware of the size of the ATP budget they would expect British firms to 
be able to obtain ATP support, and would only award contracts if they did so (this 
may already be true in those markets where a number of donors offer mixed 
credits). Similarly, any large increase in ATP increases the chances that it will be 
used for contracts that could have been won without aid support. Furthermore, this 
strategy could expect a frosty reception from other members of the DAC. Finally, 
the estimates assume that the additional ATP can be used to win new orders, which 
may not be the case: if all donors offer comparable mixed credits, the effect nets out 
and firms compete on prices again. If this is the case, Britain’s current market share 
is its competitive share (trade-creation is considered in Section 9.4).
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9.3. The Opportunity Costs of Commccially Oriented Aid
We interpret opportunity cost narrowly: if le government could obtain greater 
impact from some form of spending otht than aid, tied aid has a positive 
opportunity cost in that the money could »e better spent. Since the principal 
commercial objective of tying is to promote xports, some form of general export 
subsidy may appear to be an appropriate .tentative. We do not consider this 
because general export subsidies are prohibitd by international agreement, notably 
GATT (it is largely for this reason that mixedredits are subsumed under aid rather 
than treated explicitly as export subsidies). Tfc best way to promote exports may be 
a devalued £Stg and lower interest rates, butuch policies are beyond the scope of 
our analysis (and cannot be simulated on oi 10 model). The non-aid alternative 
policies considered are two for which the impzt can easily be estimated.
The first alternative is termed the investmenDpportunity cost (VOC) and assumes 
that the additional expenditure of £1160i is allocated, as final demand, to 
industries in proportion to their share of derand for fixed capital formation. One 
could conceive of this being done through rants or investment incentives. The 
VOC is a notional estimate of the impact of a>olicy to encourage investment; since 
our model is static we understate the truempact. The second alternative, the 
government opportunity cost (GOC), assumeihat the additional money is allocated 
to industries according to their share in goveiment final demand. The GOC is like 
an across the board increase in govemmentspending benefiting all industries in 
equal proportion to the government's demandor their output.
Table 9.3 presents the industry distribution f orders for the five policies we are 
comparing: aided exports due to the 1986 ai budget (xa), exports due to aj (xj), 
exports due to <Z2 (*2)» industry shares>f orders from VOC and GOC. It is 
clear that x a and *2 are the most evenly dmbuted across the listed industries. 
This is partly because the industry list is thator aided-exports but largely because 
x j is limited by definition, almost 60 per cet of VOC goes to Construction and 
almost three quarters of GOC is on MiscS sire this includes public administration 
(it is assumed that such expenditure doesbenefit the economy although the 
approach does not measure such indirect bendts).
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Table 9.3: Industry Shares in Aid and Alternative Policies
INDUSTRY xa X1 x2 VOC GOC
% % % % %
1 . IPlt 6.31 - 15.46 2.0 -
2 . AMch 2.88 20.0 0.48 - -
3. TWMch 3.00 10.0 0.96 0.5 -
4. PMch 5.43 - 5.97 1.0 -
5. MCMch 11.55 10.0 11.29 1.2 0.1
6 . OMch 5.86 - 4.94 1.1 0.5
7. OfEq 0.52 - 0.16 0.1 -
8 . IW&C 3.07 - 5.70 0.3 -
9. ElEq 12.36 - 23.83 1.4 0.2
10. TTEq 1.89 - 1.17 2.4 1.4
11. ECA 0.43 - 0.20 - 0.1
12. I&S 5.27 - 3.41 - -
13. Const 16.33 10.0 5.69 59.8 3.9
14. Mot 4.92 - 3.51 8.8 0.3
15. Ships 1.73 - 3.56 0.7 1.0
16. OVch 3.31 10.0 5.59 0.2 -
17. Frt 0.60 20.0 0.48 - -
18. Phm 1.25 - 1.03 - 2.5
19. InstE 4.38 - 0.48 0.4 0.3
20 . Md 0.84 - 0.28 1.5 0.3
21 . nMMP 0.39 - 0.24 - 0.3
22 . TPRP 2.34 - 0.75 3.6 1.1
23. BSer 1.46 10.0 1.02 5.8 1.3
24. RSer 1.01 10.0 0.36 - 3.2
25. MiscP 1.18 - 0.91 0.1 4.2
26. MiscM 0.72 - 1.08 4.8 4.4
27. FDTC 0.53 - 0.55 - 1.3
28. MiscS . - . 4.5 73.7
Notes and Sources: xa refers to all aided exports in 1986; Xj refers to all exports 
associated with a j, similarly for x2in respect of 0 2 ', VOC and GOC are fully 
defined in Table 9.4 below.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 9 203
Table 9.4: Opportunity Cost Estimates for ‘Commercial’ Aid
VOC VOC-a2 GOC GOC-a2
g £m 1160.0 0.0 1160.0 0.0
£m 2089.0 -19.8% 1690.9 -35.1%
2 * 1.8 -0 .4 1.5 -0 .7
ws 66265 -19.3% 103084 25.6%
w s 57.1 88.9
Tax % 25.0 -17.2% 25.9 -14.2%
** £m -163.4 -1395.9 -109.9 -1342.4
NOTES and SOURCES: Essentially as for Table 9.2, except: VOC refers to initial 
outlay g, government spending, being on investment demand, allocated by industry 
as in Table 9.3; VOC-a2 is the measure of opportunity cost as the difference 
between VOC and the 'Commercial Aid' policy, generally expressed as a percentage 
of a2; similarly for GOC, save initial outlay g is government spending on final 
demand by industry as in Table 9.3. Output, employment and tax are expressed 
relative to g; xg is the net exports which, since gross exports are zero, is the value 
of imported inputs required to produce qg, and the difference is relative to net exports 
that would have resulted from aid.
Any allocation of public funds will benefit some groups rather than others, in this 
case industries, and one of the selection criteria must be in terms of the ultimate 
objectives. Thus to maximise employment, allocate funds to employment intensive 
industries; to maximise exports, support major exporters. However, the final 
appraisal should also consider the effects on the rest of the economy.
The results of the OC estimates are presented and compared to <22 ^  Table 9.4. 
The obvious conclusion is that the impact of a2 is greater than if the money went 
on investment or government spending, with the exception that GOC has a greater 
employment potential (arising because the public sector is labour intensive). Not 
spending the money on aid generates a cost in lost exports which, combined with
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Chapter 9 204
the increased demand for imports, means that either VOC or GOC could have 
added about 16 per cent (£ 1.35b) to the visible trade deficit in 1986 relative to the 
same money being spent on a ‘commercial* aid budget The less commercial is aid 
policy the smaller will be the deviations measured, as the reader can easily 
determine using our earlier results. Compared to these other forms of spending, tied 
aid generates greater commercial benefits, except in respect of employment. The 
VOC was the weakest, generating 20 per cent less output and employment than a.2 
and 17 per cent less in tax revenue while adding the equivalent of two per cent to 
the visible trade deficit
Since the Byatt Report, the employment potential of export subsidies has been 
debated. Byatt (1984) argued that the potential for export subsidies to generate 
exports that could not otherwise be won or to generate follow-on orders was quite 
limited, ie. the trade-creating potential was seen as very limited. Consequently, the 
Report argued: “Supported employment is assumed to last the life of the project and 
after this the level of employment is lower than if the project had not been 
undertaken until all those who had been employed on it are again re-employed.” 
(Byatt, 1984:174). The implied cost-per-job depended on the assumed length of 
time before the workers were re-employed. Assuming that all exports due to ATP 
were additional, Byatt*s cost-per-job estimates in 1982 prices ranged from £33,000 
(assuming full re-employment would take 10 years) to £132,000 (re-employment 
after 3 years). These estimates took no account of output multipliers, and we 
divided them by Qxa ~ 1 .79 (Table 9.1) to allow for indirect employment. Table 
9.5 updates the estimates to 1986 prices and includes figures for the cost-per-job of 
employment-creation measures cited by Byatt. Table 9.5 only includes the lowest 
(£33,000) Byatt figure for ATP, adjusted as outlined above, because we claim only 
to estimate the level of employment supported (how many person-years were 
required irrespective of whether they were new). We address the distinction 
between the potential to support employment rather than create new employment, 
which is far from semantic and has implications for a more general interpretation of 
opportunity costs to which we turn at the end of this section.
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Table 9.5: Alternative Cost-per-job Estimates for 1986




















NOTES: SOURCES as indicated, but figures, all in 1986 prices, have been adjusted for 
comparison: HSPE ranges are simply the £11.8m of ATP divided by their upper and 
lower total employment estimates; Love and Dunlop (1990) lower estimate is their 
figure, upper estimate is three times this to reflect fact that only one of the three 
projects included in the total employment estimate was supported by ATP; for Byatt 
(1984) the two lower bounds are the given range of costs for special employment 
measures, the upper bound is the lowest cost-per-job for ATP estimate given by 
Byatt, all figures originally in 1982 prices have been revised to 1986 prices using the 
manufacturing industry wage index (Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 
1988:115). The range for Table 9.1 refers to ATP, multilateral and bilateral aid 
respectively; the range for Table 9.4 refers to GOC and VOC respectively. See text 
for elaboration.
Byatt (1984) can be taken as the official line against export subsidies and business 
groups have consistently tried to argue that the estimates are far too low. An early 
response was Morris (1984) who argued that Byatt under-stated the trade-creation 
potential and over estimated the employment costs. Morris cited NEDO estimates of 
cost-per-job ranging from £1,500 to £10,000 but offered no source nor explanation 
of their derivation and, furthermore, concentrated more on the issue of export credit 
subsidies (subsidised interest rates) than ATP. Consequently, we do not cite the 
Morris estimates. Some company case studies estimated employment, from which 
estimates of cost-per-job could be derived, as for HSPE (1986).
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As mentioned in Chapter 8, Love and Dunlop (1990) include three projects in their 
study although only one required ATP support; while their study is rigorous and we 
accept that all three projects may have been won as a package with an ATP element, 
generalising from this atypical case to the impact of ATP as a subsidy is, in our 
opinion, inaccurate and seriously overstates the potential of ATP. We include their 
estimate of £2,773 but also derive an upper bound of £8,319 which should be more 
representative of typical ATP projects and is, indeed, almost identical to our own 
cost-per-job estimate for ATP at £8,410, and also close to the HSPE upper bound. 
In conclusion, the cost-per-job supported by ATP was some £8,000 in 1986, 
similar to estimated costs for general employment support schemes (Byatt, 
1984:175). Other forms of aided-exports or final demand would have had a higher 
cost, because they did not have as high an export ratio.
While this appears to be ammunition for the business lobby it should be emphasised 
that impact analysis, even when displacement is incorporated, does not imply 
employment-creation. The IO method can estimate the level of employment 
associated with a given level of output distributed across certain industries, and it 
can link that output to an industry distribution of exports, but it cannot identify what 
would have happened in the absence of the initial injection. Companies will claim 
that they need ATP and/or tied aid to win orders because of support to other 
donors, and will publicise any obvious cases of follow-on orders, but this does not 
mean the subsidies are net trade-creating. If the companies were not exporting, they 
may meet domestic demand; if they cannot win sufficient exports without a 
subsidy, perhaps they are uncompetitive.
May, Schumacher and Malek (1989) estimated the employment impact of UK aid in 
some detail but not, unfortunately, in a way comparable with the estimates 
presented here. They attributed a total of 38,000 UK jobs to world-wide aid in 
1984, equivalent to a cost-per-job of £23,233 in 1986 prices, which compares 
favourably with our implied figure of £25,370 for the total UK aid budget (Table 
9.1). Of greater relevance, they argue that aided-exports overall have a lower 
employment potential than other components of final demand, ie. “If aid
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expenditure is financed through cutting back a similar amount in each of the 
categories of final demand the net employment impact in all cases would be 
negative.” (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:218). This differs from our 
conclusion in Table 9.4 because by focusing on the most commercial aid we 
estimate an upper bound of employment potential. Nevertheless, we concur that 
export subsidies are not an efficient means for employment creation.
9.4. Aid and Export Competition
Tied aid in principle is not defensible in strategic terms because it is a distortion of 
aid, and should be evaluated as such, rather than an instrument of trade policy. Tied 
aid reduces choice and generally increases prices to recipients relative to untied aid, 
but may still be preferable to no, or less, aid. If aid is going to be tied, the STP 
argument has relevance in indicating which industries should benefit. Introducing 
tying to relatively competitive markets is an unambiguous distortion but in imperfect 
markets tying may exhibit redeeming features. The arguments for targeting 
industries can be applied to tied aid as a 100 per cent export subsidy and the 
question becomes, in an imperfect world, is it better to support some industries 
rather than others?
We summarise the characteristics of industries which could most appropriately be 
targeted for export subsidies, through mixed credits or tied aid, to remind the 
reader. First, the international market must be oligopolistic and highly concentrated 
with firms earning monopoly rents. Second, domestic and global barriers to entry 
should be high, preferably due to inflexible capital-intensive inputs and high R&D 
expenditure. Third, the domestic industry should exhibit economies of scale, 
preferably with a cost advantage over foreign firms, and external economies, 
especially due to technology-intensity. Fourth, the domestic industry should not be 
intensive in the use of scarce factors. Finally, the subsidy should not be matched by 
rivals nor should it encourage rent-seeking by domestic exporters. Under such 
imperfect competition, a subsidy may enable a domestic firm to penetrate new 
markets so that subsequent orders can be won without subsidy. In this situation a 
temporary subsidy may be of a net economic benefit to the domestic, and global, 
economy. If some aid is to be tied, then it is best that it is targeted on those
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industries where there is scope to switch profits from foreign rivals and generate 
external and scale economies, especially if the aid is in the form of mixed credits.
The fundamental aspect of the strategic argument, as for the opportunity cost 
arguments, is that the subsidy is required to generate new exports which can then 
be sustained without a subsidy. If this basic condition is not met, and the STP 
criteria are necessary but not sufficient for this, then the subsidy is a redistribution 
from taxpayers to firms which permits increased profits but distorts the global and 
domestic allocation of resources. There is no economic benefit from a subsidy, in 
terms of efficiency and welfare, unless there is demonstrably highly imperfect 
competition in the relevant international market
The procedure here will be to examine the relationships between the patterns of aid- 
supported exports by industry and some indicators of industry export performance 
and structure (as used in Chapter 7). This is a first-step towards an empirical 
analysis and the data are incomplete or inadequate in many respects. Nonetheless, 
we feel the data series used are indicative, the most regretable omission being that 
we have no data on changes over time in the amount of aid support going to various 
industries. The notation and data series used should by now be familiar. Total aid- 
supported exports, are here measured as industry share of exports supported 
by each type of aid, in percentage terms.1
The variables are .interpreted as measures of industry export potential: x^/e,- 
indicates the importance of aid to industry exports; ejqi the export-orientation of 
the industry and e je  the industry’s export importance. These series were 
calculated for 1984 and we also measured the change from 1979, giving A 
and A (eje) respectively, in percentage points, which are indicators of export 
performance. Our data, unfortunately, do not permit direct inferences regarding the 
effect of aid-support on export performance over time, because we have no estimate
1 The notation does not distinguish industry shares in volume terms from percentage shares 
because the statistical analysis employed is non-parametric, thus based on the rankings of 
industries which are the same in each case.
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of lagged aid-support. We cannot be certain that export performance in the period 
examined was unrelated to aid prior to the period examined.
In addition to trade and aid variables, we include three series of structural variables. 
The first is industry employment potential, and given the emphasis placed on 
this we expect aid to go in greater amounts to industries with a high employment 
potential. The second measure is CR5, the share of sales of the five largest firms, 
and aid should be more likely to go to concentrated industries (both because they 
are more likely to meet STP criteria and because they may be politically more 
influential). Finally, the output multiplier, O,, measures the linkages of an industry 
with other industries. The higher it is, the greater the spillover effect of demand for 
one product on the output of the rest of the economy, thus the more likely is the 
industry to meet STP criteria for external economies.
Although the data series are nominally parametric the aided-exports are estimated 
and the structural series are proxies. Consequently, greater reliance can be attached 
to the ranking of industries within series than to the actual values and differences, 
and for this reason we use a non-parametric test to assess the relationship between 
series. The Spearman rank correlation (SRC) measures the correlation between the 
ordering of one series with that of another, and this is the statistical measure used to 
assess the relationship between aided-exports, trade and structural variables. Rather 
than reproduce the raw data we present only the SRC values.2
Table 9.6 presents the results for exports attributable to all three types of aid, xai, 
and we only discuss those SRC with a significance level (Sig) below 0.500, ie. 
those cases where the probability of observing the SRC shown if the series were 
independent is less than 0.5, implying that the relationship is significant. The 
correlation between shares of aided-exports, x aj, and their importance to 
industries, x^/e^  is quite high so that aid is roughly in line with export volumes. 
Of greater importance, however, are the negative correlations between the 
importance of aid and the trade variables: xaJe[ tends to be greater for industries
2 The raw data can be found in either Appendix A or Appendix B; the sample used is N=21, 
industries 1 to 21 in Table A.1, for which all variables were available.
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that are not strongly export-oriented and that have experienced a deteriorating export 
performance. This must be qualified because we are unable to identify the LDC 
sub-markets within industry exports. On the other hand, the observation is not 
surprising: if industry export performance is deteriorating, then aid will assume 
greater importance.
Table 9.6: Correlations for All Aid, Exports and Structure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
xm xJ ei A(e/<7Z) eje M eje)
[2] SRC 0.597 -0.243 -0.404 -0.697 -0.325
Sig .004 .289 .069 .000 .151
[3] SRC 0.177 0.736 0.512 0.203
Sig .444 .000 .018 .378
[4] SRC 0.082 0.721 0.491
Sig .724 .000 .024




Wt SRC 0.378 0.446 0.004 -0.103 -0.344 -0.279
Sig .091 .043 .987 .658 A l l .221
c r 5 SRC -0.203 0.002 -0.061 -0.040 0.022 0.149
Sig .377 .993 .794 .862 .926 .519
Ot SRC 0.070 0.053 -0.335 -0.230 0.038 -0.490
Sig .763 .819 .138 .316 .871 .024
NOTES: The variables are defined in the text
SOURCES: Aid data are own calculations utilising the UK IOt Tables for 1979 and 
1984; W} and CRg are from the 1985 Census of Industrial Production.
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Aided-export shares are weakly but positively related to export-orientation. The 
export series themselves are positively and often strongly related; obviously, 
industries whose export performance improved are likely to be more export- 
oriented. In contrast, industries whose share of total exports grew fastest are not 
significantly correlated with major exporting industries, suggesting that growth was 
fastest in relatively small (but export-oriented) industries which derived relatively 
little benefit from aid, being negatively correlated with both xai and x a[le .^ 
Overall, aided-exports are of greater importance to industries with a lower, and 
deteriorating, export performance but do not necessarily go in greater amounts to 
them. This is more consistent with claims that aid is used to assist uncompetitive 
industries than with the counter-claims that aid helps firms to penetrate new markets 
and expand. The data offer no support to the argument that aid promotes export 
growth in general, though the argument may still hold in specific markets.
The structural variables are generally weakly correlated with the others. As 
expected, aided-exports are more likely to go to industries with high employment 
potential which are also industries of lower overall export performance, perhaps 
because they are relatively labour-intensive. However, this goes against strategic 
criteria both in favouring labour- rather than technology-intensive industries and 
because it may put an upward pressure on domestic wage rates (especially given 
that engineering Trade Unions tend to be relatively powerful). Concentration is 
negatively correlated with xai-, which is largely because domestic production in 
engineering has low concentration whereas only a few of the larger firms are 
involved in LDCs, but is generally insignificant. The negative correlation between 
Oi and export variables can be explained by high linkages representing a domestic- 
orientation. From a strategic perspective, there is no tendency for aid to go to the 
industries on which it should be targeted. We can elaborate these issues for the 
different types of aid.
Table 9.7 presents a comparable set of correlations for exports attributable to tied 
bilateral aid (jc^); 0,* and CR5 are not discussed because, while positive, the 
correlations are insignificant. The conclusions for aid in general are even stronger
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for the case of tied bilateral aid: the shares and importance of are positively 
correlated with employment potential and negatively correlated with export 
variables. Tied bilateral aid is more likely than aid in general to go to industries with 
a poor and deteriorating export performance and importance. This is consistent with 
claims the the LDC projects market has become increasingly tight and competitive, 
especially during the recession of the early 1980s and the subsequent debt crisis, 
and aid support may do no more than offset the severity of a trend decline. There is 
no tendency for the benefiting industries to meet the strategic criteria, while the 
significance of employment is difficult to interpret clearly - it could be a proxy for 
political pressure but can also be a factor in poor export performance (ie. industries 
with high employment have high wage costs and are less competitive).
Table 9.7: Correlations for TBA, Exports and Structure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
x ti • V * i A (e/qj) eje A(e/e)
[1] SRC 0.737 -0.115 -0.251 -0.112 -0.613
Sig .000 .620 .272 .630 .003
[2] SRC -0.427 -0.580 -0.668 -0.427
Sig .054 .006 .001 .054
SRC 0.376 0.320
Sig .093 .158
c r 5 SRC 0.029 0.152
Sig .902 .510
4- SRC 0.095 0.052
Sig .683 .823
NOTES and SOURCES: As for Table 9.6 except: [1], industry share of exports 
supported by TBA; [2], TBA-supported exports as share of total industry exports.
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Table 9.8: Correlations for Multilateral Aid, Exports and Structure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
xpi xfd ei ejqi A (e/<7;) eje A(e/e)
[1] SRC 0.539 0.385 0.296 0.219 -0.431
Sig .012 .085 .192 .340 .051
[2] SRC -0.117 -0.314 -0.601 -0.400
Sig .614 .165 .004 .072
SRC 0.239 0.260
Sig .297 .256
CR5 SRC -0.229 -0.118
Sig .318 .611




NOTES and SOURCES: As for Table 9.6 except: [1], industry shares in multilateral
aid funded exports; [2]. exports in [1] as a percentage of total industry exports.
Table 9.8 presents the correlations for exports financed by MAAs (x^) and, since 
such contracts are open to international tender, can be interpreted as the control 
group. Because the volume of is by far the greater share of the total, at least for 
the period in question (it was 62 per cent, compared to 18 per cent for and 20 
per cent for x ^ ), it is the major weight in the statistics and other types are best 
interpreted in comparison. The correlation between and export-orientation is 
positive, unlike forx^, which suggests that export-oriented industries do attract a 
greater share of multilateral aid, consistent with the international competitive 
tenders, although the orders are more important to the weaker exporters. This 
demonstrates that industry shares, rather than the importance, of aided-exports is 
the important factor in deciding if aid is more likely to go to strong exporters, which 
is clearly the case for x ^  but not for x ^  reinforcing the argument that TBA
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appears to assist industries whose export markets are threatened rather than support 
expanding and internationally competitive exporters (the results in Table 9.7 offer 
no support to the claim that tied aid is trade-creating). The relationship with 
employment is positive in Table 9.8 but lower than for TBA, while tend to be 
lower in concentrated ’ industries, following the result for Table 9.6. The 
observation that TBA is if anything positively correlated with concentration is 
consistent with STP but also suggestive of rent-seeking.
Table 9.9: Correlations for ATP, Exports and Structure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
x ai x J ei e^ i M efa ) eje Meje)
[1] SRC 0.980 -0.087 -0.131 -0.251 -0.280
Sig .000 .709 .571 .273 .218
[2] SRC -0.175 -0.241 -0.357 -0.256



















NOTES and SOURCES: As for Table 9.6 except: [1], percentage share of industries 
in ATP-supported exports; [2], ATP-supported exports as a percentage of total 
industry exports
The correlations for ATP and export variables are in Table 9.9, and conform to the 
general trends already observed. ATP is more heavily concentrated in a few firms 
than are other types of aid, hence the correlation between and x^/e j is almost
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perfect. Interestingly, while also negative the correlations of ATP shares and 
x (ri!ei with export variables are less significant than for TBA, especially in respect 
of export performance. Furthermore, the correlation between x ^ /e i  and export 
performance is even lower than that for multilateral aid. Those winning ATP- 
exports appear to be stronger exporters than those winning orders from TBA, while 
those for which are of greatest importance seem to be stronger exporters than 
those for whom aided-exports in general are important. The most simple 
interpretation is that ATP is indeed more appropriately related to trade policy than 
aid policy, but it remains the case that correlations between x ai and export 
indicators are all negative, if not always significant No firm conclusion is possible, 
and one area for future research is to compile a comparable data set for industry 
exports to LDCs only, ideally over time. However, the data do not support claims 
that ATP is export-creating. Like other types of aid and as discussed in Chapter 8, 
ATP tends to go to relatively high employment industries.
9.5. Choosing a UK Aid Strategy
The measurement of impact demonstrates that there are good reasons for business 
interests to advocate tied aid, and good (political and commercial self-interested) 
reasons for the government to listen and agree. It is imperative that those promoting 
aid for development be aware of the scale of potential commercial benefits, in a 
phrase, 'to know what they are up against1. Political economy considerations 
indicate that aid must confer commercial benefits, but it would be nice to know 
what level of impact the government desires (in general, business interests want 
maximum impact; because they have other objectives, the government would accept 
somewhat less). The issue then becomes how best to structure aid policy so that it 
is as effective as possible in promoting development, given an impact constraint and 
implicit political objectives. We consider this in Chapter 10.
The root objection to tied aid is that it distorts the prices to LDCs. Although the full 
subsidy is a resource which reduces the cost of goods to recipients, the price of 
goods under tied aid will tend to exceed the international competitive price so that 
there is inefficient resource allocation, which is the true cost in terms of global
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welfare. If the relevant international market is sufficiently oligopolistic the welfare 
cost of tying may be less, because the world price will include monopoly rents, 
depending on how competitive the domestic industry is relative to the world market, 
ie. how great is the mark-up element in tied aid prices relative to the monopoly rents 
element in world prices. This is difficult to disentangle without formal analysis, but 
suggests that strategic trade arguments can be applied to tied aid.
Although the transfer element is always less in mixed credits they may be preferable 
to tied aid on efficiency grounds if the relevant markets are Cournot oligopolistic. In 
contrast to tied aid, the price of goods under mixed credits can be less than 
prevailing world prices because the subsidy displaces some of the monopoly rent 
element in world prices. The recipient pays less than it would have to pay in the 
absence of a subsidy, while the profits of domestic firms increase at the expense of 
foreign competitors. The extent to which mixed credits displace aid funds is a 
separate issue of relevance to the transfer element but not the resource costs. Since 
requests for ATP are initiated by companies, they seem to relate directly to export 
competition. It is highly likely, although it has not been demonstrated, that some 
orders would not have been won without subsidies; this is consistent with a market 
where prices are flexible and subsidies are used to support firm’s quantity 
decisions, ie. Cournot oligopoly.
The distribution of aided-exports overall offers little evidence that industries 
meeting STP criteria have been targeted. Aided-exports are of greater
importance to industries with a lower, and deteriorating, export performance but do 
not necessarily go in greater amounts to them, and are more likely to go to 
industries with high employment potential. This goes against strategic criteria both 
in favouring labour- rather than technology-intensive industries and because it may 
put an upward pressure on domestic wage rates. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that the industries benefiting from aided exports exhibit significant external 
economies, so that some of their gain from the subsidy could be passed on to the 
rest of the economy. Consequently, the industries do not obviously meet the STP 
criteria and their potential to generate a net economic gain must be questioned.
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Tied bilateral aid is more likely than aid in general to go to industries with a poor 
and deteriorating export performance and importance, supporting the argument that 
TB A is assistance to industries whose export markets are threatened rather than 
support for expanding and internationally competitive exporters. It appears that 
more export-oriented industries attract a greater share of multilateral aid, but again 
there is no evidence that the industries have particularly high entry barriers or sunk 
costs (R&D, inflexible capital inputs or bidding costs). The relevant industries may 
be oligopolistic, but not so obviously as to provide a strategic rationale for export 
subsidies.
Strategically, the underlying rationale for matching subsidies is retaliation, a tit-for- 
tat strategy to deter others from continuing their subsidies. There is a little evidence 
that retaliatory mixed credits have reduced their usage; the total value of donor 
funds allocated has fallen since the early 1980s, and the DAC continues to try and 
negotiate further reductions and restrictions. Our conclusion is that tying and mixed 
credits have been introduced, and are likely to persist, because of the domestic 
political economy of aid policy. It is not that the government believes that it should 
assist exporters - the Thatcher regime holds the opposite view - but rather that they 
are inclined towards the transfer principle (they do not believe in giving money 
away for no obvious return). The government, like business, tends to treat the 
gross commercial benefits to the UK as equivalent to economic gains, and only 
occassionally enquires about the net economic effects. Our analysis suggests that 
these net economic effects are not necesarily positive so that, given the detrimental 
implications of tying for recipients, the effect of tied aid and mixed credits on global 
welfare is quite likely to be negative.
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CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have tried to illuminate the influence of the business lobby in British aid policy 
by examining the arguments of that lobby, especially in respect of demands for tied 
aid, and assessing the extent to which these have been reflected in trends in the UK 
aid budget over the decade 1978 to 1988. The central point has been that the 
benefits to business are determined largely by the impact of aid, the extent to which 
British exports are aid financed and the distribution of such exports across 
industries and firms. To this end, much of the thesis has concentrated on estimating 
the impact of different types of UK aid, allowing us to identify which industries, 
and in some cases firms, benefit and to indicate the importance of aided exports to 
them. In this way we have been able to link the businesses which benefit to those 
which lobby the government on aid; the success of their lobbying is reflected by the 
trend in impact and its distribution. This is summarised in Section 10.1.
A second theme of the thesis is that impact, at best, only measures the commercial 
benefits from aid. This is important because it can be related directly to the business 
lobby, as indicated above, and because impact provides a first approximation of the 
effects of aid. In particular, measuring impact is central to our critical evaluation of 
the arguments for tied aid. The economic growth and development arguments for 
aid, as outlined in Chapter 2, generally condemn tying as being against the interests 
of aid recipients. Tying distorts the market in aid-financed goods and thereby fails 
to maximise global welfare; it also constrains the choices open to LDCs and can 
engender dependency on often inappropriate, or less than optimal, Western 
technology. Nevertheless, tying is prevalent among all major bilateral donors and 
we seek to explain why, at least in the case of Britain.
The basic argument for tying is that aid is a resource cost to donors that can be 
offset to the extent that it finances exports; rather than aid being a direct transfer 
from donor taxpayers to LDCs, tying renders aid an indirect transfer from donor 
taxpayers to donor exporters. This imposes a cost on recipients, relative to untied 
aid, and may impose a cost on donors; the issues relating to the net effects of aid, 
and how tying affects these, are discussed in Section 10.2. An implicit claim for
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tied aid is that, by definition, it maximises the export ratio of aid; we will question 
this claim and suggest that tying tends to benefit the relatively less competitive 
exporters and amounts to an effective subsidy to inefficient firms. This is unlikely 
to be supported by the taxpayers who vote for aid, nor is tying likely to be 
supported on the basis of net global welfare. These issues are all summarised in 
Section 10.2, which also considers strategic criteria.
In elaborating the issues relating to measuring the net economic effects of aid and 
the net effect on global welfare,- we will identify many important questions which 
are not answered in the the thesis. These questions, which provide scope for further 
research, are set out in Section 10.3. It is to be anticipated that a thesis will throw 
up unanswered questions, partly because any study must necessarily limit its scope 
but also because often one set of questions have to be answered before the next set 
can be fully identified. Had we not answered some questions we would not have 
known what others to ask.
10.1. Business Interests and Trends in the Impact of Aid
Limiting attention, in the first instance, to the simple impact of aid, we can 
summarise the basic results of our empirical analysis in respect of the three principa/ 
forms of aid with direct commercial implications. Since ATP is an export subsidy 
the ratio of exports to aid is high, 3.2 over 1978-86, and the average output 
multiplier (the ratio of domestic production required to meet aided exports to the 
initial aid) was 5.66 over 1978-86. For multilateral and tied bilateral aid we use the 
average of the estimated output multipliers for 1980 and 1985, giving values of 
1.85 and 1.17 respectively. Multilateral aid has the higher multiplier because its 
export ratio is above unity; the value of MAA contracts exceeds the value of donor 
contributions and UK firms tend to be successful in winning MAA orders. The 
export ratio for TB A is less than unity because of allowance for local costs. The 
multipliers incorporate both the likely value of exports per £lm  of aid, and the share 
going to different industries, and gives the value of total output required in the 
economy to meet the exports generated. Since TB A excludes items such as technical 
cooperation and the multipliers exclude spare part or follow-on orders, the figures 
can be treated as lower bound estimates.
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In citing the commercial benefits of aid, the business lobby and a number of 
analysts have emphasised the employment potential of the output generated (see 
Chapter 9). On face value, each £lm  of ATP could have supported 122 jobs in 
1986, each £lm  of TBA could have supported 34 jobs and of multilateral aid 56 
(Table 9.1). However, as we have argued, the method of impact analysis cannot 
claim that employment was created by aided exports and tied aid is not an efficient 
policy if employment creation is the specific objective. Two conclusions from the 
thesis are relevant here. First, while the commercial benefits from tied aid appear 
great, tying itself is not an optimum means to achieve these gains. Second, the 
commercial gains to the UK from multilateral aid exceed those from tied bilateral 
aid, and from bilateral aid in general.
The basic question we wish to answer is, using impact as the measure of 
commercial benefit, has the business lobby been successful in influencing Britsih 
aid policy over the last decade? The final column of Table 10.1 gives an order of 
magnitude for the impact of UK aid in each year on the assumption that each type of 
aid had the same multiplier over the entire period. This assumption is necessary 
because there are no data to permit the estimation of annual multipliers for each type 
of aid. The breakdown of aid in the other columns is not comparable to the figures 
in Chapter 4 because it is based on figures for gross aid in 1985 prices using a 
Retail Price Index deflator; this is deemed appropriate because we wish to indicate 
the magnitude of real impact for firms (1985 prices are used because they relate 
more closely to the period of our impact estimates).
The estimated total impact is the sum of the impact for three types of aid we are able 
to distinguish. The 30 per cent fall in real impact over 1978-88 exceeds the fall of 
18 per cent in real aid; between 1979 and 1987 the real value of impact was almost 
halved while real aid fell by a third. A large part of the fall in the real value of 
impact is explained by the fall in the value of aid; since multilateral aid held roughly 
its share of the budget its impact fell at a rate only slightly exceeding the fall in real 
aid. The significant fall in TBA suggests that ATP was conceded at a cost in terms 
of reduced tied project aid.
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Table 10.1: Potential Impact of British Aid, 1978-88
Share of Impact Due to:oiuuv VI xin v xvut iv,
Gross Multi­ Bilateral Potential
aid lateral Tied ATP Impact
£m % % . % £m
1978 1576.7 63.4 36.6 - 1807.0
1979 1765.8 60.9 26.9 12.2 2239.6
1980 1221.4 50.1 33.8 16.2 1183.3
1981 1489.3 53.6 30.8 15.6 1502.2
1982 1260.2 56.4 17.1 26.5 1564.9
1983 1301.6 68.1 17.6 14.3 1445.8
1984 1395.6 65.8 14.5 19.7 1583.4
1985 1309.6 65.8 17.1 17.1 1374.0
1986 1304.4 57.2 16.1 26.7 1594.8
1987 1197.4 72.0 15.7 12.2 1238.3






I 1 1 1 1
-18.1% 6.9 -12.3 5.4 -29.9%
NOTES: Initial impact estimates were calculated in current prices; Gross aid and 
potential impact are expressed in 1985 prices using the retail price index (Q3 Total 
non-Food, Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1989:131). Potential impact is 
based on applying the aggregate output multiplier for each type of aid in each year 
(ie. there are no assumed impact lags).
While the share of tied aid fell, the commercial benefits per £lm  of tied aid may 
have risen because ATP yields far greater benefits than TBA. Over 1978-84, each 
£lm  of tied project aid (non-ATP) generated about £0.7m of UK exports whereas 
each £lm  of ATP generated some £3.2m of exports. In this sense, each £lm  of 
ATP has the commercial value of some £4.6m of TBA. The implied trade-off is that 
a percentage point increase in the share of ATP would compensate for a 4.6
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percentage point fall in the share of TBA. A positive net trade-off would imply that 
business as a whole benefited from the introduction of ATP; although the evaluation 
of the trade-off depends on the specific period chosen, it tended to be negative. The 
3.4 per cent share of ATP in 1988 could be seen as compensating for a 15.6 
percentage point fall in TBA over 1978-88 (ie. since the introduction of ATP); the 
actual fall of 22.3 points is well in excess of this indicating that business as a whole 
lost in the implied trade-off. A similar conclusion holds for the period 1979-88. 
Between 1979 and 1982, however, ATP's share of the budget rose 3.1 percentage 
points while tied project aid fell by 11 points whereas 'parity1 would have been 
maintained by a 14.3 point fall. An end date of 1986 also suggests a net increase in 
commercial benefits. Business groups were apparently successful in getting ATP 
introduced in 1978 and increased in 1980, but the benefits have been offset, 
perhaps more than offset, by the large fall in tied project aid. It would seem that 
ATP was a pyrrhic victory for the business lobby; closer examination indicates, 
however, that the switch towards ATP favoured a small group of firms, as 
identified in Chapter 8.
It is only to be expected that, being a relatively small budget, ATP is more 
concentrated than TBA; however, this would not be so pronounced if consultants 
and medium sized firms got as much assistance as they would like. The important 
conclusions about ATP are that it is an export subsidy that is less likely than normal 
aid to meet development objectives, is more likely to go to richer LDCs and is 
heavily biased towards large firms. The apparent shift from TBA to ATP has 
benefited large insider firms, who used direct contacts with decision-makers to 
lobby for ATP, at the possible expense of less well connected companies who faced 
a smaller fund of tied bilateral aid. This conclusion is consistent with the argument 
that ATP has encouraged rent-seeking activity among large exporters to avail of the 
existing export subsidy, which undermines its strategic value.
It seems plausible to argue that ATP has been used to provide the commercial 
benefits of aid, which have consequently become more concentrated on a few 
firms, while the bilateral budget has been deployed with development objectives in 
mind, so that the level of tying has been reduced and a greater share is allocated to
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natural resources and the poorest countries. The UK gave a greater share of its aid 
to the poorest LDCs than did any of the other major donors, by a considerable 
margin, and the share of bilateral aid going to the fifty poorest LDCs rose from 62 
per cent in 1985 to 68 per cent in 1987.
In Morrissey (1990b) we outlined a perception that the aid budget had been 
commercialised throughout the 1980s. This belief was justified by the introduction 
and expansion of ATP and the adoption of a very commercial rhetoric on the part of 
Ministers for Overses Development during the period (see Chapter 4). On the basis 
of the evidence on impact just reviewed, it is the rhetoric on aid that has been 
commercialised, not the aid budget itself. The business lobby demanded more tied 
aid to match other donors but the government was committed to cutting spending 
and neither aid nor subsidies were part of its ideological baggage. So the budget 
was cut, severely. Business does have an important position in society, it is 
consulted on policy and its views cannot be ignored completely. The government 
made repeated statements to reassure business that it was aware of their problems 
and on their side; greater co-operation from the DTI, and ODA, reinforced this. 
Nonetheless, although a few firms benefited from ATP, the business lobby failed to 
get its primary, broad, interests enshrined in the aid budget, despite a rhetoric of 
government aid policy supportive of commercial interests; there is little evidence 
that business exercised influence on this issue (which is not to deny that it may have 
influence on other issues).
Donors do define aid criteria in terms reflecting business interests; development 
means economic growth, successful projects are those profitable in terms of internal 
rates of return, and aid as a real resource outflow begs the promotion of donor 
exports. Aid is structured to benefit donor exporters.more than if development 
interests were paramount. British business has gained from this general philosophy 
of aid but has not been successful in getting as much support from the UK 
government as foreign businesses get from theirs.
Business groups are aware that they are unlikely to be able to alter government 
philosophy or its chosen strategy. They can however, try to alter the tactics 
employed to meet this strategy, by seeking marginal changes to policy. The large
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insider firms were able to present a coherent view and identify visible costs and 
benefits in support of ATP, which was introduced and developed to favour large 
exporters; smaller firms need more initial help with identifying projects and it 
became more difficult for consultants to benefit when the 100 per cent financing 
was halved. In effect, ATP sheltered a number of large firms from the commercial 
costs of the reduced budget; insider status was not the only factor explaining why 
they were sheltered: the international markets where matching mixed credits are 
required tend to be for capital-intensive projects which require large contractors; 
only large firms can maintain the local contacts to operate in LDCs; large projects 
are easier to administer and are of high visibility for political purposes.
There are implications for the effectiveness of aid in promoting the interests of 
developing countries, although these are obviously tentative given the framework of 
our analysis. Unambiguously, the decline in the real value of British aid has not 
furthered the interests of LDCs, nor has the introduction of ATP (relative to using 
the same money to finance other types of aid projects, preferably untied). The 
tendency of the share of multilateral aid to rise relative to TBA has probably 
benefited the UK and may well have benefited LDCs, but one cannot draw clear 
conclusions about the relative effectiveness of multilateral and tied bilateral aid. 
While the increasing share of aid going to the poorest countries appears to be a 
desirable shift, it may not be so; one needs to know the types of projects to which 
the aid is allocated. It is possible that the same countries are recieving the aid but 
that they have become relatively poorer (due to the ineffectiveness of previous 
aid?). On balance, we feel that the ability of the UK aid budget to promote 
development objectives has deteriorated over the last decade.
This study suggests that the business lobby has had only a limited influence on the 
Thatcher governments, at least in respect of the aid budget; firms are expected to 
compete as if there were a free market, despite evidence of distortions introduced by 
other donors. International and internal political interests, notably public 
expenditure restraint, have been the predominant determinants of the aid budget, 
and the changes since 1979 offer little evidence that either the business or 
development lobbies have had much influence. There has been a commercialisation
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of the rhetoric of government aid policy but no real substance behind their words; 
British business has been unable to exert the influence required to elicit a real 
increase in tied aid. The major exporters elicited some support through ATP, but 
there is a strong suggestion that this was grudgingly granted because of the 
extensive mixed credits offered by other donors. Neither the business nor the 
development lobbies can derive much satisfaction out of recent UK aid budgets.
Our study also offers some implications for the strategies that the development 
lobby should adopt in trying to influence the Government. The first clear point is to 
acknowledge that while development and business interests are in general conflict, 
both share the objective of increasing the real volume of aid. It seems likley that the 
increase in the volume of UK aid in the late 1980s reflects the activities of both 
lobbies since the mid-80s. The second point is that this study offers ammunition to 
the development lobby insofar as we show that tying is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to generate commercial benefits to the UK. In particular, both lobbies 
could also share the objective of multilateral untying, although it is clear that the 
business lobby would not adopt this argument easily (because certain influential 
firms may lose from such a change while the gainers are likely to be those who are 
already internationally successful and therefore less vocal regarding the aid budget). 
The weakness of the commercial argument, however, can be revealed by showing 
that commercial gains are not a measure of, and may in fact disguise the true 
absence of, economic benefits, as we discuss in Section 10.2. This weakness can 
be exploited, politically, by making voters aware that aid does not represent a 
transfer to poor people in LDCs but, rather, to shareholders in exporting firms.
10.2. Measuring the Net Effects of Aid
There are a multitude of ways in which aid can benefit donor economies, aside from 
the international and domestic political and humanitarian motives for aid. Attention 
here has been confined to commercial benefits which arise if aid increases donor 
exports. If aid contributes to the economic growth of recipients it will, in time, 
provide new export markets for donor economies; while some donor industries will 
suffer from increased competition from developing countries, this may be in the 
interests of global economic welfare and efficiency. Since few developing countries
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have adequate capital industries, a large share of present aid finances capital exports 
from donors to recipients. Depending on their international competitiveness, donor 
industries will win a share of global orders which, in the absence of tying, should 
reflect their market shares; tying is not essential to ensure donor benefits.
One rationale for tying is that it may help a donor to derive benefits from increased 
trade that are more than proportional to its share of world export markets. Two 
issues are salient to this use of tying as an instrument of strategic trade policy. First, 
it is necessary that tied aid be trade creating, ie. there is no net benefit if the export 
orders would have been won in the absence of aid. Second is the incidence of 
competitive tying between donors: donors offering a greater volume of tied aid are 
more likely to win a net increase in market share. Furthermore, although tying may 
not be trade creating relative to a base year or trend, as other donors tie their aid any 
individual donor must offer tied aid to protect its market share. While tying may not 
appear to increase market share, the absence of tying may lose market share (the 
relationship between tying and market share is asymmetrical). Once tying exists it is 
therefore self-perpetuating.
A more basic, and less competitive, rationale for tying is provided by transfer 
theory (Chapter 3). Aid is a balance of payments cost so that if tying generates 
exports it reduces the real resource cost of transfers to donors. Support for tying 
stems from commercial self-interest, reinforced by competitive donor tying, and the 
desire to purchase political leverage and goodwill. It obviously confers benefits on 
donors, although competitive tying may render these quite small. In fact, donor 
benefits are frequently over-emphasised by failure to account for the absence of net 
export, and output, creation. We have argued, in Chapter 9, that there is no 
conclusive evidence that British aid has been export creating. Furthermore, we have 
suggested that the industries benefiting from tied aid tend to be less competitive than 
average - tied aid does not appear to be a policy of ‘picking winners’. Finally, while 
the business lobby emphasises the employment potential of aided exports, this may 
impose a resource burden on the economy, ie. wages are pushed up in inefficient 
industries supported by aid, and this will have an inflationary wage pressure on 
other industries thereby reducing their international competitivenes.
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A final point worthy of consideration, in terms of the benefits to donors, is the 
displacement effect - the net impact on the donor is reduced to the extent that the 
demand for domestic inputs to meet aided exports displaces domestic demand that 
would otherwise have been realised. While it is unlikely that displacement has been 
significant (see Chapter 3), this does not imply that opportunity costs were 
negligible. We demonstrated in Chapter 9 that one's preference for a particular 
policy, in terms of opportunity cost, will depend on the maximand. Tied aid fares 
well if the specific objective is to maximise exports (although it may not be the 
optimal policy for such an objective - there are innumerable policy options we did 
not consider) but not if employment generation is the objective. An evaluation of 
opportunity costs requires a careful specification of the policy objectives and is 
discussed in the next section.
A general theme, introduced in Chapter 3 and explored in Chapters 7 to 9, has been 
that tied aid in general, and mixed credits in particular, may appear to be justifiable 
in tenns of strategic trade policy. We have posited, in fact, that if mixed credits do 
not meet the strategic criteria they cannot be defended as export subsidies, and 
should not be part of the aid budget. While some of the industries benefiting from 
ATP appear to meet these criteria, being in relatively concentrated international 
markets likely to earn monopoly rents and likely to display external economies, 
further analysis suggests that the strategic gains are unlikely to have been realised. 
This is so essentially because of matching use of tying and mixed credits by all 
donors and rent-seeking by donor exporters. Thus, we concluded in Chapter 8 that 
there remained no convincing economic case for ATP, a conclusion that we believe 
can be generalised to all tied aid.
10.3. Areas for Further Research
Although this thesis has been about aid, attention has been largely confined to the 
donor perspective and commercial interests. While we consider this approach to be 
very important, in that it offers the key to understanding the determinants of donor 
aid policy, insufficient attention is consequently paid to recipient interests. In 
particular, while we try to explain why donors engage in tying (and argue that they 
are wrong to do so) we are unable to explore fully the implications this has for the
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effectiveness of aid in promoting development and economic growth. We consider 
this omission as an inevitable result of focussing on one side of the story rather than 
a weakness of the thesis, and have reviewed in Chapter 2 the literature indicating 
that tied aid is not in the interests of LDCs. It is this observation which prompts the 
basic question: if tying does not benefit LDCs, can it be rationalised because of 
benefits to donors? We argue that claims that tying confers net economic benefits on 
donors are inconclusive and often misplaced, although political considerations may 
represent the best explanation for tying. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
tying and aid effectiveness is deserving of further research.
The potential net economic benefits for donors from tying depend crucially on the 
relationship between aid and trade. The essential question is whether the provision 
of tied aid establishes a trade pattern, which generates future exports independent of 
aid, that would not have arisen in the absence of tied aid. This issue was addressed 
in Chapter 9 inter alia but it is beyond the scope of this study to resolve it. 
However, our analysis has shown how to approach answering the question and this 
is an area for future research which follows logically from the thesis. It is clear that 
the commercial benefits of tying accrue to a few industries only, thus the aid-trade 
relationship from the donors perspective should be analysed for these industries.
The question is not easy to answer either in terms of the model or data required. 
The basic hypothesis to test must be whether the growth of exports to LDCs was 
greater for those industries benefiting from aided exports than for others. A number 
of problems are obvious. First, there is implicit selection bias since those trading 
most with LDCs are most likely to win aided exports. Second, the data 
requirements are heroic: the export pattern of any industry will depend on trends in 
the domestic industry, on the changing economy of its trading partners and on the 
activity of competitors from other donors, to name but a few factors. These brief 
observations indicate the difficulty of a general analysis and suggest that a detailed 
examination of a few markets may be more fruitful. This is the essence of the third 
area for future research we identify.
In Chapters 3 and 8 in particular, we identified the relevance of strategic trade 
arguments for tied aid. If tying confers a net welfare gain, globally or to the donor
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only, then this should be most apparent in respect of ATP. The strategic criteria 
indicate the industry requirements for an export subsidy to generate a net gain in 
welfare. Thus, a detailed study of those industries, or better still those firms, 
winning ATP orders which ascertained if they meet the criteria would represent a 
significant contribution to the arguments surrounding tied aid. We sketched the 
requirements for such an analysis in Chapter 8, and our preliminary investigation 
suggests that the criteria are not met If tied aid can increase donor or global welfare 
then ATP is a test case which warrants further study.
10.4. Conclusion: Prospects for British Aid Policy
Three major trends in British aid over the period 1978-88 have been identified, and 
an explanation for each offered. First, there has been a significant decrease in the 
real value of aid. This reflects the policy of the Thatcher Governments to restrain 
the growth of public expenditure, although we cannot definitely account for why 
aid bore a disproportionately greater share of the cuts than some other expenditure 
headings. It is probably true that aid is relatively easy to cut, at least insofar as the 
domestic political costs are relatively low. It may also be relevant that the ideology 
of the Thatcher Governments was generally against redistribution and the provision 
of social welfare by the State. Just as unemployment benefit could be claimed to 
discourage the unemployed from seeking work, aid could discourage LDCs from 
becoming economically efficient.
Second, there has been a significant reduction in the volume of tied bilateral aid and 
in its share of the aid budget. While this can be partly explained as an offset against 
the general increase in ATP, it may more generally reflect that part of the Thatcher 
ideology which rejects the argument for subsidising industry. The logic of this 
ideology is that State intervention is an undesirable distortion and that subsidies 
discourage firms from increasing their efficiency. Successful firms are those that 
are competitive on their own and if the correct free market conditions are created, in 
LDCs aswell as the UK, the fittest will rise to the top. It seems broadly true that the 
Thatcher Governments have done little to assist industry, and exporters, in general. 
It should be noted, however, that TBA may be easier to cut than other forms of 
bilateral aid precisely because it is closely linked to exports rather than development
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projects and programmes. In particular, TCA and aid directed to alleviate poverty 
may have a political and humanitarian weight, and may involve long-term 
commitments, so that it is difficult for a donor to reduce their volume, although 
increases may be equally rare.
The third general trend has been the increasing emphasis on ATP and a tendency for 
the benefits of aided exports to become concentrated in a few firms. While it may 
appear ideologically inconsistent to reject the principle of subsidies in general yet 
grant them in particular cases, there is a political logic. The firms that have 
continued to benefit from aided exports are the insiders, large important companies 
which usually have identifiable links with the Conservatives. Researchers for Ann 
Clywd, Labour's Shadow on Overseas Development, have recently emphasised the 
significant donations to the Conservative Party by a number of firms prominent 
among the beneficiaries of ATP {Guardian, 18.10.90). It may not simply be a case 
of rewarding supporters. The Government may feel that the commercial importance 
of these companies warrants some support Alternatively, it may be the case that the 
Government is more sympathetic to the arguments of its supporters; if these firms 
are deemed to be succesful, then aid support may be justified to counteract the 
parctice of other donors. More generally, the influence of insiders indicates the 
importance of examining interest group behaviour to understand policy, especially 
on issues that are marginal to the median voter.
The case for tying is weak. Competitive British firms can gain greater commercial 
benefits from MAAs than from British bilateral aid, so that tying to generate 
commercial benefits is not an efficient policy. Even if one confines attention to the 
donor, it is far from obvious that tying generates a net economic gain. Once the 
effect on LDCs is considered, it appears clear that tying reduces net global welfare. 
Furthermore, tying is at variance with the free-market and trade liberalisation 
arguments to which the major donors now pay lip service. Tying is not a net benefit 
yet it persists. It seems reasonable to ask why. Political considerations provide the 
most robust answers. First, internal politics will encourage a Government to 
appease important lobbies and reward supporters. Second, international politics will 
encourage a Government to match what other donors do, at least until such time as
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it can encourage those other donors to mend their ways. Finally, there is the weight 
attached to the easily measured commercial benefits against the somewhat intangible 
net economic and welfare effects; it is easy for a donor to believe that it benefits 
fiom tying if it wants to believe i t
And what of the future? There is no reason to believe that the trend of British aid 
policy will differ significantly from that outlined in Chapter 4 if power remains in 
the hands of the Conservatives. It seems probable that Britain would be willing to 
abolish ATP if other donors, and the DAC, agreed to abolish mixed credits. Our 
analysis seriously questions the economic rationale of mixed credits, but a more 
solid refutation will be required to convince those who wish to believe that tying 
does benefit donors, and who tend to equate commercial with economic benefits. 
And what lessons for those campaigning against tying? Quite simply, that academic 
argument is not as influential as political lobbying.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF AIDED EXPORTS DATA
The data requirement for the procedure detailed in Chapter 5 is an industry 
breakdown of aided exports, distinguishing between orders relating to the British 
bilateral aid budget (generally referring to TBA) and orders from MAAs to which 
the UK contributes (Multilateral), compatible with the industries in an 10 matrix of 
the economy. Since two 10 Tables were used, each with slightly different industry 
classifications, and the data on aided exports was insufficiently disaggregated by 
industry to relate directly to these 10 Tables, we constructed compatible 28 industry 
aggregated 10 matrices (GIO) for 1979 and 1984. The 28 GIO industries are 
defined in Table A.1 and were chosen according to the principle of not aggregating 
those 10 industries for which data on aided exports were available at a compatible 
level of aggregation. Since 20 four-digit SIC industries accounted for 83% of 
Bilateral and 74% of Multilateral orders (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:99), 
22 of the GIO industries were unchanged from their classification in the 10 Tables, 
as can be seen from Table A.1, and accounted for over 90% of aided exports.1 
Having calculated the L for each GIO, the next step was to allocate the aided 
exports by industry to get x.
When we constructed x the available source of data was May, Schumacher and 
Malek (1986). The later publication of May, Schumacher and Malek (1989) 
provided limited additional information which would have facilitated our estimation 
procedure. In particular, our allocation as detailed in Table A.2 is based on Tables 
3-1 and 3-2 of May, Schumacher and Malek (1986) which correspond to Tables 
7.1 and 7.2 in May, Schumacher and Malek (1989:98-99). However, while Table 
3-2 only gave the breakdown of bilateral aided exports for selected four-digit SIC 
industries, Table 7.2 also gives this breakdown for multilateral aided orders. 
Considerable effort and time would be required to re-estimate the allocation and 
recompute impact; the final column of Table A.2, however, indicates that the 
revision of the allocation of multilateral orders would have made few differences, 
and that these were only significant for five of the industries (cf. Table A.8).
1 Since FSer in 1984 includes two 101984 industries, the unchanged industries in the GIO for 
1984 are, strictly speaking, only 21.
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Table A.1: Industries in the Aggregate 10 Matrix
No. Industry Title SIC IQ
1. Mineral Oil Processing (140) (6, 5)
2. Iron and Steel, Steel Products (221/3) (11, 10)
3. non-Metal Mineral Products (24) (15-18, 14-18)
4. Fertilisers (251) (21)
5. Pharmaceuticals (257) (25)
6. Metal Goods n.e.s. (31) (32)
7. Industrial Plant and Steelwork (320) (33)
8. Agricultural Machinery, Tractors (321) (34)
9. Textile, Woodwork etc. Machonery (323,7) (37)
10. Process Machinery and Contractors (324) (38)
11. Mining, Construction etc. Machinery (325) (39)
12. Other Machinery, Mechanical Equipment (328) (41)
13. Office Machinery, Computer Equipment (330) (43)
14. ; Insulated Wires and Cables (341) (44)
15. Basic Electrical Equipment (342) (45)
16. Telecommunication etc. Equipment (344) (47)
17. Electronic Components, sub-Assemblies (345) (48)
18. Motor Vehicles and Parts (351,3) (52)
19. Shipbuilding and Repairs (361) (53)
20. Other Vehicles (362/3) (55)
21. Instrument Engineering (37) (56)
22. Timber, paper, rubber, plastics (46/8) (80=86)
23. Construction (50) (88)
24. Banking, Finance and Insurance (81/2) (97, 98-99)
25. Agric., utilities, metals and chemicals (01/25) (1/27 nes)
26. Miscellaneous engineering and manufactures (3) (29/56, 87 nes)
27. Food, drink, tobacco and clothing (41/5) (28 and 57-79)
28. Miscellaneous Services (6,7,8,9) (89/102 nes)
NOTE: The Industry number (No.) refers to the position in the aggregate matrix. The 10 
column gives industry numbers in the full 10 Tables; if different for the two years, 
1979 (Business Monitor, 1983) is given first and 1984 (CSO, 1988) is second. For 
the miscellaneous categories (nos 25,26 and 28), nes means industries in the range 
given but not included elsewhere. The 10 industries are matched with Standard 
Industrial Classifications (SIC) from a Table in CSO (1988:7), and nes applies where 
relevant
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Table A.2: Estimated Aided Exports, by Industry, 1978-84
INDUSTRY BILATERAL MULTILATERAL
£m % £m %
1. MOP* 6.64 0.5 2.53 0.1 (0 .1)
2. I&S 1 114.13 8.6 131.35 5.2 (5.2)
3. nMMP * 7.96 0.6 10.10 0.4 (0.4)
4. Frt 15.60 1.2 11.49 0.5 2 (0.4)-
5. Phm 34.80 2.6 25.64 1.0 2 (1.0)
6. Mtl* 9.29 0.7 27.79 1.1 (1.1)
7. IPlt* 42.47 3.2 83.36 3.3 (3.3)
8. AMch 15.60 1.2 107.35 4.3 3 (4.9)-
9. TWMch 15.70 1.2 107.35 4.3 3 (2.9)-
10. PMch * 151.29 11.4 93.46 3.7 (3.7)
11. MCMch * 119.44 9.0 310.70 12.3 (12.4)-
12. OMch* 74.32 5.6 159.14 6.3 (6.3)
13. OfEq* 5.31 0.4 17.68 0.7 (0.7)
14. IW&C 29.80 2.2 54.74 2.2 4 (3.4)-
15. ElEq 116.30 8.8 213.62 8.5 4 (3.1)-
16. DEq 28.70 2.2 52.08 2.1 4 (4.9)-
17. ECA 6.10 0.5 11.84 0.5 4 (1.2) -
18. Mot * 107.50 8.1 118.72 4.7 (4.7)
19. Ships 42.80 3.2 15.82 0.6 5 (0 .6)
20. OVch 93.89 7.1 34.70 1.4 5 (1.4)
21. InstE * 15.93 1.2 171.77 6.8 (6.8)
22. TPRP *6 25.21 1.9 78.31 3.1 (3.1)
23. Const *7 134.04 10.1 563.30 22.3 (22.3)
24. FSer * 27.87 2.1 75.78 3.0 (3.0)
25. MiscP8 31.88 1.8 23.49 0.9 (l-7)~
26. MiscM9 8.88 0.6 16.31 0.6 (1.2) -
27. FDTC 10 19.91 1.4 7.50 0.3 (0.2) -
28. MiscS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (0.0)
TOTAL 1327 .10  100.0 2526 .00  100.0
SOURCE: May, Schumacher and Malek (1986); detailed notes on the next page.
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NOTES TO TABLE A.2
The data are from May, Schumacher and Malek (1986). The total for Multilateral 
aid is that given in their Table 2-4, while the percentage distribution is derived from 
their Table 3-1 (T3.1 below). The figures for Bilateral aided exports are taken from 
T3.1 where possible (indicated by * in Table A.2), otherwise they are from their 
Table 3-2 (T3.2) in which a four digit SIC disaggregation is given. In a number of 
cases, the classification of data under multilateral aid in T3.1 encompassed more 
than one IO industry; lacking any better method, we allocated these exports to 10 
industries using the distribution revealed by data for bilateral aid (see notes 2 to 5 
below). In the case of the revised estimates for multilateral, but with the exception 
of industries referred to in note 4 below, where Table 7.2 identified only four-digit 
SIC industries which make up part of a GIO industry, the share for the GIO 
industry in Table 7.1 was accepted; ie. it was assumed that the entire share of a 
two-digit SIC in Table 7.1 could be attributed to the relevant three-digit SIC/GIO 
industry in our Table A.2 (for example, see note 1).
1 T3.1 gives figures for SIC 22 whereas T3.2 shows that Iron and Steel (SIC 
221) accounts for £101m. Assuming that the remaining £13m goes on steel 
products (SIC 222/3) rather than any other three-digit industries in SIC 22, all 
the exports under Class 22 in T3.1 are allocated to our industry No. 2, as 
defined in Table A. 1.
2 Class 25 in T3.1 includes Frt and Phm plus a residual going to other chemicals 
(under MiscP); all is allocated to Frt, and Phm according to the bilateral 
distribution given in T3.2. In respect of the revised estimates (see Table A.8 
below) 1% of total aided exports is allocated to MiscP.
3 From Class 32 in T3.1, the shares of IPlt and industries Nos. 10 to 12 were 
determined; AMch and TWMch are assumed to share equally in the residual, for 
both bilateral and multilateral aid. In the revised estimates, AMch is known and 
the residual is allocated to TWMch and MiscM.
4 Class 34 in T3.1 includes industries Nos. 14 to 17 (the shares of each are in 
T3.2) plus a residual going to MiscM; the same distribution is assumed to apply 
to orders from multilateral agencies. In the case of the revised estimates, the 
multilateral shares for Nos. 14-16 were known from Table 7.2, leaving a
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residual 2.4% (of total) to be allocated between ECA and MiscM (which 
includes industrial electrical equipment) and we allocated half to each.
5 The bilateral share of Ship is that of SIC 3610 in T3.2; the share for OVch is the 
total for Class 36 in T3.1 minus Ship. The same pattern is applied to 
multilateral.
6 The definition of TPRP (Table A.1) includes SIC 46-48 only whereas in T3.1 
the corresponding figure includes Class 49, the share of which in aided exports 
we assume zero for convenience.
7 Virtually all the aided exports under Const are for Civil Engineering.
8 The values for MiscP are the residuals when exports for Frt and Phm are 
deducted from Class 25 in T3.1.
9 MiscM values are residuals when allocations to Nos. 14-16 (from T3.2) are 
deducted from Class 34 in T3.1.
10 Derived from T3.1 to include orders for Classes 43-45 and 'other'.
Comment on the Revisions
As is clear from the final column, where ~ denotes a GIO industry with a revised 
share, only a few industries were affected, and only a few of these experienced 
sizeable revision. Furthermore, while most of the revisions are within the ElEng 
industrial group the total for that group is unaffected. While the impact estimates for 
1980 and 1985 discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 are based on the unrevised shares, 
the discussion of the importance of aided exports to particular industries (Section 
7.4) is based on the revised shares. Finally, we re-estimated 1985 impact for 
Multilateral orders using the revised allocation and, excepting individual ElEng 
industries, the effect on the results was minimal. The re-estimation procedure and 
results are discussed in reference to Table A.8 below.
Industrial Groups
We concentrate on groups in Chapters 6 and 7. The classification used can be given 
in reference to Table A.1: MecEng is industries numbered 7 to 12 inclusive; ElEng 
is industries 14 to 17 inclusive; Vehicles is Nos. 18 to 20; Chemicals Nos. 4 and 5; 
I&S is No. 2 and Const is No. 23.
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Allocating Aided Exports to Years
The allocations in Table A.2 are industry shares of total aided exports over the 
period 1978-84; May, Schumacher and Malek (1986,1989) provide no indication 
of how the value of aided exports, or industry distribution, varied over each of 
these years. In order to distinguish 1980 and 1985, it was necessary to assume the 
distribution was the same in each year and then to adopt some means of determining 
the value of aided exports in each of those years. The means we chose, following 
the assumption of a one-year lag between aid and aided exports in equation (5.4), 
was to assume that the value of xt was directly proportional to the value of 2Lt_j. 
Thus, we calculate the share of aid in year t for each year over 1978-84 and 
assume this represents the share of x  in year t+1 for total aided exports. The share 
for each year of each type of aid over 1978-84 is given in Table A.3.
Table A.3: British Tied Bilateral and M ultilateral Aid, 1978-84
YEAR BILATERAL MULTILATERAL
£m % £m %
1978 291.0 14.78 184.0 7.48
1979 339.0 17.22 252.0 10.25
1980 266.0 13.51 255.0 10.37
1981 347.0 17.62 346.0 14.07
1982 260.0 13.20 411.0 16.71
1983 229.0 11.63 480.0 19.52
1984 237.0 12.04 531.0 21.59
TOTAL 1969.0 100.00 2459.0 100.00
SOURCE: Values in current prices from Tables in the introduction to British Overseas Aid 
Statistics (ODA, 1982 and 1986).
Since 17.22% of TBA was allocated in 1979, we assume that 17.22% of x r 
accrued in 1980; similarly, 12.04% of x T was assumed to accrue in 1985. 
Consequently, xr was estimated as £224m in 1980 and £157m in 1985. Applying
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the same approach to multilateral aid implies that was £259m in 1980 (10.25% 
of the total) and £545m in 1985 (21.59% of total). Recent data indicate that in 
1980 was £233m while was £272m (May, Schumacher and Malek, 1989:66). 
The deviation of estimated from actual is quite small and we retain our procedure to 
keep the 1980 estimates on the same basis as those for 1985. Although it is 
reasonable to assume that xt are proportional to atmj, the relationship may not be as 
direct as we assume therefore one must be wary of asserting, on the basis of our 
estimates, that there has been a significant change in x  between 1980 and 1985.
Com puting Procedures
With the exception of the revised estimates discussed in regard to Table A.8, all of 
the impact estimates were calculated using FORTRAN programmes on a mainframe 
UNIX system. Since the programmes were fairly elementary and of little interest in 
their own right, no sample programmes are reproduced here. Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate to outline the procedure. We note that we included Public 
Administration in L, although many practitioners do not, on the basis that 
Government is an important part of the economy and is, conceptually, inter­
dependent with other industries. As the economy expands so too does tax revenue 
therefore there is scope for expansion in Public Administration. Furthermore, the 
Government provides useful services to industry not least of which, in the context 
of this study, is assistance in winning overseas orders and in administering and 
insuring exports.
We first calculated 0 , 0 ,  L and industry shares of total inputs, by type of primary 
'input, and of total output, by type of final demand, and the shares of each 
component of final demand in industry output, for all industries in the full 1979 and 
1984IO Tables (a NAG subroutine was used for the matrix inversion). All of the 
results were printed out and selectively checked visually to ascertain that the raw 
data was correctly entered and that the programmes worked. Then the aggregation 
matrices for each year were constructed and the GIO for 1979 and 1984 calculated, 
following equations (5.15) to (5.17). All of the above results for the full IO Tables 
were calculated for the GIO and again selective visual comparisons were made to 
ensure that the aggregation procedure was correct. We were then confident that <X> 
and L had been correctly estimated for the GIO in both years and, as discussed
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above, we also had estimates of xT and x^ for each year. It was then relatively 
straightforward to estimate equations (5.11) and (5.18) for each type of aided 
export in each of the two years. The relevant results are reproduced in Tables A.4 to
A.9 below; these Tables (printed from EXCEL Spreadsheets) are together at the end 
of this Appendix and are preceded by brief comments on each.
Table A.4: This gives the detailed industry breakdown of the impact of TBA in 
1980; the notation used for the column headings differs from that used in the 
text (due to font restrictions on EXCEL). The following key is applicable, with 
obvious variations, to Tables A.4 to A.9. 
x(A) = xv  exports due to the relevant aid type for each industry. 
q(A) = qv  output due to Xjfor each industry. 
q/x(A) = the effective output multiplier for each industry. 
w/q(i) = Wqi, industry employment per unit (£lm) output. 
w(A) = w-p employment due to x^or  each industry; note the predominance of 
Const which is the industry for which these estimates are least reliable. 
w/x(A) = Wtf/Xtf, industry employment per unit (£lm) of aided exports (wxri). 
q(A)/q(i) = q^/q^ q# as a share of industry output, in percent 
x(A)/ei = Xtf/e,-, aided exports as a share of industry exports, in percent 
m(A) = qxi*<pmiy imported imports required to produce q& 
x-m(A) = net exports, x#  - m(A), in £m.
t(A) = taxes on intermediate inputs to produce q&
h(A) = <7>n*0/u, household income due to labour inputs to produce q& 
p(A) = q^Qja, value of profits and trading income on the production of q^. 
REV(A) = t(A) + 0.25h(A) + 0.2p(A), total tax revenue attributable to q#.
Table A.5: The impact of TBA in 1985, by industry, with all variables having the 
same definition as for Table A.4.
Table A.6: The impact of multilateral aid in 1980. These estimates are based on 
the original allocation by industry of exports attributable to multilateral aid, x^, 
and variables are as for Table A.4 except that (M) designates x ^ .
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Table A.7: As for Table A.6, except refering to 1985.
Table A.8: These are estimates of the impact of the revised industry allocation of 
Xy for 1985; variables have the same meaning as in Table A.4, except (R) 
denotes the revised allocation, and can be compared directly with the 
corresponding values in Table A.7. The revised estimates were calculated using 
the Leontief inverse as calculated from the aggregated 1985 IO matrix; this L 
was entered into an EXCEL Spreadsheet which was then used to derive the 
reported results.
Table A.9: This lists a variety of structural values for each industry computed 
from the 1984 GIO. We consider the column headings to be self-explanatory 
but, briefly: the first six columns give imported inputs (m), taxes (t), labour 
inputs (h), profits (p) and exports (e) as a share of industry output, and the 
change in exports' share of output over 1979-84; the next two columns give 
industry exports as a share of total exports {eje) and the change in this share 
over 1979-84; the final five columns give the IO multipliers (Chapter 5, Section 
5.3) for Output, imports, taxes (on intermediate inputs), household labour 
income and, finally, profits.
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APPENDIX B: MEASURING EXPORTS DUE TO ATP
Table 8.1 in the text lists the industries receiving ATP over the period 1978-90; 
Table B .l provides the SIC and 10 classifications of these industries. The impact 
analysis reported here and in Chapter 8 was based on L calculated for 1979 and 
1984 for a GIO of the 18 industries in Table B .l, following the procedure in 
Appendix A. The data on ATP awards from 1978 to 1986 are from Foreign Affairs 
Committee (FAC, 1987) and data for 1987-90 were provided by the ODA. Table
B.2 lists the value of exports supported by ATP (xa), by industry, for each year 
over 1978-86 and Table B.3 provides corresponding figures for 1987/8 to 1989/90. 
Basic structural data for the 10 industries can be found in Appendix A.
The ATP awards were classified by industry by relating the project description in 
FAC (1987) to the SIC description of industries (CSO, 1979: Standard Industrial 
Classification, Revised 1980, London: HMSO). There were two stages in deriving 
x a from awards data; deducting local costs and allocating projects to industries. 
Because ATP is requested by companies who have targeted potential exports, 
impact is assumed to occur in the year the contract is agreed (despite the fact that 
many are long-term construction projects). Estimates of this (potential) impact for 
1979 and 1983 are presented in Tables B.4 and B.5.
Deductions for Local Costs
The xa are of essentially two types, those where a finished good is exported from 
the UK directly, and those where the funded activity takes place overseas (though 
usually requiring UK goods). In both case the contract value overstates x a because 
some of the contract will be spent overseas and such monies, which can generally 
be deemed local costs (including sub-contracting to third, ie. non-local, non-UK, 
parties), do not impact on the UK. The deduction for local costs varied from a 
minimum of 10 per cent, for direct exports and technical co-operation, to a 
maximum of 40 per cent for low technology, labour intensive, projects.
The ten per cent minimum may appear to overstate local costs on direct exports, of 
vehicles for example, or training, which often takes place in the UK, but allows for
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import taxes, transport charges and contract expenses. In the case of consultancy, 
which largely takes place in the LDC, or the export of equipment for assembly 
overseas, the minimum may appear too small. There were two types of project for 
which larger deductions were made (based on comments by representatives of firms 
which have won ATP contracts). First, 25 per cent was deducted in the case of 
large capital projects which involve high technology but also require a high labour 
input, such as the construction of power or process plant. Second, 40 per cent was 
deducted for large-scale, low technology and labour-intensive projects such as 
roads and irrigation.
A direct consequence of deducting local costs was to substantially reduce the 
implied commercial benefits of large projects. For example, Biwater's major rural 
water supply scheme in Malaysia had a contract value of £194m, with 1986 ATP of 
£59.5m, or thirty per cent, whereas the estimated export value was £116.5m 
reducing the export ratio to about two rather than above three. We largely avoid this 
problem by using the x a to estimate impact only; when considering the importance 
of ATP to companies, and its allocation to recipients, we refer to the contract value.
Allocation to Industries
The majority of the ATP projects are easily linked to the exporting industry since 
the data give a project description which identifies the commodity (which is the 10 
basis of definition of the export industry we use). There were slight difficulties for 
consultancy, training or feasibility contracts. First, if the company winning the 
contract is clearly part of an industry other than consultancy, the x a were allocated 
to the industry, eg. if GEC win an electrification feasibility study, it is allocated to 
ElEq. Second, if the award is for consultancy the allocation is to BSer, which 
includes consulting engineers, architects, etc. Finally, awards to an Institute, 
professional or Government organisation were allocated to RSer.
Allocation difficulties arose for some of the largest, usually construction, projects 
which were shared between two, or more, industries. Generally, after deducting 
local costs, 75 per cent was allocated to the principal contractor industry (frequently 
ElEq for power generation or transmission) and 25 per cent to the major supply
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industry for equipment sub-contracting (most frequently IPlt which includes the 
manufacture of metal structures for industrial, power and civil engineering 
projects).
Table B .l: ATP-Recipient Industries 1978-90
No. Industry Title SIC IQ
1 Industrial Plant and Steelwork (IPlt) (320) (33)
2 Textile, Woodwork etc. Machinery (TWMch) (323,7) (37)
3 Process Machinery and Contractors (PMch) (324) (38)
4 Mining, Construction etc. Machinery (MCMch) (325) (39)
5 Other Machinery, Mechanical Equipment (OMch) (328) (41)
6 Insulated Wires and Cables (IW&C) (341) (44)
7 Basic Electrical Equipment (ElEq) (342) (45)
8 Telecommunications Equipment (TIEq) (344) (47)
9 Motor Vehicles and Parts (Mot) (351,3) (52)
10 Shipbuilding and Repairing (Ships) (3610) (53)
11 Aerospace (Aero) (364) (54)
12 Other Vehicles (OVch) (362/3) (55)
13 Construction (Const) (50) (88)
14 Business Services (BSer) (8) (100)*
15 Research Services (RSer) (940) (101)*
16 Other Engineering (OEng) (3) (29-56)
17 Other Production (OPrd) (01-45) (1-28; 57-87)
18 Other Services (OSer) (6-9) (89-102 nes)*
NOTES: Industry titles and 10 numbers are those in the 1984 10 Tables for the UK 
(CSO, 1988) which correspond to the same industries in the 1979 Tables (Business 
Monitor, 1983) except fon 
* 10 100 in 198410 Tables was included with Banking and Financial Services in 1979
(10 97); 10 101 in 1984 was 10 99 in 1979. The aggregates Nos. 16 to 18 cover all 
10 industries not receiving ATP orders; the numbers in parenthesis refer to the 
section of the 10 Table covered but excludes any ATP-recipient industries within the 
stated range.
British Aid Policy 1978-89: Appendix B 250
Table B.2: Estimated ATP-supported Exports, 1978-86
INDUSTRY 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
£m £m £m £m £m
1. IPlt - 13.613 1.611 14.885 227.976
2 . TWMch - - 5.294 5.958 -
3. PMch - - - 0.169 -
4. MCMch - 25.938 - 0.017 11.250
5. OMch 0.050 - 6.615 28.969 -
6 . IW&C - 20.700 ■ - - -
7. ElEq - 26.775 39.026 18.207 234.928
8 . TTEq - 2.700 - 2.535 -
9. Mot 1.584 - 0.864 - 3.801
10. Ships - 16.200 24.300 - 12.186
11. Aero 3.150 2.700 4.856 - -
12. OVch 27.360 2.788 7.157 - 21.330
13. Const - - - 0.504 0.180
14. BSer - - 0.399 3.807 -
15. RSer - - - - -
TOTAL 32.144 111.414 90 .122 75 .051 511 .651
INDUSTRY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1978-86
£m £m £m £m £m
1. IPlt 18.606 26.951 9.382 22.128 33$.16
2 . TWMch • - - - - 11.25
3. PMch 0.181 0.918 0.953 31.569 33.82
4. MCMch 55.833 3.098 28.759 58.335 183.23
5. OMch 4.500 - 23.076 1.031 64.24
6 . IW&C - 93.600 - - 114.30
7. ElEq 14.975 90.436 0.073 56.462 480.88
8 . TIEq - 0.960 0.200 0.047 6.44
9. Mot - - - - 6.25
10. Ships - - 1.940 - 58.63
11. Aero ■- - 9.303 - 20.01
12. OVch - - - 6.375 65.01
13. Const - - 0.400 39.554 40.64
14. BSer 2.287 3.608 1.080 1.090 12.27
15. RSer 0.054 0.039 - 0.068 0.16
TOTAL 96.436  219 .610  75 .166  216 .659  1428 .25
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Table B.3: ATP Awards by Industry, 1987 to 1990
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T able B.4: The Potential Impact o f ATP in 1979
Industry w q ?a /^ i
£m £m %
1. IPlt 13.613 15.596 44.35 691.6 0.67
2. TWMch 0.0 0.101 53.15 5.3 0.01
3. PMch 0.0 0.114 42.38 4.8 0.01
4. MCMch 25.938 26.927 39.63 1067.2 0.98
5. OMch 0.0 5.434 49.62 269.6 0.12
6. IW&C 20.700 21.879 32.13 703.0 2.28
7. ElEq 26.775 28.733 56.74 1630.4 1.49
8. TTEq 2.700 3.726 54.79 204.1 0.14
9. Mot 0.0 0.837 42.88 35.9 0.01
10. Ships 16.200 17.029 70.17 1194.9 1.09
11. Aero 2.700 3.066 42.65 130.7 0.10
12. OVch 2.788 2.994 63.66 190.6 0.38
13. Const 0.0 1.244 48.45 60.3 0.01
14. BSer 0.0 2.583 68.61 177.2 0.02
15. RSer 0.0 4.734 153.52 726.8 0.03
16. OEng 0.0 10.760 49.00 527.2 0.06
17. OPrd 0.0 33.945 36.60 1242.4 0.03
18. OSer 0.0 16.459 147.94 2435.0 0.02
TOTAL 111.414 196.159 11297.3
Industry *cx V « i m a x a m a h a
£m % £m £m £m
1. IPlt 13.613 2.17 1.495 12.118 0.255
2. TWMch 0.0 - 0.010 -0.010 0.002
3. PMch 0.0 - 0.013 -0.013 0.002
4. MCMch 25.938 2.31 2.678 23.260 0.402
5. OMch 0.0 - 0.515 -0.515 0.096
6. IW&C 20.700 11.90 6.829 13.872 0.320
7. ElEq 26.775 3.80 3.863 22.912 0.505
8. TIEq 2.700 0.34 0.459 2.241 0.069
9. Mot 0.0 - 0.098 -0.098 0.014
10. Ships 16.200 4.60 2.202 13.998 -0.260
11. Aero 2.700 0.22 0.703 1.997 0.046
12. OVch 2.788 1.32 0.304 2.485 0.041
13. Const 0.0 0.064 -0.064 0.016
14. BSer 0.0 0.022 -0.022 0.143
15. RSer 0.0 0.018 -0.018 0.170
16. OEng 0.0 1.227 -1.227 0.188
17. OPrd 0.0 5.396 -5.396 0.412
18. OSer 0.0 0.709 -0.709 0.352
TOTAL 111.414 26.604 84.810 2.772
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Table B.5: Potential Im pact of ATP in 1983
Industry 4<x W<1 Qcd/4i
£m £m %
1. IPlt 18.606 23.662 28.76 680.5 0.76
2. TWMch 0.0 0.047 32.40 1.5 0.00
3. PMch 0.181 0.420 27.72 11.7 0.03
4. MCMch 55.833 60.151 27.04 1626.5 2.11
5. OMch 4.500 9.974 32.06 319.8 0.17
6. IW&C 0.0 0.451 23.97 10.8 0.04
7. ElEq 14.975 16.152 3837 619.8 0.65
8. TIEq 0.0 0.777 30.12 23.4 0.01
9. Mot 0.0 0.936 22.38 20.9 0.01
10. Ships 0.0 0.016 42.74 0.7 0.00
11. Aero 0.0 0.003 29.30 0.1 0.00
12. OVch 0.0 0.072 48.35 3.5 0.01
13. Const 0.0 0.925 32.80 30.4 0.00
14. BSer 2.287 8.805 49.54 436.2 0.03
15. RSer 0.054 0.626 107.97 67.6 0.00
16. OEng 0.0 10.147 29.52 299.5 0.04
18. OPrd 0.0 25.752 2237 581.1 0.01
19. OSer 0.0 18.282 100.46 1836.7 0.01
TOTAL 96.436 177.199 6570.5
Industry x a x a/ei m a x a m a h a
£m % £m £m £m
1. IPlt 18.606 3.51 2.456 16.150 0.341
2. TWMch 0.0 - 0.005 -0.005 0.001
3. PMch 0.181 0.04 0.025 0.156 0.008
4. MCMch 55.833 4.50 5.143 50.690 0.952
5. OMch 4.500 0.22 0.950 3.551 0.165
6. IW&C 0.0 - 0.109 -0.109 0.007
7. ElEq 14.975 1.30 2.208 12.767 0.252
8. TDEq 0.0 - 0.137 -0.137 0.009
9. Mot 0.0 - 0.186 -0.186 0.016
10. Ships 0.0 - 0.001 -0.001 0.000
11. Aero 0.0 -  - 0.001 -0.001 0.000
12. OVch 0.0 - 0.009 -0.009 0.001
13. Const 0.0 - 0.038 -0.038 0.010
14. BSer 2.287 0.08 0.054 2.233 0.374
15. RSer 0.054 0.01 0.006 0.049 0.022
16. OEng 0.0 - 1.341 -1.341 0.169
17. OPrd 0.0 - 4.017 -4.017 0.013
18. OSer 0.0 - ' 0.564 -0.564 0.348
TOTAL 96.436 17.251 79.185 2.686
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